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Abstract 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This master’s thesis examines whether the change from local U.K. GAAP to IFRS has any impact 
on acquisition premiums paid in the U.K. The purpose of the study is to identify critical changes in 
acquisition accounting and study whether related changes in future reported earnings are likely to 
impact premiums paid despite zero impact on the intrinsic target firm value. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The main sample consists of 178 acquisitions of control among firms listed in the U.K. between 
announcement dates of 1999 and 2012. Deal data is gathered from SDC, financial data from 
Worldscope and stock data from Datastream. The data is further complemented manually with 
CEO compensation, board stock holdings and purchase price allocation information from the 
annual reports of the acquirer for each transaction.  
The effect of variables related to IFRS is investigated using OLS regression with and without year 
fixed effects. The Baseline model is built from scratch by combining relevant literature and 
statistical methods to maximize adjusted r-square. The dependent variable in cross-sectional 
regressions is acquisition premium. The main hypothesis suggests that goodwill has a negative 
correlation with the premium paid and that effect is decreased after the adoption of IFRS. In 
addition the impact of CEO bonuses, managerial discretion in avoiding goodwill write-offs and the 
recognition of acquired finite life intangibles to acquisition premium is studied.  
 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
Before IFRS, goodwill variables correlate negatively and significantly with acquisition premiums. 
Although after the adoption of IFRS this association stays negative it is not significant anymore. 
Subsample analysis reveals that goodwill variables have significantly negative coefficients under 
U.K. GAAP only for transactions where CEOs have reported earnings related incentives. Goodwill 
recognised in business combinations is further significantly and positively correlated with 
acquisition premium for same transactions under IFRS. Results, however, do not support the view 
that organisationally complex firms could pay higher premiums after adopting IFRS due to 
increased managerial discretion in purchase price allocations. Results are relatively robust to an 
exhaustive number of control variables, alternative model specifications and variable 
transformations including Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformations, as well as eliminations of 
statistically significant outliers. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background  
On June 6, 2002, the Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU) issued an official 
statement that required all public firms in the EU to adopt International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) for their consolidated accounts by 2005
1
. The mandatory adoption of IFRS 
aimed to harmonise financial reporting standards across the EU and increase the quality of 
reporting standards. However, at the firm level it also significantly changed how business 
combinations are accounted for by introducing IFRS 3. IFRS 3 effectively removed amortisation 
of acquired goodwill by replacing it with yearly impairment testing similar to SFAS 142 
introduced in 2001 for U.S. firms. This removal of amortisation created an opportunity for firms 
to plan future impairments (see e.g. Ramanna and Watts, 2012) and increased subjectivity in 
allocating the cost of acquisitions in purchase price allocations (PPA) by introducing new 
intangible asset classes that would be recognised in business combinations.  
Regarding impairment management, AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares and Roberts (2011) find that 
managers in the United Kingdom (U.K.)  exercise discretion in the reporting of goodwill 
impairments consistent with the International Accounting Standard Board’s (IASB) objectives. 
Thus managers are conveying private information about future cash flows. While there is no 
strong evidence that goodwill impairment management in the U.K. is opportunistic, the findings 
of Detzen and Zülch (2012) with European data and Shalev, Zhang and Zhang (2013) with U.S. 
data, imply that managerial discretion in PPA has been used as an earnings management tool by 
managers with bonuses based on earnings.  
Additionally, there is consensus among IFRS researchers that while IFRS does not have a first-
order effect on firm valuation, market reactions to events suggesting adoption of IFRS have been 
positive (Armstrong et al. 2010). Similarly an acquisition of the firm can be described as an event 
where the acquirer applies a specific set of financial reporting standards to consolidate the target. 
According to Kallunki, Lantto and Sahlström (2008), the largest change in reporting standards, in 
terms of economic importance, has been the introduction of IFRS 3 concerning accounting for 
                                                 
1
 EU firms that (1) are listed in a non-EU exchange and use U.S. GAAP, (2) have only publicly traded debt or are 
listed on Alternative Investment Market (AIM) did not need to report under IFRS until 2007. 
2 
 
  
 
acquisitions and goodwill. Therefore, I wonder why, according to my knowledge, acquisition 
premiums have not been studied comprehensively from the perspective of changes in accounting 
for business combinations with any European control bid data? 
My thesis, which studies IFRS related changes in acquisition accounting and acquisition 
premiums with U.K. control bids, is related to the agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
as managers’ motives play a role in how much they are willing to pay for certain acquisitions. In 
other words, I assume that when amortisation of goodwill decreases future reported earnings and 
thus CEOs’ bonuses after acquisition, ceteris paribus, managers have an incentive to pay less for 
these acquisitions. Therefore, it is reasonable and interesting to study the impact of changes in 
future reported earnings on acquisition premiums due to the introduction of new reporting 
standards.  
1.2 Academic and practical motivation 
There are strong general level counter arguments against the idea that changes in accounting 
standards might have an actual effect on the firm’s value or acquisition premiums. For example, 
the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) published the following Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No. 1 in 1978: 
“Financial accounting is not designed to measure directly the value of a business 
enterprise, but the information it provides may be helpful to those who wish to estimate its 
value … Although financial reporting should provide basic information to aid them 
[investors, creditors, and others], they do their own evaluating, estimating, predicting, 
assessing, confirming, changing, or rejecting.” 
Another example is presented by the theory of an equity value of the firm. Equity valuation 
models discount expected future cash flows to equity-holders. Although Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986) agree that accounting numbers do in fact affect such cash flows via contracts, taxes, 
agency costs, and in some cases, regulation, Zimmermann (2013) later points out that the vast 
proportion of the firm’s expected cash flows to equity-holders are unaffected by accounting 
numbers. According to Zimmermann (2013) such cash flows derive from the firm’s underlying 
real economics, including its business strategy, R&D pipeline, taxes, competition and regulation, 
technology, and so forth. Zimmermann’s (2013) main argument is that external financial 
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reporting quality has at best a second-order effect on firm value of U.S. publicly traded firms, and 
that attempts to improve a firm’s external reporting quality have a third-order effect on these 
firms’ value. Zimmermann (2013) defines first-order effect as a large and significant effect. 
Furthermore, historically the evidence from several studies (e.g. French and Poterba, 1991; 
Speidell and Bavishi, 1992) indicate that accounting differences will fall short of explaining 
differences in regression estimation results. 
However, recent evidence from Finland suggests that acquisition accounting does matter, at least 
in the case of goodwill and acquisition premiums. For example, in an academic survey of the 
Finnish listed firms, Huikku and Silvola (2012) find that one key reason for not writing-down 
goodwill is off-balance-sheet buffer created from cash flows generated in good years as the 
highest value for goodwill is always its book value. One of their interviewed CFOs wondered 
how it is possible by changing the internal organisation of the firm to either avoid or make 
possible the impairment of goodwill when the business itself has not changed. That might be one 
reason why some of the write-downs do not happen. Other reasons might be incorrect usage of 
Gordon’s growth model and high terminal values. In addition to methodological issues, there is, 
according to Huikku and Silvola (2012) a possibility that the economic consequences (ability to 
pay dividends, equity ratio and debt covenants) of write-downs, the optimistic nature of the 
managers and the room for subjectivity can all act as motives for managers to either make the 
write-down or not.  
Perhaps, the most interesting part of the Huikku and Silvola (2012) study is related to acquisition 
premiums. Interviewed members of the management team accentuated that removing the straight-
line amortisation of goodwill has increased acquisition premiums in M&A transactions. Because 
there is no amortisation, EPS after the transaction is now higher than before IFRS was adopted, 
which in turn might justify higher premiums. Also the impairment of goodwill occurs generally 
when: A) acquisition has failed or B) management has changed. Both of these generally 
acceptable reasons for impairment are not usually quantified in the analysis of the deal value, 
because they are unpredictable by their nature.  
The effect of IAS 36 impairment testing of goodwill has also arisen ongoing debate across 
magazines in Finland. In recent years the topic has been seen on the Finnish business magazine 
Kauppalehti (14.9.2012 and 14.12.2012) and in multiple issues of the Finnish auditing magazine 
4 
 
  
 
(Tilintarkastus-lehti, issues: 6/2010, 1-3/2011, and 1-3/2012). In Finland according to 
Kauppalehti (14.12.2012), the number of listed firms with a large goodwill impairment risk has 
doubled in the last three years from nine to 18. Kauppalehti defines a firm with goodwill 
impairment risk as a firm with over 5 % of goodwill from the balance sheet total and below 1 P/B 
figure. Both the media and the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority (FIVA) have questioned 
why the number of write-downs of goodwill did not meet the expectations in 2009 even when the 
future outlook looked anything but promising (see FIVA market bulletin, 3/2010)
2
.  
1.3 Research questions  
This research is conducted to provide information about IFRS introduced changes in accounting 
for acquisitions and acquisition premiums in the U.K. The U.K. from the EU is chosen for this 
study, for three key reasons. First, it provides the largest sample of acquisitions among listed 
firms. Second, according to AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares and Roberts (2011) the absence of special 
transitional accounting treatments in the U.K. suggests that goodwill impairments are less likely 
to be affected by managerial incentives specific to the transition period, which increases the 
generalisability of results even during the transition period. Third, the U.K. is a common law 
country, where there exists very effective accounting enforcement and audit mechanisms in the 
IFRS period of my study (see e.g. Brown, Preiato and Tarca, 2014), which is the reason why it is 
possible for the potential benefits of the introduction of these changes to be attained (cf. Byard, 
Li and Yu, 2011; Brown, Preiato and Tarca, 2014). To provide information about the relation 
between IFRS and acquisition premiums, the research question of this thesis is formulated as a 
combination of three sub-questions: 
1) Did a goodwill related discount in premium for target firms exist in the U.K. before the 
introduction of IFRS? 
2) If there was a goodwill related discount in premium before the introduction of IFRS in 
the U.K., has that discount in premium decreased after the introduction of IFRS? 
3) What are the impacts of other factors such as CEO compensation, managerial 
discretion in purchase price allocations, and the recognition of finite life intangible 
assets on acquisition premium before and after the adoption of IFRS? 
                                                 
2
 http://www.finanssivalvonta.fi/fi/Tiedotteet/Markkinat/Documents/Markkinat_3_2010.pdf 
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To study the sub-questions presented above, I will first examine the relation between goodwill 
and acquisition premiums before and after IFRS while taking into account the most important 
control variables used in literature. Then I will study whether the CEO bonus incentives have any 
impact on the coefficients of goodwill before and after adoption of IFRS. The idea is that the 
change in goodwill accounting has caused a decrease in the discount in acquisition premium 
because it is no longer a requirement to amortise goodwill. That effect should be higher, ceteris 
paribus, when the acquirer’s CEO is enjoying accounting based bonuses as earnings related 
bonus is expected to increase. Also, I will employ proxy variables for managerial discretion to 
study their impact on the acquisition premium, namely number of segments, internal Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index and unverifiable net assets for the combined firm after acquisition based on the 
study of Ramanna and Watts (2012). They study unverifiable fair value accounting and goodwill 
write-offs under SFAS 142 and provide evidence that non-impairment of goodwill is increasing 
in firm characteristics predicted to be associated with greater managerial discretion. Finally, I will 
study whether the recognition of finite life intangible assets according to IFRS is value relevant 
and conveys new information to the market. In other words, I expect that finite life intangible 
assets are positively correlated with acquisition premium.  
From the methodological perspective, this thesis follows approximately the Bugeja and Loyeung 
(2011) study done on Australian firms, but focusing on U.K. firms and introducing a new and 
more comprehensive model with substantial increase in goodness of fit. Methodologies used 
include cross-sectional OLS regressions with year fixed effects. Additionally, I will test models 
for outliers and transform selected variables with Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformation to 
increase the normality of regression residuals as measured with the Shapiro-Wilk test. 
1.4 Contribution of this study 
The main contribution of this paper to existing financial literature is that my results indicate that  
goodwill is associated with successful control bid premiums in the U.K. Before IFRS, two out of 
three goodwill measures correlate negatively and significantly with acquisition premiums. 
However, after the adoption of IFRS this discount in premium decreases, although not 
significantly, and becomes insignificant. Furthermore, I show that this relation between two 
measures of goodwill and acquisition premiums only hold when the acquirer’s CEO has earnings 
based bonus targets and he has received bonuses in either of the two fiscal years prior to the 
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acquisition. Earnings targets are here defined to include earnings, operating profit, EPS and 
return on sales targets. Additionally, there is a weak level significance that the relation between 
the recognised amount of goodwill and acquisition premium is positive under IFRS for the same 
subsample of acquisitions. These are novel findings with any European data set and any data set 
regarding only control bids among listed firms.  
My results are similar to the results of Bugeja and Loyeung (2011), except that IFRS does not 
have a significantly positive impact on the coefficient of any goodwill measure in full sample 
analysis. Bugeja and Loyeung (2011) paper is the only similar study with an Australian data set, 
but their unpublished paper lack two key features that are likely to have an impact on their 
results. First, their sample consists of takeover offers instead of successful acquisitions of control, 
which is an important distinction due to the fact that goodwill is recognised only in business 
combinations. Second, my analysis presents considerable evidence that their model, at least with 
my data set, suffers from omitted variable bias. For example, when I apply their model, the 
adjusted R-squared drops significantly from my model’s 0.662 to 0.240, regression residuals 
violate the normality assumption and the amount of statistical outliers is doubled. 
This study also makes four additional contributions to the existing literature. First, I use three 
different measures for goodwill; goodwill on the balance sheet of the target, the amount of 
goodwill recognised in the transaction and the goodwill approximation used by Bugeja and 
Loyeung (2011). My results show that all of those measures can influence acquisition premiums 
paid. Second, the results of this thesis help to understand how new accounting standards can 
impact on a acquirer’s actions to pay higher or lower premiums for target firms despite the fact 
that the intrinsic value of the target remains unchanged. Third, this study adds to the small 
amount of accounting research that examines the relation between CEO bonuses and goodwill 
(e.g. Shalev, Zhang and Zhang, 2013; Detzen and Zülch, 2012). Fourth, I will introduce a new 
variable transformation method, which has rarely been used before in finance literature. The 
name of this method is Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformation (IHS) and it is a statistically more 
advanced method in transforming variables with negative values or zeros than using the basic 
logarithmic transformations. The amount of goodwill recognised, the amount of goodwill 
approximated to be generated from acquisition of the target firm and the return on equity are 
good examples of  variables with zero or negative values in this thesis. 
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1.5 Limitations of study 
Despite the clear contribution of my thesis it has at least two key limitations. First, observed 
measures for goodwill are not perfect and each of them has unique limitations. This imperfection 
is the reason why I have employed three measures of goodwill so that the reader has as 
comprehensive picture about the reality as possible. Second, the small sample size due to strict 
sample selection criteria and availability of data causes another rather serious limitation, which, 
however, I have partly tackled with an exhaustive number of controls and robustness tests 
regarding statistical outliers and transformations to increase the normality of regression residuals.  
Regarding different goodwill measures, the goodwill recognised in business combinations suffers 
from the endogeneity problem, which arises from the fact that an increase in the acquisition 
premium mechanically increases the amount recognised as goodwill and vice versa, which will 
increase the positive correlation between acquisition premiums and the recognised amounts of 
goodwill. This endogeneity problem makes it less likely to detect a discount in premium pre-
IFRS and more likely to observe that IFRS has a positive impact on acquisition premiums post-
IFRS. Regarding goodwill on the balance sheet of the target firm, it is rather rare to see it in the 
period before IFRS in the U.K. due to the fact that before 1999 all goodwill generated was 
written off against equity reserves instead of capitalisation. However, this measure correlates 
significantly at the 1% level with the actual goodwill to be generated in acquisitions without 
suffering from the endogeneity problem. It is worth noticing that goodwill in the balance sheet of 
the target firm is also part of the recognised goodwill, since its fair value in PPA is zero. 
The last measure of goodwill, namely the amount approximated to be recognised in the 
transaction, is perhaps the most controversial proxy for true goodwill. First, it is perfectly 
correlated with the market-to-book ratio and thus it resembles the fair value of growth assets. 
Second, it is significantly and positively correlated with the recognised amount of goodwill, 
because it measures, for example, the going concern goodwill of the target. Third, by  definition, 
it excludes the goodwill in the balance sheet of the target firm and thus is significantly and 
negatively correlated with it. Fourth, it also includes the intangible assets to be recognised in 
business combinations. These issues make approximation of goodwill the most inaccurate of the 
three goodwill measures used. Therefore, I will give it less weight than other measures. 
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The limitation of small sample size arises from the requirement that both the target and acquirer 
must be listed firms and the acquirer must consolidate the target as an acquisition after the 
transaction, i.e. I am studying only control bids. In addition there are 19 cases in which, the 
purchase price allocation (PPA) data in annual reports is not available. These cases are typically 
either cases in which A) the acquirer has acquired multiple acquisitions in the same fiscal year 
and the acquisition of the target has not been individually material
3
 and the information regarding 
PPA could not be estimated according to the method presented in Subchapter 5.3 or cases in 
which B) the acquirer has been acquired soon after the acquisition. My analysis is therefore most 
applicable for acquisitions where the target firm has a material impact on the acquirer and for 
other transactions that meet the requirements of my sample. In fact, my analysis is likely to be 
less relevant outside my sample, where target firms are often smaller and therefore have less 
impact on the acquirer. They are also often less liquid and in most cases even private, which 
makes them less likely to use IFRS or demand payment in equity. 
Additionally, there are external factors that are present in empirical studies, which prevent 
authors from making conclusions regarding causality of the relations studied and thus also my 
results need a vast amount of additional research before causality can be even mentioned. 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The second Chapter describes key acquisition 
accounting concepts under both IFRS and U.K. GAAP and introduces factors that influence 
interpretation of financial reporting standards. The third Chapter presents the main findings on 
studies regarding accounting and acquisition premiums, IFRS related studies, and discusses 
potential managerial motives related to the impact of reported earnings on acquisition premiums. 
The fourth Chapter introduces the hypotheses. The fifth Chapter describes the data and sample 
selection process. The sixth Chapter constructs variables. The seventh Chapter reviews important 
literature on the determinants of acquisition premium and constructs the variables used in this 
thesis. The eighth Chapter introduces the methodology employed. The findings from empirical 
analysis are shown in the ninth Chapter. The final Chapter concludes the paper and suggests 
future research topics. 
                                                 
3
 Under both FRS 6 and IFRS 3 only material transactions are required to be disclosed individually, otherwise the 
information should be given in aggregate. 
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2 Acquisition accounting under IFRS and U.K. GAAP  
This thesis studies changes in financial reporting due to the introduction of IFRS and their 
influence on acquisition premiums. Therefore it is of the utmost importance to know how 
acquisition accounting was regulated according to U.K. GAAP and how it is accounted under 
IFRS. As IFRS is at the centre of my thesis, I will first go through acquisition accounting under 
IFRS in Subchapter 2.1, while Subchapter 2.2 presents acquisition accounting under U.K. GAAP. 
Aforementioned Subchapters cover issues such as purchase price allocation, goodwill and 
intangible assets as the key issues in acquisition accounting. Subchapter 2.3 highlights the most 
relevant changes in acquisition accounting and their estimated impact on reported earnings and 
acquisition premiums. The final Subchapter 2.4 discusses factors that influence financial 
reporting practices and interpretation of new IFRS standards specifically in the U.K. This 
essential information is used when hypotheses are formed and the results interpreted, because the 
results depend on a large amount of country specific factors and the differences between old and 
new standards. For example, in Australia the adoption of IFRS decreased the number of 
intangible assets to be recognised, but in the U.K. the effect was the reverse. 
2.1 Acquisition accounting under IFRS 
This subchapter presents IFRS standards related to acquisitions. This is important as political 
decisions made by standard setters and politicians tend to somewhat influence the real market 
situations. They can for example introduce new regulation creating barriers to existing business 
procedures or allow new business opportunities by improving current ones with deregulation. 
The both aforementioned situations are present in the introduction of IFRS as it removed some 
constraints (removal of the amortisation of goodwill, increased subjectivity) and introduced new 
ones (increased the number of disclosures required and the number of intangible asset classes 
required to be recognised). In addition, IFRS eliminate merger accounting by prohibiting the 
pooling of interest method. Section 2.1.1 describes relevant goodwill accounting related 
standards, Section 2.1.2 covers intangible accounting in acquisitions and Section 2.1.3 presents 
the purchase price allocation (PPA) process. To give a detailed view of acquisition accounting, I 
have used the book by Epstein and Mirza entitled Interpretation and Application of IFRS 
published in 2005 as a basis for these aforementioned Sections. Finally, Section 2.1.4 summarises 
the key changes in IFRS during my sample period and concludes this subchapter. 
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2.1.1 Goodwill accounting under IFRS  
The main change in goodwill accounting under IFRS was the introduction of IFRS 3 (Business 
Combinations) on 1 April 2004, which removed the amortisation of goodwill. The removal of the 
amortisation of goodwill had the largest impact on firms’ income statements among all the 
changes required to implement the mandatory adoption of IFRS (see e.g. Kallunki, Lantto and 
Sahlström, 2008). Currently, the only accounting procedure regarding goodwill is the impairment 
testing of goodwill. In this section I will cover annual impairment testing of goodwill and 
intangible assets according to IAS 36 revised version effective at 31 March 2004.  
Goodwill arising from acquisitions must be recognised as an asset and should be reviewed at 
each balance sheet date to determine whether the asset has suffered any impairment. If goodwill 
is no longer deemed probable of being fully recovered through the profitable operations of the 
acquired business, it should be partially written down or fully written off. The impairment 
process for goodwill, however, is totally different from other assets as the direct evaluation of the 
recoverable amount of goodwill is not actually feasible. This difference comes from the fact that, 
unlike other intangible assets that are individually identifiable, goodwill is amorphous and cannot 
exist, from a financial reporting perspective, apart from the tangible and identifiable intangible 
assets with which it was acquired. Therefore, IAS 36 requires that goodwill be combined with 
other assets which together define a cash-generating unit, and that an evaluation of any potential 
impairment (if warranted by the facts and circumstances) is conducted on an aggregate basis. 
This is done by calculating and comparing the recoverable amount of each cash-generating unit 
with the goodwill allocated to that unit. If the recoverable amount is less than the carrying value, 
an impairment write-down must be made. An impairment loss is first absorbed by goodwill, and 
only when goodwill has been eliminated entirely, the carrying values of identifiable intangible 
and tangible assets can be adjusted accordingly. Any write-off of goodwill must be charged to 
expense and unlike other impaired assets it cannot be restored later as an asset. Acquired 
goodwill should not be mixed with the internally generated goodwill from existing operations 
before acquisition. However, it is important to point out that often especially for outsiders of the 
firm it is impossible to draw the exact line between internally generated goodwill, which should 
not be recognised, and acquired goodwill after the acquisition. Thus standard setters are 
concerned that in practice firms can use internally generated goodwill as a cushion against 
impairment of acquired goodwill (Epstein and Mirza, 2005). Another important thing according 
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to Epstein and Mirza (2005) is that in case of acquisitions less than 100%, the goodwill is 
recorded only for the price paid by the new parent firm in excess of the fair value of net 
identifiable assets attributable to the parent firm.  
2.1.2 Intangible asset accounting under IFRS 
Intangible asset accounting under IFRS is regulated by IAS 38 (effective at 31 March 2004). It 
stipulates that the cost of intangible asset acquired as part of a business combination is its fair 
value as at the date of acquisition. The fair value of the asset is based on the following hierarchy: 
1. Quoted market price in active market 
2. The amount that the enterprise would have paid for the asset in an arm’s length 
transaction at the date of acquisition 
3. If the cost cannot be measured reliably or the asset cannot be recognised as an 
identifiable intangible asset, it is included in goodwill 
After initial measurement acquired intangible assets are measured with either a cost model or a 
revaluation model. In the cost model, after initial recognition, an intangible asset should be 
carried at its cost less any accumulated amortisation and any accumulated impairment losses, 
while in the revaluation model assets are written up to fair value. However, the standard restricts 
the revaluation of intangible assets to freely tradable intangible assets by supporting only the 
quoted market price in an active market as the basis of revaluation. Thus, revaluation will not be 
applied to intangible assets without active markets such as patents and trademarks. Also, if some 
of the intangible assets in a given asset class are subject to revaluation, all the assets in that class 
should be consistently accounted for unless fair value information ceases to be available. 
It is important to notice that some assets can be classified as intangible assets, inventory or 
tangible assets depending on the use of the asset. For example software acquired for further sale 
is treated as inventory and software held for licensing or rental must be recognised as an 
intangible asset, while software purchased by an enterprise for its own use and which is integral 
to the hardware would be treated as a part of cost of the hardware and capitalised as property, 
plant, or equipment. Other software programs, which are not an integral part of the hardware and 
are used by the enterprise itself, should be recognised as intangible assets. A list of examples of 
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recognised intangible assets in my sample for U.K. GAAP and IFRS acquisitions can be seen in 
Table 8 in Subchapter 5.2, which presents descriptive statistics.  
After recognition, intangible assets are divided into two groups according to the expected 
economic life of the assets: those with finite life and those with indefinite life. An entity shall 
assess whether the useful life of an intangible asset is finite or indefinite and, if finite, the length 
of that useful life. An intangible asset shall be regarded by the entity as having an indefinite 
useful life when, based on an analysis of all the relevant factors, there is no foreseeable limit to 
the period over which the asset is expected to generate net cash inflows for the entity. This 
distinction is important as intangible assets with a finite life must be amortised over their useful 
economic life, which has a negative impact on the reported earnings of the combined firm.  The 
amortisation method used for these assets should reflect the pattern in which the economic 
benefits are consumed by the enterprise and it can be one of the same systematic and rational 
methods that are used to depreciate tangible fixed assets. IAS 38 seemingly permits straight-line, 
diminishing balance and units of production methods and if other than straight-line is used, it 
must accurately mirror the expiration of the asset’s economic service potential. An intangible 
asset has an indefinite life if there is no foreseeable limit to the period during which the asset is 
expected to generate future cash flows. Indefinite life intangibles are only subject to annual 
impairment reviews. 
IAS 36 controls the impairment of intangible assets. Indefinite life assets must be tested annually 
with impairment tests, as well as whenever there is an indication that the intangible may be 
impaired. The impairment process for intangibles, other than goodwill, is exactly the same as that 
used for long-lived tangible assets. Thus carrying amounts must be compared to the greater of net 
selling price or value in use, when there are indications that impairment has been suffered. 
Reversals of impairment losses under defined conditions are also recognised. The impact of 
impairment and reversals will be reflected in current period operating results, if the intangible 
assets in question are being accounted for in accordance with the cost method. With the 
revaluation method, impairments will normally be charged to stockholders’ equity to the extent 
that revaluation surplus exists and only to the extent that the loss exceeds previously recognised 
valuation surplus will the impairment loss be reported as a charge against earnings. 
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2.1.3 Purchase price allocation under IFRS 
According to IFRS 3 (effective at 2005), when the firm acquires majority interest from another 
firm it must allocate the cost of acquisition in a purchase price allocation process to all 
identifiable assets and liabilities valued at fair value at the effective date of the acquisition. The 
acquisition date is specified as a date when control of the net assets and operations of the 
acquired entity is effectively transferred to the acquirer. This definition is important as I only 
study acquisitions where the acquirer has acquired controlling interest of the target firm defined 
as percentage of shares acquired. In the purchase price allocation process, described in Figure 1 
below, the cost of acquisition is allocated in three phases to following items: net assets valued at 
fair value, identifiable intangible assets and goodwill.  
Figure 1 – Allocation of the cost of acquisition in business combinations 
 
This figure illustrates the three phases of allocation of the cost of acquisition in purchase price allocation process under IFRS 3. Existing goodwill 
is actually included in the book value of net assets, but since its fair value is zero it goes directly to recognised goodwill. Other assets behaving 
similarly include deferred tax items. This presentation is for illustrative purposes only and those boxes are not in size of the economic importance.  
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In the first phase from the left of Figure 1, the book values of already recognised assets and 
liabilities are adjusted to a fair level and then summed up together (assets – liabilities). The cost 
of acquisition consists of the sum of fair values of all different forms of considerations transferred 
to target firm shareholders, amount of non-controlling interests (if any), fair value of previous 
equity interests (if any) and acquisition-related costs. Acquisition-related costs include 
transaction costs such as legal and accounting fees, investment banking charges and depending 
on the terms of the acquisition also certain contingent consideration. In the second phase, new 
intangible assets such as patents, brand names and computer software are recognised. IAS 38, 
Intangible Assets, stipulates the key criteria for determining whether the intangible assets are to 
be recognised or not. In short, the criteria consist of identifiability and control of the asset, the 
flow of future economic benefits and ability to reliably measure the cost of the asset. 
However, when an intangible asset is acquired in a business combination, the identifiability 
criterion has the most significant role in enabling allocation to be made. This is probably due to 
the fact that the standard setter prefers that as many individual assets are recognised as possible, 
because the residual amount of unallocated acquisition cost is treated as goodwill, and it is less 
likely to be impaired than an identified asset, and provides less transparency to investors (Epstein 
& Mirza, 2005). Also, the criterion of control is straightforward as a consequence of the 
acquisition and the fair value assumption takes into account the probability of the future cash 
flow even with low probabilities. The future economic benefits can take the form of revenues 
from sale of products or services, cost savings, or other benefits resulting from the use of the 
intangible asset by the enterprise. The reliability in measuring the cost of the asset also plays a 
role because if the intangible asset cannot be measured reliably it is not recognised, but rather, is 
included in goodwill. While it reveals the fact that allocation of the cost of acquisition to 
goodwill has been made increasingly more difficult, in practice, according to evidence from 
Hamberg, Paananen and Novak (2011) with Swedish data, firms have been able to take 
advantage of the removal of the amortisation of goodwill and recognise even more goodwill in 
their balance sheets than ever before. 
In phase 3, the excess purchase price over the fair value of the net assets (including intangibles) 
is then allocated to goodwill. Similarly, if the fair values of the net identifiable assets obtained 
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exceed the price paid, then negative goodwill exists. As described in Figure 1, goodwill includes 
going concern goodwill, synergy benefits, overpayment due to managerial hubris and assets with 
zero fair value such as existing goodwill on the balance sheet of the target. Other assets with zero 
fair value include for example deferred tax items. IFRS 3 further specifies that in the case of step 
acquisitions, the cost of the acquisitions is measured with reference to the cost and fair value data 
at each stage, thus leading to a situation where at the date of each respective exchange, goodwill 
or negative goodwill would have to be recognised and at the end added together. After 
acquisition subsequent changes in the fair value of the contingent consideration should lead to 
adjustment of the amount of goodwill recognised. However, I will use values only from the first 
annual report reporting purchase price allocation, because I am interested only in acquisitions 
leading to consolidation.  
2.1.4 Revision of IFRS standards at 2009 – key changes 
Regarding this thesis, the revision of IFRS standards made four important changes to the 
following issues regarding acquisition accounting: step acquisitions, acquisition-related costs, 
contingent consideration and intangible assets. Regarding step acquisitions, the requirement to 
measure at fair value every asset and liability at each step for the purposes of calculating a 
portion of goodwill has been removed. Instead, goodwill is measured as the difference at 
acquisition date between the fair value of any investment in the business held before the 
acquisition, the consideration transferred and the net assets acquired. Acquisition-related costs are 
to be recognised as expenses rather than included in goodwill. This change in accounting for 
acquisition-related costs has an impact on the denomination of finite life intangible asset and 
goodwill variables (excl. recognised amount of goodwill) and it also decreases equally (in 
absolute terms) the values for both the denominator and nominator of goodwill recognised 
variable. The Contingent consideration is now required to be recognised and measured at fair 
value at the acquisition date, while before it was only measured if it was likely to become payable 
and could be measured reliably. Also, subsequent changes in fair value under the revised version 
of IFRS 3 are recognised usually in profit or loss rather than by adjusting goodwill. At the same 
time IAS 38 was revised and the possibility of using lack of reliability in valuation as an 
exceptional reason for not recognising an intangible asset was removed. These revisions are 
effective for annual periods beginning on or after 1 July 2009.  
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2.2 Acquisition accounting under U.K. GAAP 
In the U.K. before IFRS, accounting was regulated with national U.K. GAAP. Reporting 
standards issued to guide acquisition accounting include Financial Reporting Standard 6, 
Acquisitions and Mergers (FRS 6)
4
 and Financial Reporting Standard 7, Fair Values in 
Acquisition Accounting (FRS 7)
5
 issued by the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) in 1994. The 
other relevant standards regulating acquisitions were Financial Reporting Standard 10, Goodwill 
and Intangible assets (FRS 10) and Financial Reporting Standard 11, Impairment of fixed assets 
and goodwill (FRS 11) issued by the ASB in 1998. I will summarise the key issues from the 
aforementioned standards in Sections 2.2.1-2.2.3 in accordance with the webpage of the Financial 
Reporting Council, which is the U.K.’s independent regulator responsible for promoting high 
quality corporate governance and financial reporting.  
In my thesis, I will exclude mergers and focus only on acquisitions due to the different treatment 
of mergers and acquisitions in terms of goodwill recognition under FRS 6. In addition, it will 
increase the comparability of my results, because IFRS prohibit the use of pooling of interest 
accounting. There will be an endogeneity issue due to joint determination of accounting method 
and acquisition premium under FRS 6, but it is likely to be rather small due to the strict criteria 
regarding when merger accounting can be applied (see FRS 6 for more information). 
2.2.1 FRS 7: Fair values and goodwill in acquisition accounting  
FRS 7 sets out the principles of accounting for a business combination under the acquisition 
method of accounting. The objective of the FRS 7 is to ensure that: 
when a business entity is acquired by another, all the assets and liabilities that existed in 
the acquired entity at the date of acquisition are recorded at fair values reflecting their 
condition at that date; and that all changes to the acquired assets and liabilities, and the 
resulting gains and losses, that arise after control of the acquired entity has passed to the 
acquirer are reported as part of the post-acquisition financial performance of the acquiring 
group. 
                                                 
4
 http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Accounting-and-Reporting-Policy/Standards-in-Issue/FRS-6-
Acquisitions-and-Mergers.aspx 
5
 http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Accounting-and-Reporting-Policy/Standards-in-Issue/FRS-7-
Fair-Values-in-Acquisition-Accounting.aspx 
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The positive or negative goodwill recognised in purchase price allocation is the difference 
between the aggregate of the acquired entity’s fair values of identifiable assets and liabilities and 
the cost of that entity. This definition of goodwill seems to be in line with IFRS 3, but in fact 
there are differences especially in intangible asset accounting and in the definition of cost of 
acquisition. Fair value is the amount at which an asset or liability could be exchanged in an arm’s 
length transaction between informed and willing parties, other than in a forced or liquidation sale. 
In practice, unless fair values can be estimated at market value, the fair values of non-monetary 
assets will normally be based on replacement cost, but should not exceed their recoverable 
amount as at the date of acquisition. The recoverable amount is defined as the greater of the net 
realizable value of an asset and, where appropriate, the value in use. The identifiable assets and 
liabilities should be capable of being disposed of or settled separately, without disposing of a 
business of the entity. The cost of acquisition is simply the amount of cash or cash equivalents 
paid and the fair value of other purchase consideration given by the acquirer plus non-controlling 
interests and previously owned tangible fixed assets together with the expenses of the acquisition. 
By this definition there are no large and significant differences when compared to IFRS 
standards
6
. Therefore we must look closer at how potentially large differences such as 
recognition of acquired intangible assets and goodwill amortisation are accounted for according 
to FRS 10 in the next Section 2.2.2. 
2.2.2 FRS 10: Goodwill and intangible assets  
FRS 10 regulates goodwill and intangible asset accounting in the U.K. after it became effective 
for accounting periods ending on or after 23 December 1998 for British firms not using IFRS or 
other international standards. The objective of FRS 10 is to ensure that: 
a) capitalised goodwill and intangible assets are charged in the profit and loss account in 
the periods in which they are depleted; and 
b) sufficient information is disclosed in the financial statements to enable users to 
determine the impact of goodwill and intangible assets on the financial position and 
performance of the reporting entity 
                                                 
6
According to IAS 22, fair values of identifiable assets and liabilities acquired in an acquisition should be determined 
by reference to their intended use by the acquirer. Also, the revision of IFRS 3, effective at 1 July 2009, excludes 
acquisition expenses to be included in goodwill and the cost of acquisition. 
18 
 
  
 
The definition of intangibles under U.K. GAAP is significantly more limited than under IAS 38. 
The former only allows the recognition of intangibles that are controlled through custody or legal 
rights (e.g. trademarks, retail product rights and broadcasting licenses), while the latter also 
includes intangibles such as unpatented technology and trade secrets. Intangible assets are 
according to FRS 10 estimated based on its replacement cost, which will normally be the asset’s 
estimated market value. Other techniques are allowed to estimate the fair value of intangible 
assets when market values are not observable, but the standard states that if the value of an 
identifiable intangible asset cannot be measured reliably it should be subsumed within the 
amount of the purchase price attributed to goodwill. Hence, in theory, the proportion of the cost 
of acquisition allocated to goodwill under FRS 6 and FRS 10 should be larger than according to 
IFRS 3 and vice versa for intangibles. 
Under FRS 10 all intangible assets and goodwill are amortised over the useful economic life of 
an asset by using a straight-line method unless another method can be demonstrated to be more 
appropriate. For goodwill though, there is hardly any reason to use anything other than straight-
line depreciation. The useful economic life of an intangible asset is the period over which the 
entity expects to derive economic benefit from that asset and for purchased goodwill it is the 
period over which the value of the underlying business acquired is expected to exceed the values 
of its identifiable net assets. The useful economic life for both intangible assets and goodwill can 
further be defined either to limited or indefinite useful economic lives. When the useful economic 
life is classified to be limited, then that asset is normally amortised over a maximum period of 20 
years depending on the length of the useful economic life of an asset. This aforementioned 
presumption may be rebutted and a useful economic life regarded as a longer period or indefinite 
only if: 
a) the durability of the acquired business or intangible asset can be demonstrated and 
justifies estimating the useful economic life to exceed 20 years; and  
b) the goodwill or intangible asset is capable of continued measurement (so that annual 
impairment reviews will be feasible) 
It is important to point out that in the U.K., there was a possibility before IFRS to not amortise 
goodwill when the useful economic life was regarded as an indefinite period. Therefore, I will 
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check for each acquisition under U.K. GAAP whether the acquirer will amortise goodwill in the 
following fiscal years or not and input this information in a dummy variable.  
2.2.3 FRS 11: Impairment of fixed assets and goodwill 
FRS 10 presented in the previous Section 2.2.2 and FRS 11 together regulate the impairment of 
goodwill. FRS 11 became effective for accounting periods ending on or after 23 December 1998 
for British firms. The objective of FRS 11 is to ensure that: 
a) fixed assets and goodwill are recorded in the financial statements at no more than their 
recoverable amount; 
b) any resulting impairment loss is measured and  recognised on a consistent basis; and 
c) sufficient information is disclosed in the financial statements to enable users to 
understand the impact of the impairment on the financial position and performance of 
the reporting entity. 
The impairment of goodwill and intangible assets that are amortised over a finite period not 
exceeding 20 years are reviewed for impairment at the end of the first full financial year 
following acquisition and when events or changes in circumstances indicate that the carrying 
values are not recoverable. Impairment must be based on expected future cash flows. Goodwill 
and intangible assets with longer periods are reviewed for impairment at the end of each reporting 
period. The first year impairment for goodwill is done in two stages following FRS 10. First, by 
comparing post-acquisition performance in the first year with pre-acquisition forecasts used to 
support the purchase price, possible impairment is identified. Second, if the initial review 
indicates that the post-acquisition performance has failed to meet pre-acquisition expectations or 
if any other previously unforeseen events or changes in circumstances indicate that the carrying 
values are not recoverable, then the firm must perform a full impairment review in accordance 
with the requirements of FRS 11 (Impairment of fixed assets and goodwill) introduced in 1998. 
According to FRS 11, the carrying amount of net assets in the income-generating units and the 
purchased goodwill is compared with the recoverable amount. If the carrying amount is higher, 
impairment should firstly be allocated to goodwill, secondly to any capitalised intangible asset in 
the unit and finally to the tangible assets in the unit on a pro rata or more appropriate basis. 
Recoverable amount is defined as the higher of the amount that could be obtained by selling the 
asset (net realisable value) and the amount that could be obtained through using the asset (value 
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in use). The impairment testing in subsequent years is also done following the regulation in FRS 
11.  
2.3 Summary of the key differences in accounting for business combinations 
This subchapter briefly summarises Subchapters 2.1 and 2.2 by presenting the key standards in 
accounting for business combinations under U.K. GAAP and IFRS. Based on this information 
hypotheses are developed in Chapter 4 in combination with the information in Chapter 3 
regarding empirical findings. These accounting differences are presented in Table 1 below. 
Table 1 – Summary of the key differences in accounting for business combinations 
This table presents the key differences in accounting for business combinations and their estimated impact on earnings and acquisition premiums 
under U.K. GAAP and IFRS. 
Topic U.K. GAAP IFRS 
Effect on 
earnings 
Theoretical 
effect on 
acquisition 
premiums 
Goodwill 
accounting 
Generally amortized, but indefinite life can be 
assumed if the durability of the acquired 
business can be demonstrated and it justifies 
estimating the useful economic life that exceeds 
20 years. Impairment only method is used for 
indefinite life goodwill. 
Impairment only method. Positive Positive 
Intangible asset 
recognition in 
PPA 
Only intangible assets, which are controlled 
through legal rights or custody can be 
recognised. In addition FRS 10 stipulates that if 
the value of identifiable asset cannot be 
measured reliably (e.g. with observable market 
values) it should be subsumed within the amount 
of the purchase price attributed to goodwill. 
The idea of IAS 38 is to recognise as 
many individual intangible assets as 
possible to increase transparency to 
investors. IAS 38 allows intangible 
assets to be valued with the amount 
representing price paid in arm's 
lenght transaction. Also, it only 
requires that acquirer controls the use 
of intangible asset as a result of its 
past actions and events. 
Negative Positive 
Intangible asset 
accounting 
Generally amortized, but indefinite life can be 
assumed if the durability of intangible asset can 
be demonstrated and it justifies estimating the 
useful economic life that exceeds 20 years. 
Impairment only method is used for indefinite 
life intangibles. 
Intangible asset have an indefinite 
life when there is no foreseeable limit 
to the period over which the asset is 
expected to generate net cash inflows 
for the entity, otherwise useful life is 
finite. Finite life intangibles are 
amortized and indefinite life 
intangibles are only tested for 
impairment. 
No effect No effect 
Acquisition 
expenses in PPA 
Acquisition related costs are included in 
goodwill. 
After 1 July 2009, acquisition related 
costs are expensed immediately. 
Negative No effect 
Mergers Under FRS 6, merger accounting was approved 
for “merger of equals” if five specific criterion 
was met. In these cases, pooling of interest 
method was used and thus no goodwill was 
recognised in transaction. Therefore these 
transactions do not meet the scope of my thesis. 
IFRS 3 required all acquisitions to be 
accounted using purchase accounting 
and prohibited the use of pooling of 
interests method previously used for 
mergers. 
Negative Negative 
The key conclusion from Table 1 is that the first two topics regarding goodwill accounting and 
recognition of intangible assets have the largest theoretical effect on acquisition premiums. The 
effect of goodwill accounting changes is positive, because goodwill is no longer being amortised, 
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while the effect of intangible asset recognition is more related to general value relevance of 
recognised intangible assets despite the negative impact on reported earnings. The negative 
impact on earnings is based on the larger amount of finite life intangibles to be recognised under 
IFRS (see Subchapter 5.2 for evidence based on my sample). In my thesis I will focus more on 
finite life intangibles, because the number of finite life intangibles is expected to increase after 
the adoption of IFRS. In addition their value is often more difficult for outsiders to observe than 
for example indefinite life brands. 
2.4 Key factors influencing interpretation of IFRS in the U.K. 
This subchapter will provide important background information regarding factors influencing 
accounting practices in the U.K. This is important because according to Ball (2001) an 
accounting system is: A) a complementary component of the country’s overall institutional 
system and B) determined by firms’ incentives for financial reporting. Factors in general 
associated with financial reporting quality include, but are not limited to, the legal system’s effect 
on a country’s financial system (La Porta et al., 1998), the tax system7, ownership structure8, the 
political system (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006), capital structure (Sun, 2006), capital market 
development (Ali and Hwang, 2000) and the role of the accountancy profession (Troberg, 2007). 
Furthermore Soderstrom and Sun (2007) add in their paper that as a result of the interdependence 
between accounting standards and the country’s institutional setting and firm’s incentives, the 
economic consequences of changing accounting systems may vary across countries. Thus results 
for U.K. based data are more or less country specific due to a different level of accounting quality 
even across the users of IFRS in the EU. 
As pointed out in the introduction, the U.K. has a highly developed set of legal institutions, legal 
enforcement systems and financial markets. In addition the U.K. has a long history with True and 
Fair View (TFV). TFV is a broad concept in which accounts are reported with the aim of 
providing unbiased information about activities that affect a company’s intrinsic value (Ekholm 
and Troberg, 1998). The TFV concept was invented in the U.K. and spelled out for the first time 
in the 1948 Companies Act: 
                                                 
7
 See e.g. Guenther and Young (2000), and Haw et al., (2004) 
8
 See e.g. Ball and Shivakumar (2005), Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006), and Fan and Wong (2002) 
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True and fair view shall override all other requirements for the Companies Act as to 
matters to be included in a company’s financial reports. This means that information not 
specifically required by law must be provided in order to give a true and fair view.  
Thus the TFV concept has been a part of English law and central to accounting and auditing 
practice in the U.K. for many decades, despite the fact that there has been no statutory definition 
of true and fair
9
. However, the introduction of IFRS was a large step towards conformity with 
GAAP and that has created a tension between the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the U.K. 
and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). This tension created by significant 
changes in accounting standards and company law, led some to question whether the views about 
TFV, expressed in legal Opinions written by Lord Hoffmann and Dame Mary Arden in 1983 and 
1993, still remain applicable. In these circumstances the FRC commissioned a further legal 
opinion written by Martin Moore QC on October 3, 2013: 
Directors must consider whether, taken in the round, the financial statements that they 
approve are appropriate. Similarly, auditors are required to exercise professional 
judgment before expressing an audit opinion. As a result, the Opinion confirms that it will 
not be sufficient for either directors or auditors to reach such conclusions solely because 
the financial statements were prepared in accordance with applicable accounting 
standards. 
This conflict is a great example of how IFRS influence financial reporting and how the use 
of IFRS is influenced by historical accounting practices in the U.K.  
Another important factor shaping accounting in the U.K., in addition to TFV, is the fact that the 
U.K. is a market-oriented common law country. In market-oriented systems there are numerous 
diverse investors without direct access to company information and therefore investors are likely 
to rely heavily on financial reporting disclosures to obtain information to be used in valuation of 
securities and in the monitoring of management (see e.g. Berglöf, 1990; Mueller, Gernon and 
Meek, 1994). Therefore, U.K. firms are likely to interpret IFRS in a way that delivers as value 
relevant information as possible. My view is supported by Ali and Hwang (2000), who find that 
the value relevance of financial reporting is high for countries where the financial system is 
                                                 
9
 https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Codes-Standards/Accounting-and-Reporting-Policy/True-and-Fair.aspx 
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market-oriented; where private sector bodies are involved in the standard setting process; where 
accounting practices follow the British-American model, where tax rules have no great influence 
on financial accounting measurements; and where spending on auditing services is relatively 
high. 
As Troberg (2007) notes, the common law system originated in England and is developed from 
case law. It is developed case by case and does not prescribe general rules that could be applied 
to several cases. Accounting rules, however, are not part of the law, but accounting regulation is 
in the hands of professional organisations in the private sector. Typically company law in these 
countries is kept to a minimum. Bartov, Goldberg and Kim (2005), describe that in common law 
countries (e.g. in the U.K.), accounting rules are determined largely by the disclosure needs of 
shareholders and prospective shareholders. The problem of asymmetric information between 
managers and shareholders is addressed through financial reporting and other means of timely 
public disclosure. In the common law environment, accounting standards are generally separated 
from tax laws and they evolve by becoming commonly accepted practice. 
Studies by Francis, Khurana and Pereir (2003) and Hope (2003) find that common law countries 
(e.g. the U.K.) have stronger accounting standard enforcement mechanisms than code law 
countries (i.e., the rest of the EU). The international accounting literature further indicates that 
accounting quality is higher in countries with a common law origin
10
, and enforcement 
mechanisms appear to influence the expected quality of financial reporting under IFRS
11
. Barth, 
Landsman and Lang (2008) also conclude that the potential benefits of the introduction of IFRS 
are difficult to attain without the existence of effective enforcement mechanisms (cf. Byard, Li 
and Yu, 2011; Brown, Preiato and Tarca, 2014). 
By acknowledging the aforementioned issues, I know that my results are likely to apply strongly 
only to firms in the U.K. as it is reasonable to assume that all country related factors with respect  
to reporting quality stay the same in one country or change only gradually. Therefore, the results 
of this study are mainly influenced by a combination of the adoption of IFRS, changes in the 
general market situation and firm specific factors (e.g. ownership structure and capital structure).  
                                                 
10
 See e.g. Ali and Hwang (2000), Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000), and Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) 
11
 See e.g. Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000), Ball (2006), Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008), Byard, Li and Yu (2011), 
Dao (2005), and Daske et al. (2008) 
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3 Theoretical background 
In this chapter the theoretical grounding of my topic is presented. Subchapter 3.1 summarises 
what has already been researched about the association between accounting and acquisition 
premiums and lays the grounding for my thesis. Subchapter 3.2 presents relevant literature 
regarding the impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS. It specifically concentrates on intangible 
assets and acquisitions. Subchapter 3.3 ends this chapter by discussing the motives for managers 
to pay a higher or lower premium for some target firms after the adoption of IFRS.  
3.1 Financial reporting and acquisition premiums 
This subchapter presents current information about how financial reporting can influence the 
target firm value in the market for corporate control. Recall from Introduction Chapter the 
arguments of Zimmermann (2013) who state that external financial reporting quality has at best a 
second-order effect on firm value of U.S. publicly traded firms, and that attempts to improve a 
firm’s external reporting quality have a third-order effect on these firms’ value. Because firm’s 
value at stock market is based mainly in its ability to generate future cash flows and/or pay 
dividends to shareholders it is reasonable assume that Zimmermann (2013) is correct. However, 
Zimmermann (2013) limits his arguments to firms’ value in exchanges with rational investors 
and does not consider acquisitions, where the motives of the acquirer’s management influence 
offer premiums. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that the evidence from studies regarding 
external financial reporting and acquisition premiums indicate an association between financial 
reporting and acquisition premiums. I will provide this evidence in more detail in this subchapter. 
I will present the current information regarding the association between accounting and 
acquisition premiums in order of importance in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. Section 3.1.1 discusses 
the main evidence regarding the association between IFRS and acquisition premium. It presents 
findings from two studies authored by Bugeja and Louyeung (2011) and Bozos, Raitnaike and 
Alsharairi (2014). After that, Section 3.1.2 summarises the main findings from the U.S. regarding 
the relation between acquisition accounting choice and acquisition premiums. 
3.1.1 The association between IFRS and acquisition premiums 
The literature on the association between IFRS and acquisition premiums is scarce. According to 
my knowledge there are currently only two papers authored by Bozos, Ratnaike and Alsharairi 
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(2014) and Bugeja and Loyeung (2011). Bozos, Raitnaike and Alsharairi (2014) focus on 
European transactions where at least 20% of the target is acquired, while Bugeja and Loyeung 
(2011) study offer bids with Australian data. Of these two papers, the Bugeja and Loyeung 
(2011) paper is more important as it also focuses on the effect of changes in goodwill accounting, 
while the other paper study the overall influence of IFRS due to improvements in harmonisation 
of reporting standards and value relevance of accounting information.  
In more detail, the study by Bugeja and Loyeung (2011) on Australian acquisitions, including 
both private and public bidders, examines the relation between goodwill accounting and 
acquisition premiums before and after the adoption of IFRS. They find that the correlation before 
IFRS is significantly negative, thus implying that bidding firms lower their acquisition premium 
when there is greater target firm goodwill. Furthermore, they find that the adoption of IFRS 
eliminates the negative relation. The authors further show that this change in the relation between 
acquisition premiums and goodwill post-IFRS only exist for bidding firms that have a CEO 
accounting based performance plan in place. They attribute this change in relation to the adoption 
of impairment only method in accounting for goodwill. In more detail, they explain that 
impairment only method removed the income decreasing effect of goodwill amortisation, which 
had direct personal financial consequence to CEOs with an accounting based performance plan in 
place. Such CEOs also received post-IFRS the most financial benefit from the change in 
accounting method from annual goodwill amortisation to impairment testing.  
Bugeja and Loyeung’s (2011) study, however, raise four critical issues that I am going to discuss 
here. First, they do not present any information about the industry distribution of their sample. 
Thus financial firms with different revenue recognition criteria may influence their results. 
Second, they remove 340 observations with negative goodwill and the size of these observations 
is substantial compared to their final sample of 380 observations after the removal of firms 
reporting with non-Australian GAAP and acquisitions with missing data. Third, the accounting 
based performance plan dummy is a noisy measure as firms can have a number of different 
accounting based targets, which are not further specified in Bugeja and Loyeung’s (2011) study. 
Also, it do not incorporate information about how much in bonuses it is expected to be paid in the 
acquisition year. Fourth, they use only one goodwill variable, which is the approximation of 
goodwill to be generated on acquisition. This variable is in fact an approximation of the total 
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value allocated in the purchase price allocation process in all the three different phases. As 
described in Section 2.1.3, the first phase shows the allocation of the cost of acquisition to the 
value of net assets plus fair value adjustments of the net assets; the second phase represents the 
recognition of intangible assets and the third allocation of the rest of the cost of acquisition to the 
goodwill only if there is anything left to be allocated. Thus, especially under IFRS it is not a very 
precise proxy variable due to increased number of intangible assets to be recognised (see 
descriptive statistics in Subchapter 5.2). In conclusion, I think that it is important to study this 
topic in more detail in order to shed some light on these issues. 
While Bozos, Ratnaike and Alsharairi (2014) do not focus on separate accounting changes and 
their effect, their study show how the adoption of IFRS affects merger premiums in the European 
Union with a sample of deals among listed firms from 2000 to 2011 (incl. the U.K.). They 
discover that merger premiums decrease for targets using IFRS and attribute this to the increases 
in quality, transparency and comparability of company reports due to harmonisation of 
accounting standards across Europe. They also find that this effect is stronger, when the target 
firms’ accounting standards are further away from IFRS.  
The most important difference between their study and this thesis is that they focus on the overall 
influence of changes in the target firms’ value relevance of accounting information, while I focus 
solely on the correlation between changes in acquisition accounting and acquisition premiums 
from the perspective of the ultimate acquirer. Another important issue is that their study do not 
separate results for U.K. acquisitions and their sample also includes acquisitions of associated 
companies, while my sample is formed only from acquisitions of controlling interests. Finally, 
their IFRS dummy receives value one where the target has adopted IFRS, while it is the other 
way round in my study. These distinctions, therefore, make it impossible to compare their results 
with mine and thus I have not based any hypothesis on their findings. 
3.1.2 U.S. studies regarding the association between  accounting choice and 
acquisition premiums 
In this section I will review the key literature regarding the association between accounting 
choice and acquisition premiums in U.S. The main hindrance with these studies is that they suffer 
from endogeneity problems as the accounting method choice and takeover premiums and jointly 
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determined (Bugeja and Loyeung, 2011). Before the adoption of SFAS 141 and SFAS 142 in 
2001 acquirer could either use pooling-of-interest accounting for stock-for-stock financed 
acquisitions or purchase accounting. For other transactions only purchase accounting was 
allowed. Firms had clear incentive to favour pooling-of-interest accounting over purchase 
accounting. The main benefit of pooling-of-interest accounting was that acquirers could report 
lower total assets and higher net income relative to the purchase method by combining the book 
value of net assets together without recognising or amortising goodwill. Purchase accounting is 
similar with the accounting treatment under U.K. GAAP and thus the difference between 
purchase price and fair value of net assets is recorded as goodwill, which is amortised yearly. 
Prior literature provides evidence that managers have incentives to finance acquisitions with 
common stock to qualify for the pooling-of-interest accounting and are willing to incur 
significant costs to achieve this goal, including paying higher acquisition premiums and 
accepting restrictions on stock repurchases (e.g. Lys and Vincent, 1995; Aboody, 2000; Ayers, 
Lefanowicz and Robinson, 2002; Weber, 2004). Robinson and Shane (1990) investigate whether 
the aforementioned benefits derived from accounting method are reflected in acquisition 
premiums for target firms. Their sample consists of 95 stock-for-stock acquisitions of which 59 
are accounted for as poolings, and 36 accounted for as purchases. The results of Robinson and 
Shane (1990) show an association between acquisition accounting method and acquisition 
premiums for target firms. They report that acquisitions accounted for as poolings involved 
higher average acquisition premiums than acquisitions accounted for as purchases. However, it is 
important to point out that Robinson and Shane (1990) also remind reader that the benefits 
associated with accounting method are difficult to isolate, difficult to measure, and some may be 
obtained with either the purchase or the pooling method. The findings of Ayers, Lefanowicz and 
Robinson (2002) provide further support. They study a relatively homogeneous set of 523 U.S. 
non-taxable stock-for-stock combinations from 1990 through 1996 that could potentially qualify 
as either purchases or poolings.  After controlling for economic differences across pooling and 
purchase transactions their analysis indicate that higher acquisition premiums are associated with 
the pooling method. 
To summarise, information in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 suggests that there is an association 
between reporting standards and acquisition premiums. The current evidence shows that 
28 
 
  
 
association is either based on the improved value relevance of accounting information (Bozos, 
Ratnaike and Alsharairi, 2014) or to method used in accounting for business combinations (e.g. 
Robinson and Shane, 1990; Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson, 2002). 
3.2 Relevant literature regarding to impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS 
This subchapter shows relevant accounting literature findings on the impact of mandatory 
adoption of IFRS. First, Section 3.2.1 presents general findings about the impact of mandatory 
adoption of IFRS. Second, I will go through studies, which research the increased managerial 
discretion in goodwill accounting after the adoption of IFRS in Section 3.2.2. Third, I will cover 
studies focusing on IFRS and other intangible assets, in Section 3.2.3. Section 3.2.4 finalises this 
subchapter and shed a light on the connection between IFRS and M&A activity. 
3.2.1 Current information about the overall impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS 
This section aims to combine key findings from the extensive literature studying the impact of 
mandatory adoption of IFRS to give the reader a broad level understanding about the significance 
of IFRS. Firstly, IFRS/IAS provides more information (Ali and Hwang, 2000; Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000). Secondly, it is associated with improved analyst forecast accuracy and 
reduction in dispersion
12
. Thirdly, financial information under IFRS is more transparent and 
decision useful (Davis-Friday and Skaife, 2009) than financial information under national 
GAAPs. Furthermore, market reactions to events suggesting an increase in the likelihood of 
mandatory IFRS adoption are positive (Armstrong et al. 2010). Previously mentioned authors 
argue that these benefits of IFRS adoption could result from improved accounting 
quality/comparability. The findings of Brochet, Jagolinzer and Riedl (2013) support the view 
regarding improved comparability, when separately tested among U.K. firms. Results, however, 
regarding accounting quality and IFRS are somewhat contradictory. For example, Barth, 
Landsman and Lang (2008) find that voluntary adopters exhibit decreased income smoothing and 
increased timeliness of loss recognition after adoption, thus pointing to improved accounting 
quality. However, when Ahmed, Neel and Wang (2013) study the same proxies, they find that 
accounting quality decreased after mandatory IFRS adoption for IFRS adopters in strong 
                                                 
12
 See e.g. Glaum et al. (2013), Cotter, Tarca and Wee (2012), Jiao et al., (2012), Horton, Serafeim and Serafeim 
(2013), and Byard, Ying and Yu (2011) 
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enforcement countries and interpret that the difference between the results could be due to 
differences between voluntary and mandatory adopters. 
However, it is important to notice that the benefits are likely to depend on the firm and country 
specific factors, of which U.K. specific factors that influence interpretation of IFRS are discussed 
in Subchapter 2.4. Regarding the impact of firm specific factors, Daske et al. (2013) examine 
liquidity and the cost of capital effects around voluntary and mandatory IAS/IFRS adoptions and 
focus on the firm-level heterogeneity in the economic consequences. They recognise that firms 
have considerable discretion in how they implement the new standards and classify firms into 
“label” and “serious” adopters using firm-level changes in reporting incentives, actual reporting 
behaviour, and the external reporting environment around the switch to IAS/IFRS. They find that, 
while on average liquidity or cost of capital often do not change around IAS/IFRS adoptions, 
“serious” adopters are associated with an increase in liquidity and a decline in cost of capital, 
whereas “label” adoptions are not. Thus their findings imply that caution must be exercised when 
interpreting capital-market effects around IAS/IFRS as they also reflect changes in reporting 
incentives or in firms’ broader reporting strategies, and not just the standards. Due to the small 
sample size, my results are vulnerable to firm specific factors regarding the interpretation of 
IFRS, although this impact is mitigated by the fact that all firms from my sample are from a 
common law country (the U.K.), where there exist very effective accounting enforcement and 
audit mechanisms in the IFRS period of my study (see e.g. Brown, Preiato and Tarca, 2014)).  
3.2.2 Studies related to managerial discretion in goodwill impairments under IFRS 
Recall from Section 2.1.1 that IFRS 3 requires the testing of goodwill for impairment annually or 
more frequently if events or changes in circumstances indicate that the asset might be impaired. 
The intention of the impairment only approach is to provide users with more useful and value-
relevant information regarding the underlying economic value of goodwill. However, this 
approach has been criticised by academics, practitioners, and dissenting IASB members because 
of the managerial discretion inherent in the process of testing goodwill for impairment, and the 
resulting blending of acquired goodwill and internally generated goodwill (Massoud and Rajborn, 
2003; Watts, 2003). Thus managers can either use the discretion to convey their private 
information on future cash flows or opportunistically exploit unverifiable accounting discretion 
to extract rents from other contracting parties.  
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Motivated by the above debate, AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares and Roberts (2011), examine managers’ 
use of discretion by using a sample of 528 firm-year observations drawn from the top 500 U.K. 
listed firms for 2005 and 2006. In more detail, they investigate the extent to which proxies for 
economic impairment, managerial discretion, and effective corporate governance mechanisms 
explain the magnitude of goodwill impairment losses. They find that managers are actually 
exercising discretion in the reporting of goodwill impairments consistently with the IASB’s 
objectives and thus they are conveying private information about future cash flows. Their 
conclusion is based on their results, which suggest that goodwill impairments 1) are more likely 
to be associated with recent CEO changes, income smoothing, “big bath” reporting behaviours 
and 2) strongly associated with effective governance mechanisms. Also consistently with IASB’s 
objectives, Chalmers, Godfrey and Webster (2011) find that the association between firms’ 
goodwill charges against income and the firms’ investment opportunities was stronger during the 
IFRS regime than under systematic amortisation required by the Australian GAAP regime. 
IFRS 3 has enabled managers to use discretion in determining goodwill impairments and when 
they decide to make impairment, current results suggest that it happens because firms need to 
convey value-relevant information regarding the underlying economic value of goodwill. 
However, the manager’s decision to use managerial discretion and not impair goodwill in 
situations where the manager knows that in fact there has been decline in the economic value of 
goodwill under IFRS, has not been studied according to my knowledge. The reason for this is that 
for the outsiders of the firm it is not possible to observe managers’ unbiased expectations 
regarding the future performance of a cash-generating unit that includes goodwill, which would 
be the ideal economic variable (Riedl, 2004). Previous researchers
13
 have instead used empirical 
proxies to capture the economic impairment of firm-wide goodwill. However, AbuGhazaleh, Al-
Hares and Roberts (2011) argue that the problem with these measures and especially the MTB 
ratio is that they can be noisy measures as firms that perform poorly at the firm level are able to 
avoid impairment if the cash-generating unit performs particularly well and vice versa. While the 
manager’s decision to not make impairment under IFRS has not been studied, Jarva (2009) and 
Ramanna and Watts (2012) examine samples of non-impairing firms under SFAS 142, which 
also removed the amortisation of goodwill, to find out whether managers act opportunistically 
                                                 
13
 e.g. Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996), Riedl (2004), Beatty and Weber (2006), Lapointe-Antunes, Cornier and 
Magnan (2008), Zang (2008), AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares and Roberts (2011) 
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when avoiding the impairment of goodwill. Jarva (2009) fails to find convincing evidence that 
those non-impairment firms in his sample are opportunistically avoiding impairments. On the 
other hand, the results of Ramanna and Watts (2012) provide evidence that non-impairment of 
goodwill is increasing in firm characteristics predicted to be associated with greater managerial 
discretion (number of size of reporting units and unverifiable net assets in reporting units).  
3.2.3 IFRS and intangibles other than goodwill 
As covered in Sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.2, IAS 38 expanded the list of intangible assets to be 
recognised in business combinations in the U.K. The situation was similar in Norway, where 
Gjerde, Knivsflå and Sattem (2008) examine the impact of IFRS reconciliation adjustments to the 
value relevance of accounting figures compared to Norwegian GAAP from the restatement year 
2004. Their most important finding related to my topic is that increased value relevance of the net 
operating income stems from different reporting of intangible assets. Thus they provide evidence 
that capitalizing intangible assets is more value relevant than expensing them as incurred or 
through goodwill amortisation. Oliveira, Rodrigues and Craig (2010), study the value relevance 
of the amounts for identifiable intangible assets and goodwill reported in the financial statements 
of all non-finance firms listed on the main market of the Portuguese Stock Exchange from 1998 
to 2008. A distinctive change in accounting after adoption of IAS 38 and IFRS 3 was that listed 
firms in Portugal were no longer required to recognise some intangible assets (such as start-up 
costs and research expenditures) and were no longer required to amortise goodwill. They find that 
the IAS/IFRS had no impact on the value relevance of identifiable intangibles as a whole, but that 
when the subclasses of intangible assets are considered, they report evidence of an increase in the 
value relevance of goodwill, other intangible assets, and research and development expenditures. 
The amortisation and capitalisation of finite life intangibles simultaneously with the impairment 
only procedure for goodwill has a negative effect on the managers’ willingness to recognise finite 
life intangibles in business combinations. This effect and its impact on the bonuses of CEO has 
been studied by Detzen and Zülch (2012) with European data and Shalev, Zhang and Zhang 
(2013) with US data. Detzen and Zülch (2012) argue that the discretionary valuation of intangible 
assets, provided by the introduction of IFRS, translates into discretion regarding the recognition 
of goodwill, which is an item that is all the more interesting for managers due to its impairment 
only accounting treatment. The authors show that managers with increasing cash bonus intensity 
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recognise more goodwill. Shalev, Zhang and Zhang (2013) find that more goodwill is reported by 
acquirers, where CEO has earnings based targets in their bonuses under SFAS 141. These two 
pieces of research imply that managers use the discretion provided by the IFRS 3 
opportunistically as an earnings management tool to avoid amortisation of finite life intangibles. 
3.2.4 IFRS and M&A activity 
Ashbaugh and Davis-Friday (2002) undertook probably the earliest study on high quality 
international financial reporting standards and M&A activity. They find that for firms cross-listed 
on the London Stock Exchange, adopting IFRS or U.S. GAAP increases the likelihood of the 
firms becoming M&A targets. According to Soderstrom and Sun (2007) this leads to two 
interpretations. One interpretation is that higher quality financial reporting allows outsiders to 
better identify acquisition targets, leading to more acquisitions of firms using IFRS or U.S 
GAAP. Another alternative, but not mutually exclusive, interpretation of these results is that 
firms that want to be acquired adopt more transparent accounting standards. Furthermore, 
Soderstrom and Sun (2007) argue that both interpretations suggest that a more transparent 
accounting environment facilitates merger and acquisition activity. The empirical tests of Davis-
Friday and Skaife (2009) show that aforementioned issues are robust even after controlling for 
both firms’ specific characteristics such as growth, performance, leverage, size, ownership 
structure and for other characteristics such as within-country, across-country and within-industry 
M&A transactions. Their results indicate that firms domiciled in countries with less expropriation 
risk and less M&A regulation are more likely to be targets. However, they do not find a 
statistically significant relation between the legal system and the likelihood of being a target.  
3.3 Motives for managers to pay higher or lower premium for some target firms 
after adoption of IFRS 
This subchapter aims to answer the question of why acquirers would be willing to either 
underestimate or overestimate the true intrinsic value of the target in certain transactions. First, I 
will discuss the role of incentive contracts in guiding managerial behaviour in Section 3.3.1. 
Second, I will cover two alternative hypotheses in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 that aim to help in 
understanding the connection between changes in reported earnings after acquisition and 
acquisition premium. Altogether, the purpose of this subchapter is to provide a theoretical link 
33 
 
 
 
between political changes in accounting standards due to the adoption of IFRS and the economic 
impact of those changes on acquisition premiums paid in transactions.  
3.3.1 Information asymmetry and the role of management accounting bonuses 
Information asymmetry is a problem between two contracting parties, where one party has more 
knowledge than the other party, for example the seller of the car has more information about the 
quality of the car than the buyer of the car (Akerlof, 1970). In the context of this thesis, 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders plays a crucial role in terms of 
adverse actions taken by managers as a consequence of either agency motive or hubris. For 
example, assuming that shareholders know the same information that managers know, then for 
managers to pull off harmful actions would be difficult, but that is not the case in reality.  
One solution to the information asymmetry problem is compensation contracts, which are made 
to provide incentives for managers to engage in voluntary disclosures (Healy and Palepu, 2001) 
and to align the interests of managers and shareholders, thus working as a mechanism for solving 
the manager-shareholder agency problem (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). To promote managerial 
effort, compensation contracts typically include A) fixed compensation that does not depend on 
performance, B) equity-based compensation that depends on the performance of the firm’s stock 
price (shares and options), and C) performance-based compensation that depends on firm 
performance as measured by accounting metrics (Frydman and Jenter, 2010). Accounting-based 
bonuses are of particular interest in this case because only some of them can be affected by the 
changes in accounting standards. Those that are affected by the amortisation of goodwill are 
earnings-based performance measures and financial ratios, while non-earnings-based 
performance measures such as cash flows or sales are not affected or are less affected.  
The aforementioned issues have in fact two important implications regarding this thesis. First, 
managers prefer targets for acquisitions, which will increase the welfare of the management the 
most (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993). Second, the relative importance of accounting-based 
bonuses in a CEO’s pay package is an important determinant of the proportion of the purchase 
price allocated to goodwill under fair value accounting (e.g. after IFRS), driven by the impact of 
tangible and identifiable intangible asset depreciation or amortisation to managers’ post-
acquisition bonuses (Shalev, Zhang and Zhang, 2013). As write-offs of goodwill impairment are 
infrequent (Ramanna and Watts, 2012), recording more goodwill generally leads to higher post-
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acquisitions earnings. Even an increase in the likelihood of future impairment write-off is only 
expected to have a minimal impact on the bonuses. For example, Dechow, Huson and Sloan 
(1994), and Gaver and Gaver (1998) suggest that CEOs’ cash pay is shielded from non-recurring 
losses such as goodwill impairment. However, impairment of goodwill will have a negative 
impact on the CEOs’ equity-based pay due to negative market reactions (Li et al., 2011; Bens, 
Heltzer and Segal 2011). Therefore managers with a high relative importance of earnings based 
accounting bonuses in their compensation package are motivated to overstate the amount of 
goodwill recognised after the adoption of IFRS (Detze and Zülch, 2012). This is based on the 
assumption that bonus plans often include mechanical earnings-based formulas (e.g. Murphy, 
1999), whereas other forms of compensation are less likely to increase with earnings inflation 
(Shalev, Zhang and Zhang, 2013). The findings of Bugeja and Loyeung (2011) with Australian 
data are also very important. They find out that only firms where CEO has accounting based 
bonuses in place pay a goodwill related discount in acquisition premium before introduction of 
IFRS and that same firms significantly increase their bids as a consequence of the adoption of 
IFRS. Furthermore, the relative importance of accounting-based pay is positively associated with 
the extent of earnings management (Larcker, Richardson and Tuna, 2007). The impact of 
accounting based bonuses on managers’ behaviour related to mergers and acquisitions is further 
elaborated in following Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, which presents two competing hypotheses: the 
management welfare hypothesis and the earnings dilution hypothesis.  
3.3.2 Management welfare motive 
Management welfare motive belongs to a group of motives for managers to engage in 
acquisitions under agency motives. Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) point out that under agency 
motive acquirers identify targets that are most suited to increase the welfare of the acquirer’s 
management. It is important to point out that management welfare can lead to either opportunistic 
behaviour of management or under efficient contracting to shareholder value-maximisation.  
From all of the managers’ incentives under agency motive only management welfare explains the 
reason why managers pay less money for targets with significant amount of goodwill in their 
balance sheet. This is because before IFRS, amortisations of goodwill were likely to decrease 
management’s accounting based bonuses and after amortisation of goodwill was removed by the 
introduction of IFRS 3, there was no reason for managers not to favour targets generating large 
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amounts of goodwill assuming that write-downs could be avoided. That should in turn increase 
the premium paid for those firms as now the demand for firms with either large amount of 
goodwill in their balance sheet or generated on acquisition should be at least equal to other firms 
considering the preference of managers to overstate the amount of goodwill after adoption of fair 
value accounting as discussed in previous Section 3.3.1. However, all other reasons to engage in 
M&A are of course important and likely to impact on my results as, according to Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1993), the synergy motive, the agency motive and the hubris motive are all likely to 
be present in all samples regarding M&A transactions. The next Section 3.3.3 discusses the 
earnings dilution hypothesis as another explanation for the potential behaviour of managers. 
3.3.3 Earnings dilution motive 
Both a competing and related hypothesis to the management welfare hypothesis is earnings 
dilution hypothesis. In short it means that managers prefer to avoid earnings dilution and it is also 
the single most important factor in determining whether to issue equity (Graham and Harvey, 
2001). Even financial theory suggests that it is irrelevant in firm valuation (see Modigliani and 
Miller 1958; Brealey, Myers and Allen, 2007). Huang, Marquardt and Zhang (2014) find that 
managers increasingly try to avoid earnings dilution when their bonus compensation explicitly 
depends upon earnings per share performance, which is often the case. Their findings are robust 
after controlling for endogeneity in compensation contract design and behaviour explanations 
related to investor sentiment and clientele effects. Given their findings I assume that there is a 
similar effect in case of acquisitions, where the managers select targets, determine bid prices and 
leverage after acquisition to make sure that EPS for combined firms is not significantly lower 
than before the acquisition. A good example of target selection guided by earnings dilution is the 
acquisition of higher EPS targets to increase the EPS for one’s own firm even in cases when there 
are no significant synergies. This hypothesis can explain why firms might pay more for targets 
after the introduction of IFRS. The reason for that is the increase in post-acquisition EPS figures 
as a consequence of the removal of the amortisation of goodwill, which is in line with the 
findings of Huikku and Silvola (2012). This impairment only approach also increases managers’ 
EPS based bonuses and generally prevents further dilution of EPS caused previously by 
amortisation. Thus, I expect that managers with earnings based bonuses pay lower premiums for 
acquisitions that decrease reported earnings especially before the introduction of IFRS.  
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4 Hypotheses  
The goal of the empirical study is to generate answers to the three research questions introduced 
in the first Chapter. After examining U.K. GAAP and IFRS accounting standards, the influence 
of changes in acquisition accounting standards and managers’ incentives, I can now formulate 
research hypotheses to examine the association between IFRS and acquisition premiums in the 
U.K. In course of the analysis of the empirical study, I verify (i.e. validate or reject) these 
hypotheses and develop explicit answers for the three research questions. For these hypotheses I 
will use data from acquisitions among listed firms in the U.K. from 1999 to 2012. 
First, I begin with an investigation of the existence of the goodwill related discount in acquisition 
premiums in the U.K. before the introduction of IFRS. Second, I analyse the impact of the 
introduction of IFRS on the goodwill related discount in acquisition premiums. Third, I test 
whether results apply only when acquirer’s CEO has earnings based bonus incentives. Fourth, I 
study managerial discretion measured with initial flexibility in PPA and draw conclusions about 
its potential impact on acquisition premiums. Furthermore, I aim to shed some light on the value 
relevance of new standards in the context of acquisitions. In more detail I aim to test whether the 
recognition of finite life intangible assets seems to convey new information to the market by 
being positively correlated with the premium paid on acquisitions.  
As explained in Section 2.2.2, under U.K. GAAP firms in general had to amortise accumulated 
goodwill over its useful economic life. The findings of Bugeja and Loyeung (2011) indicate that 
the amount of goodwill approximated to be generated on acquisition decreases the premium paid 
under accounting standards that amortise goodwill. Additionally, I will also measure goodwill 
with the amount of goodwill on the balance sheet of the target firm and the amount of goodwill 
recognised in business combinations. I will examine this relation between goodwill measures and 
acquisition premiums using the first hypothesis: 
 H1: There is a negative correlation between measures for goodwill and acquisition 
premium before the adoption of IFRS for listed firms in the U.K. 
If I can validate H1, then I will continue to the hypotheses for the research question 2.  
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The mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005 changed the association between goodwill and 
acquisition premium by removing the amortisation of goodwill. Regarding this effect, Bugeja and 
Loyeung (2011) find that the association between goodwill and acquisition premium hold only 
for firms which use accounting based bonuses in CEO compensation and before 2005 there is no 
discount in premium for firms without accounting based bonus system in place. They state that 
the reason for this is that accounting based compensation creates a link between amortisation of 
goodwill and manager bonuses. However, in formulation of my Hypothesis 3, I lean towards the 
findings of Detzen and Zülch (2012) and Shalev, Zhang and Zhang (2013) regarding PPA under 
IFRS 3 and SFAS 142. The former find that CEOs whose cash bonus in the previous years before 
acquisition is between 150% and 200% recognise more goodwill, while the latter find that 
allocation to goodwill increases when acquirer’s CEO has bonuses based on the increase in 
earnings. Based on these findings, I expect that the link between goodwill and acquisition 
premiums is strongest when the CEO of the acquirer can expect to receive bonuses (i.e. bonuses 
have been paid in either of the two years prior to acquisition) and bonus targets are based on 
earnings.  
Alternatively, managers want to avoid unnecessary earnings dilution for various reasons such as 
other compensation contracts, debt covenants or ability to keep dividend pay-out ratio in check. 
For example, Graham and Harvey (2001) state that earnings dilution is the single most important 
factor in determining whether to issue equity or not. Therefore the existence of such a relation 
between goodwill and acquisition premiums may not only be limited to a case where a manager 
has an earnings based bonus system in place. To test the existence of the influence of IFRS on 
acquisition premium, I formulate the following hypotheses to answer  research question 2: 
 H2: The mandatory adoption of IFRS decreases goodwill related discount in 
acquisition premium for transactions, where the acquirer has adopted IFRS standards.  
 H3: Correlations tested with H1 and H2 regarding goodwill and acquisition premium, 
only hold when acquirer’s CEO expects to receive bonuses based on reaching earnings 
related targets. 
Ramanna and Watts (2012) discover that initial flexibility in purchase price allocation is 
associated with the CEO’s decision to make write-downs in goodwill. Thus, it is reasonable to 
argue that CEO’s with higher initial flexibility can pay a higher premium for acquisitions as they 
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do not have to fear the negative impact of goodwill impairment in case of failure. However, 
because in this thesis higher initial flexibility is measured for example with the number of 
business segments, it means that those firms with more initial flexibility than others are 
conglomerates. For conglomerates, there has been historically diversification discount
14
 in the 
market and therefore there is an increased pressure for conglomerate firms not to overpay. For all 
acquirers, the amount of unverifiable net assets on the balance sheet increases the subjectivity of 
the managers and information asymmetry between outsiders and insiders of the firm (Ramanna 
and Watts, 2012). Following Detzen and Zülch (2012), I measure all these variables for the 
combined firm after acquisition. I expect that this increased value in the option of whether to 
make or not to make impairment under IFRS standards translate to increase in premium in both 
cases. Therefore I introduce the next hypotheses for the research question 3: 
H4: For organisationally complex firms the impact of IFRS on acquisition premium is positive. 
H5: The amount of unverifiable net assets on the balance sheet of the combined firm after 
acquisition has a positive impact on the acquisition premium after adoption of IFRS. 
Finally, I am going to shed light on the usefulness of the intangible assets to be recognised in 
business combinations. The literature
15
 suggests that intangible assets are generally value 
relevant. If intangibles are not already incorporated in the value of the target firm, then the 
coefficient for intangible assets should be positive. I will here focus on finite life intangible 
assets, because they are much more common in my sample. However, I do not expect that IFRS 
per se impacts the coefficient of finite life intangible asset variable, because only the criteria for 
recognition have changed, but not the accounting for those assets, unless the assets recognised 
convey less value than assets recognised under U.K. GAAP. The differences in value relevance 
of finite life intangibles, however, cannot be studied reasonably due to small amount of finite life 
intangibles in the U.K. sample. Therefore my last hypothesis is as follows: 
H6: Based on the value relevance of the recognition of intangible assets, I assume that the 
recognition of finite life intangible assets is positively correlated with acquisition premium.  
                                                 
14
 See e.g. Berger and Ofek (1995), Lang and Stulz (1994), Comment and Jarrell, 1993, and Servaes (1996) 
15
 See e.g. Godfrey and Koh (2001), Ritter and Wells (2006) and Chalmers, Clinc and Godfrey (2008) 
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5 Data 
To study the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4, I have collected my sample as thoroughly and in 
as detailed a way as possible. Therefore the data for this study is a combination of different 
pieces of data obtained from Worldscope, Datastream, SDC and different reports published by 
the acquirers in my sample. In the next Subchapter 5.1, I will discuss data and sample selection in 
more detail and define variables employed in my regression models. In Subchapter 5.2, I will 
present descriptive statistics relating to all the variables on which my empirical analysis is based. 
In Subchapter 5.3, I discuss in more detail the process of manually collecting data and in 
Subchapter 5.4, I report the process used to check potential errors in my sample. Finally in 
Subchapter 5.5, I conclude the chapter and present the limitations of data. 
5.1 Data, sample selection and definition of variables 
This subchapter presents information regarding data, sample selection process and defines the 
variables used in this thesis. Acquisition data for this thesis is gathered from the Thomson One 
Banker SDC Premium M&A database. To be included in my final sample, a transaction must 
have been completed; the first announcement date must lie between 1 January 1999 and 31 
December 2012; the target must be a U.K. public firm; the acquirer must be either a public firm 
or a subsidiary of a public firm; the acquirer or target must not operate in the financial sector 
(SIC codes between 6000 and 6999, excluding firms operating in the real estate sector with SIC 
codes of 6798, 6552, 6531 and 6512); deal value is $1M or higher and the acquirer must 
consolidate the target firm’s balance sheet after the transaction by using acquisition accounting. 
This last criterion eliminates 18 observations related to transactions accounted as mergers under 
FRS 6. As already mentioned in Subchapter 2.2 the strict criteria for merger accounting to be 
employed together with the small number of mergers within the U.K. GAAP period effectively 
indicates that endogeneity arising from the joint determination of acquisition method and 
acquisition premium is small. Furthermore missing data is handled listwise.  
Following general practice in empirical research in accounting and finance
17
, I have also 
excluded those transactions from my sample where either the target or the acquirer has negative 
equity. The reason for this is the disturbance of negative equity stocks especially for variables 
                                                 
17
 See e.g. Fama and French (1992), Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Griffin and Lemmon (2002) 
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such as leverage, market-to-book and return on equity, which are included in all of the regression 
models used in this thesis. In total, 15 observations were removed from the data of which 10 
occurred before IFRS and five after the adoption of IFRS. My sample construction process is 
described in Table 2, which shows the number of observations obtained after a rigorous sample 
formation procedure. Originally reported accounting data came from Worldscope, stock market 
data from Datastream, while the information for purchase price allocation, accounting standards 
employed in consolidation, CEO compensation and acquirer’s board of directors’ ownership is 
hand-picked from annual reports, offer documents or listing documents. 
Table 2 – M&A sample construction 
This table presents sample selection and elimination processes used to construct the sample for Replica and Baseline models. *Requirements to 
collect sample were: 1) International M&A transactions between announcement dates of 1999 and 2012, 3) transaction must be completed, 3) 
target is a public firm, 4) acquirer is a public firm or a subsidiary of a public firm, 5) targets, acquirers and possible acquirers’ ultimate parent are 
U.K. firms and 6) after transaction it is required for the acquirer to consolidate the target i.e. before acquisition acquirer owns less than 50% of the 
target, but after acquisition acquirer controls majority of the firm. 
Transactions meeting above mentioned requirements* 363 
Exclusions in order of occurrence:     
 
Transactions accounted as merger when consolidated by the acquirer 18   
Transaction accounted as a purchase of assets 1   
Joint acquisition 1   
Missing company identifiers, or identifiers are same for both target and acquirer (incl. reverse acquisitions) 14   
Transactions with deal value less than $1M 2   
Missing target stock price data 4   
Missing annual report data 19   
Missing financial data 6   
Incorrect information/does not meet sample requirements 9   
Financial firms (excl. REITs) 41 
 
Negative equity stocks 15  
Extremely influential outlier removed 1 (131)  
Total available sample size   232 
  
Missing data for each regression model:   
1) Replica model   (53) 
Total sample size to estimate Replica model 179 
   
2) Baseline model   (54) 
Total sample size to estimate Baseline model 178 
Taking the above-mentioned restrictions into account leaves an initial sample of 232 acquisitions. 
Observations where no complete set of data is available for each model are removed according to 
listwise deletion process, which decreases the number of observations to 179 for the Replica 
sample and 178 for the Baseline sample. The Replica model employs the variables used by 
Bugeja and Louyeung (2011) for comparative purposes and the Baseline model is built from 
scratch to maximise adjusted R-squared and F-test given the group of test variables used in the 
literature (in total 54 variables were tested). Due to different variables, samples are slightly more 
unequal than the difference of one observation in sample size suggests and therefore I will treat 
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them separately throughout my thesis. My final sample sizes are comparable with numbers 
reported in the literature: Renneboog and Zhao (2014) show that 545 acquisition announcements 
that involved public bidders and targets took place over the period from 1999 to 2012 (of which 
approximately 82% were completed). My sample requirements are more restrictive but include 
subsidiary acquirers because I require acquisitions to be completed and consolidated after the 
announcement. The consolidation requirement is important because only then must the acquirer  
recognise goodwill from the transaction according to both U.K. GAAP and IFRS. 
Lastly, having the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index variable, based on the reported segment net sales 
figure for the combined firm after acquisition, adds other restrictions to those regression models 
that employ the variable in question. Net sales based HHI reflects the degree to which the net 
sales are concentrated in just a few of a company’s business segments (calculation with examples 
is shown in Section 6.3.1). Following the approach used in diversification discount literature (e.g. 
Berger and Ofek, 1995; Schmid and Walter, 2009), I assume that net sales are usually completely 
allocated among the reported segments of a diversified acquirer and therefore, I require that the 
sum of segment net sales must be within 25% of total sales for the acquirer. This requirement 
drops 4 observations from models with the HHI variable in addition to 12 missing observations 
due to lack of segment sales and the number of segments data. Negative net sales figure for a 
segment is a sign of discontinued operations, and thus negative net sales segments are excluded 
when calculating HHI by transferring the negative values to other segments on a pro rata basis, 
which ensures that the sum of segment net sales should be equal to the total net sales for the 
acquirer. Discontinued segments for the acquirer can be for example unwanted segments acquired 
in acquisition, which are then sold separately. The definitions for all dependent variables, key 
independent variables and control variables are presented in Table 3 below. 
Table 3 – Variable definitions 
This table provides the definitions of variables used in Tables 9-16. Also the source for these variables is provided. 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent variable  
Acquisition 
premium 
The natural logarithm of the final offer price divided by the target share price 42 days before original 
acquisition announcement date. Target share price is adjusted for splits and dividends. 
SDC, Datastream 
 
Key independent variables  
TGT  
Goodwill 
The balance sheet value of goodwill for the target firm divided by the consideration paid Worldscope, ARs, 
partially hand-
collected 
Goodwill  
approxima- 
tion 
The target firm market value of equity 42 days before original announcement date minus the book 
value of equity, divided by the book value of equity 
Datastream, 
Worldscope 
42 
 
  
 
Recognised  
goodwill 
The recognised balance sheet value of goodwill divided by the consideration paid ARs, hand-
collected 
IFRS A dummy variable that takes on the value of one if acquisition is accounted according to IFRS and is 
otherwise zero 
ARs, hand-
collected 
Finite life  
intangibles 
The recognised amount of finite life intangible assets divided by the consideration paid ARs, hand-
collected 
VNA The ratio of (cash + investments – debt – preferred equity) to (assets – liabilities), measured for the 
combined firm in fiscal year t+1 
Worldscope 
UNA VNA*(-1) Worldscope 
ModUNA │(1-│VNA│)│ Worldscope 
Segment The natural logarithm of the number of business segments for combined firm in fiscal year t+1 Worldscope 
HHI The Herfindahl-Hirschman ratio of business segment sales for combined firm in fiscal year t+1 Worldscope 
Market information  
Runup -1 – 
42 
The target runup expressed as (r−1-r−42)/r−42, where ri is the value of total return raw index on day i. 
Total return raw index is adjusted for stock splits and dividends. 
Datastream 
FTSE 100 P/E 
ratio 
The P/E ratio for the FTSE 100 index 42 days before the announcement of the offer for the target 
firm 
Datastream 
 
Deal characteristics  
Multiple  
bidders 
A dummy variable that takes on the value of one if there was a competing bid from a rival or a 
revised bid from the initial bidder and is otherwise zero 
SDC 
Friendly A dummy variable that takes on the value of one if target management's response is friendly SDC 
Cash only A dummy variable that takes on the value of one if payment method is cash only and is otherwise 
zero. 
SDC 
Share only A dummy variable that takes on the value of one if payment method is share only and is otherwise 
zero. 
SDC 
Toehold % The percentage of common, or common equivalent, shares outstanding held by the acquirer as of the 
announcement date. 
SDC 
Initial  
agreement 
A dummy variable that takes on the value of one if initial reception by the target is agreed and is 
otherwise zero. 
SDC 
 
Target characteristics  
TGT MTB The ratio of the target firm's market value of equity 42 days before original date announced to the 
average book value of equity in fiscal year t-1 
Datastream, 
Worldscope 
TGT Insider  
ownership  
% 
The percentage of shares held by insiders of target firm at the end of the fiscal year t-1 Worldscope 
TGT ROE The ratio of the target firm's net income to the average book value of equity in fiscal year t-1 Worldscope 
TGT  
Leverage 
The ratio of the long-term debt of a target firm to its common equity (incl. liquidation preferred 
stock) at the end of the fiscal year t-1 
Worldscope 
TGT Size The natural logarithm of target firm's total assets at the end of the fiscal year t-1 Worldscope 
TGT FCF The cash flow from operations less dividends, divided by total assets for target firm in fiscal year t-1 Worldscope 
TGT  
Growth 1  
year 
The rate of growth of net sales or revenues for target firm in fiscal year t-1 Worldscope 
 
Acquirer characteristics  
ACQ MTB The ratio of the acquirer's market value of equity 42 days before original date announced to the 
average book value of equity in fiscal year t-1 
Datastream, 
Worldscope 
ACQ Insider  
ownership  
% 
The percentage of shares held by insiders of acquirer at the end of the fiscal year t-1 Worldscope 
ACQ ROE The ratio of the acquirer's net income to the average book value of equity in fiscal year t-1 Worldscope 
ACQ  
Leverage 
The ratio of the long-term debt of a acquirer to its common equity (incl. liquidation preferred stock) 
at the end of the fiscal year t-1. 
Worldscope 
ACQ Size The natural logarithm of acquirer's total assets at the end of the fiscal year t-1 Worldscope 
ACQ FCF The cash flow from operations less dividends, divided by total assets for acquirer in fiscal year t-1 Worldscope 
ACQ Board  
ownership £ 
The value of the acquirer shares owned by the acquirer board of directors at the fiscal year end t-1 ARs, hand-
collected 
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Panel A of Table 4 presents the number of acquisitions and summary statistics about deal 
valuations for both the Replica and Baseline samples for the entire period 1999-2012 and for each 
separate year in this period. The frequency distribution of the number of deals over the sample 
period follows a similar pattern for both Replica and Baseline acquisitions, with a peak of activity 
occurring at the beginning of the period in 1999 and decreasing thereafter. The frequency of the 
deals seems to pick up again in 2003. The deal value for an acquisition is equal to the total value 
of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses. The mean and median deal 
values for acquisitions in the Baseline sample are a little higher than in the Replica sample, but 
the difference is not significant. However, it is worth noting that for both samples the mean deal 
value is approximately 3.5 times the size of a typical acquisition in my sample.  
Panel B and Panel C of Table 4 report the rankings of the top 10 industries of targets and 
acquirers for the Replica and Baseline samples. In both samples, Business services industry (SIC 
Code 73) clearly dominates the industry composition with roughly 30 target and acquirer firms. 
Second largest acquirer industry is Engineering and Management services industry (SIC Code 
87). It is also the largest target firm industry in the Replica sample but in the Baseline sample 
there are more target firms under General Building Contractors (SIC Code 15).  
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Table 4 – Deal values and industry decomposition of Replica and Baseline samples 
Panel A reports summary statistics about the number and size of deal values for acquisitions of subsidiary of U.K. listed firms by U.K. listed firms 
between 1999 and 2012 for Replica sample and Baseline sample. Replica sample includes same variables that Bugeja and Louyeung (2011) has 
used for comparative purposes and Baseline sample is constructed to improve their model to fit better for U.K. data and give more robust results. 
The deal value is defined as the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses. The mean, median and total 
columns are reported in millions of dollars. Financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) except real estate investment trusts (REITS, 6798 
SIC code) and acquisitions with a deal value less than $1 million are excluded. Listed REITS are included in samples, because before Finance Act 
2006 came effective at January 2007, they were mostly classified as property companies. Panel B reports the top 10 industries (two-digit SIC 
level) for the Replica and Baseline acquirers respectively. Panel C reports the same information than Panel B for target firms. 
Panel A: summary statistics of the deal values for Replica sample and Baseline sample        
  Replica sample       Baseline sample     
Year N Mean Median Sum   N Mean Median Sum 
1999 25 $384.16 $127.36 $9 603.94   36 $360.58 $126.08 $12 980.78 
2000 17 $531.33 $203.74 $9 032.62   20 $459.93 $158.42 $9 198.61 
2001 9 $202.25 $89.82 $1 820.23   12 $226.32 $101.56 $2 715.83 
2002 9 $185.71 $27.66 $1 671.41   7 $231.97 $209.08 $1 623.79 
2003 13 $568.39 $68.18 $7 389.07   12 $611.42 $114.13 $7 337.04 
2004 14 $169.75 $90.54 $2 376.52   13 $181.46 $93.28 $2 358.96 
2005 19 $306.84 $124.50 $5 829.99   17 $334.80 $138.67 $5 691.61 
2006 15 $325.04 $69.52 $4 875.61   12 $380.31 $93.75 $4 563.73 
2007 17 $761.96 $69.23 $12 953.34   15 $859.98 $128.68 $12 899.63 
2008 8 $480.95 $107.35 $3 847.59   7 $540.81 $152.81 $3 785.70 
2009 14 $237.43 $40.13 $3 324.08   10 $272.95 $51.89 $2 729.48 
2010 8 $871.45 $176.68 $6 971.57   7 $995.13 $283.04 $6 965.88 
2011 7 $183.14 $109.33 $1 281.97   6 $160.83 $105.75 $965.01 
2012 4 $265.78 $215.62 $1 063.12   4 $265.78 $215.62 $1 063.12 
Total 179 $402.46 $112.19 $72 041.07   178 $420.67 $120.36 $74 879.17 
 
Panel: B: industry decomposition of Replica and Baseline sample acquirers     
Replica sample     Baseline sample   
Industry SIC Code N   Industry SIC Code N 
Business Services 73 27   Business Services 73 28 
Engineering & Management Services 87 16   Engineering & Management Services 87 14 
General Building Contractors 15 14   General Building Contractors 15 13 
Food & Kindred Products 20 11   Food & Kindred Products 20 11 
Communication 48 11   Communication 48 11 
Chemical & Allied Products 28 9   Printing & Publishing 27 9 
Printing & Publishing 27 8   Real Estate 65 8 
Real Estate 65 8   Real estate investment trusts 67 8 
Oil & Gas Extraction 13 7   Chemical & Allied Products 28 7 
Eating & Drinking Places 58 7   Eating & Drinking Places 58 7 
              
Panel: C: industry decomposition of Replica and Baseline sample target firms   
Replica sample     Baseline sample   
Industry SIC Code N   Industry SIC Code N 
Business Services 73 29   Business Services 73 31 
Engineering & Management Services 87 12   General Building Contractors 15 10 
General Building Contractors 15 10   Real Estate 65 10 
Chemical & Allied Products 28 10   Food & Kindred Products 20 9 
Communication 48 9   Eating & Drinking Places 58 9 
Real Estate 65 9   Engineering & Management Services 87 9 
Food & Kindred Products 20 8   Chemical & Allied Products 28 8 
Eating & Drinking Places 58 8   Communication 48 8 
Oil & Gas Extraction 13 7   Printing & Publishing 27 6 
Special Trade Contractors 17 5   Special Trade Contractors 17 5 
Figure 2 on the following page depicts the mean premium paid for both the Replica and Baseline 
samples together with the mean FTSE 100 P/E ratio for each separate year in the sample period 
from 1999 to 2012. FTSE 100 P/E yearly averages are calculated from the daily P/E figures for 
the constituents of the FTSE 100 index, which are taken from Datastream. 
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Figure 2 – Average acquisition premium and average P/E for FTSE 100 
                                                 
This figure illustrates the variation in average acquisition premium for both Replica and Baseline samples. Yearly average P/E figures for FTSE 
100 index are calculated from daily FTSE 100 P/E figures, which are taken from Datastream. In Datastream P/E figures are derived by dividing 
total market value by the total earnings, thus providing an earnings-weighted average of the P/Es of the constituents of FTSE 100 index. The 
horizontal axes correspond to average premium per year and yearly average for P/E figures, and the vertical axis corresponds to years. 
What seems to be the most striking result is that the shapes of the distribution for mean premium 
in both samples tend to correlate positively with the FTSE 100 P/E ratio before year 2005, which 
is exactly the same year when IFRS was adopted by listed firms in the EU. In 2006, however, 
positive correlation changes to negative correlation with FTSE 100 P/E ratios and stays negative 
through the rest of the sample period. In fact the result holds even when calculating pairwise 
correlations for FTSE 100 P/E, estimated 42 days before announcement date, and the acquisition 
premium calculated without logarithm. The correlation between variables is significant and 
positive at the 1% level in the U.K. GAAP Sample, but negative, though without significance, for 
the IFRS sample. The financial crisis of 2008 can explain both the peak in average premium and 
the trough in the FTSE 100 P/E ratio as stock prices crashed, but there was not an equally drastic 
negative effect on the earnings of the firms, thus leading to both higher premiums compared to 
previous stock performance and lower P/E ratios. For other years though, IFRS may offer a 
possible, but not a complete explanation. IFRS increased the amount of reported earnings by 
removing amortisation of goodwill without impacting on the cash flows of the firm, which 
together led to a decrease in P/E ratios. It is also worth pointing out that IFRS somewhat 
decreased the aforementioned effect by decreasing earnings and increasing P/E ratios with 
amortisation of finite life intangibles. These intangibles are typically appreciated by the acquirer 
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and probably not fully reflected in the market value of the company as they are only recognised 
on the balance sheet of the acquirer in the purchase price allocation process. 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
This subchapter presents the descriptive statistics for both Replica and Baseline samples. Table 5 
reports the summary statistics for all deal, firm and market specific variables that I construct for 
the Replica sample and Table 6 reports the same information for the Baseline sample. The 
accounting values reported belong to the fiscal year prior to the announcement of the transaction 
(see variable definitions in Table 3 for more information). The mean and median for the initial 
offer premium percentage, measured as the final offer price minus the target share price 42 days 
before the original acquisition announcement divided by the target share price 42 days before the 
original acquisition announcement date, are somewhat larger in the Baseline sample than in the 
Replica sample pre-IFRS and vice versa for the goodwill on the balance sheet of the target firm. 
In the Baseline sample the goodwill on the balance sheet of the target firm standardised with the 
consideration paid is 2.36 times larger post-IFRS than its value pre-IFRS for the same sample, 
but at a nearly similar size to the post-IFRS value in the Replica sample. The difference in means 
could have some impact on the results between the models for the TGT Goodwill variable. 
Otherwise, there are no interesting differences among the variables used in both models, which 
could explain potential differences in the results between the two models. 
The most important finding from Table 5 is that the distribution for TGT Goodwill after IFRS 
differs significantly at the 1% level from the pre-IFRS figures due to a larger number of zero 
values. Regarding control variables it can be seen that the acquirer’s size, measured as total 
assets, of the typical firm after adoption of IFRS is 5.7  times larger than the typical firm size 
before IFRS
18
. Differences for means and distributions of ACQ size are statistically significant at 
the 1% level according to two-sample t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test (WRS). At the 5% 
significance level, the variable TGT insider ownership percentage is higher pre-IFRS in terms of 
means. Similarly in the IFRS sample acquirers have a larger amount of free cash flow to spend on 
acquisitions thus offering an opportunity to pay higher premiums than pre-IFRS. The mean for 
the acquirer’s free cash-flow variable measured as the cash-flow from operations less dividends, 
divided by total assets is 1.57 times larger post-IFRS.  
                                                 
18
 In Tables 5 and 6, variable size is measured with a natural log transformation as this form is used in regressions. 
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Table 6, which describes the Baseline sample, shows some additional differences between IFRS 
and U.K. GAAP samples. For example, the typical and average CEO bonuses as a percentage of 
salary in the IFRS sample period have more than doubled when compared to U.K. GAAP sample 
period. This is in line with the general growth of CEO compensation and competition for the 
most talented leaders among firms. Even more dramatic has been the change in the case of finite 
life intangible assets, where the standardised size is 24 times larger post-IFRS than pre-IFRS. 
Furthermore, a typical transaction now involves the recognition of finite life intangibles, which  
was not the case under U.K. GAAP and thus the shape of the distribution has also changed 
significantly at the 1% level.  
In the case of the control variables, the P/E ratio for the FTSE 100 index, measured 42 days 
before announcement, and acquirer’s board of directors’ ownership percentage have nearly 
halved in terms of means and medians from the U.K. GAAP sample period to the IFRS sample 
period. For both variables the shape of the distribution is significantly different in the IFRS 
sample than in the U.K. GAAP sample. P/E ratio is an overall estimation of market level 
valuations and when market level valuations are at a high (low) level, typically also the number 
of acquisitions paid with cash is lower (higher) and vice versa. My sample supports this 
hypothesis, since the amount of share only transactions stays at the same level pre- and post-
IFRS, while the amount of cash only transactions are 2.26 times more common in the IFRS 
sample than in the U.K. GAAP sample as shown in Table 6. As in the Replica sample, the mean 
ACQ Size in The Baseline sample has significantly increased together with a change in the shape 
of the distribution as indicated by WRS. The size of this increase in the average acquirer’s total 
assets is 151%. All abovementioned changes in means are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Other significant changes in means at the 5% level are a 63% increase in average target firm total 
assets (size) and a decrease in HHI with a 5% statistically significant change in the shape of the 
HHI variable’s distribution.  
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Table 5 – Summary statistics and univariate tests for variables in Replica model 
This table provides summary statistics and reports the results of the univariate tests on variables used in the Replica model studied by Bugeja and Loyeung (2011) with announcement dates from Jan 1 
1999 to Dec 2012 for 179 acquisitions among listed firms in the U.K. The dependent variable is Initial offer premium %, which is calculated as the final offer price minus target share price 42 days 
before original acquisition announcement date divided by the target share price 42 days before original acquisition announcement date.  TGT Goodwill is the balance sheet value of goodwill for the 
target firm before acquisition divided by the consideration paid, Goodwill approximation is the target firm market value of equity 42 days before original announcement date minus the book value of 
equity, divided by the book value of equity and Recognised goodwill is the recognised balance sheet value of goodwill divided by the consideration paid. IFRS is an indicator variable denoting 
acquisitions accounted according to IFRS. See Table 3 for definitions of independent control variables. Asterisks ***, **, * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of the two sample 
t-tests for the difference in means and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the difference in distributions for variables across the samples of U.K. GAAP and IFRS acquisitions, respectively. In case of binary 
variables a χ2-test is used to test statistical difference before and after the adoption of IFRS. In situations, where χ2-test is not valid, Fisher's Exact test was used. Results of χ2-tests are then marked to 
difference in means column. Differences in distributions for binary variables cannot be tested and thus those are excluded from the table. 
  N Mean Median 
St.  
dev. Min. Max. 
Pre-IFRS 
 mean 
Post-IFRS 
 mean 
Pre-IFRS 
 median 
Post-IFRS 
 median 
Difference 
in 
 means 
Difference 
in 
 medians 
Dependent variable                   
Initial offer premium % 179 0.29 0.31 0.31 -1.14 1.27 0.27 0.31 0.31 0.31 -0.04 -0.01 
Key independent variables                  
TGT Goodwill 179 0.19 0.01 0.41 -0.06 2.77 0.16 0.23 0.00 0.04 -0.07 -0.04*** 
Goodwill approximation 179 1.41 0.48 3.38 -0.95 21.78 1.34 1.50 0.46 0.49 -0.16 -0.03 
Recognised goodwill 179 0.58 0.57 0.55 -1.09 4.26 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.52 -0.02 0.09 
IFRS 179 0.45 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00             
Deal characteristics                     
Multiple bidders 179 0.07 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.06   
Friendly 179 0.94 1.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.95 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.02   
Cash only 179 0.30 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.43 0.00 0.00 -0.23***   
Toehold % 179 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.35 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Target characteristics                   
TGT MTB 179 2.41 1.48 3.38 0.05 22.78 2.34 2.50 1.46 1.49 -0.16 -0.03 
TGT Insider ownership % 179 0.31 0.31 0.21 0.00 0.82 0.34 0.28 0.33 0.27 0.06** 0.06* 
TGT ROE 179 0.03 0.09 0.37 -3.42 1.46 -0.01 0.09 0.09 0.08 -0.09* 0.01 
TGT Leverage 179 0.32 0.09 0.59 0.00 4.35 0.32 0.33 0.10 0.08 -0.02 0.02 
TGT Size 179 18.58 18.49 1.58 15.01 22.65 18.43 18.77 18.35 18.65 -0.34 -0.30 
TGT FCF 179 0.06 0.08 0.17 -1.53 0.40 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.07 -0.01 0.03 
Acquirer characteristics                   
ACQ MTB 179 5.95 2.56 14.59 0.35 143.62 5.45 6.58 2.46 2.91 -1.12 -0.45 
ACQ Insider ownership % 179 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.00 0.82 0.22 0.16 0.18 0.11 0.06* 0.07** 
ACQ ROE 179 0.13 0.12 0.58 -1.93 6.29 0.08 0.20 0.10 0.13 -0.13 -0.03 
ACQ Leverage 179 0.70 0.26 3.26 0.00 42.85 0.41 1.06 0.26 0.26 -0.65 0.00 
ACQ Size 179 20.03 19.82 2.37 14.49 26.27 19.61 20.53 19.32 21.06 -0.92*** -1.74*** 
ACQ FCF 179 0.08 0.09 0.13 -0.60 0.51 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.10 -0.04** -0.02* 
             
49 
 
 
 
Table 6 – Summary statistics and univariate tests for variables in Baseline models 
This table provides summary statistics and reports the results of the univariate tests on variables used in Baseline models with announcement dates from Jan 1 1999 to Dec 2012 for acquisitions among 
listed firms in the U.K. The dependent variable is Initial offer premium %, which is calculated as the final offer price minus target share price 42 days before original acquisition announcement date 
divided by the target share price 42 days before original acquisition announcement date. TGT Goodwill is the balance sheet value of goodwill for the target firm divided by the consideration paid, 
Goodwill approximation is the target firm market value of equity 42 days before original announcement date minus the book value of equity, divided by the book value of equity and Recognised 
goodwill is the recognised balance sheet value of goodwill divided by the consideration paid. IFRS is an indicator variable denoting acquisitions accounted according to IFRS. Finite life intangibles is the 
recognised amount of finite life intangible assets divided by the consideration paid. CEO Bonus % is the percentage of total bonus earned to total salary paid for the two previous fiscal years or for the 
previous fiscal year if FY-2 fiscal year information is missing and Earnings based bonuses is an indicator variable denoting acquisitions where acquirer’s CEO’s bonuses are based on earnings or 
earnings multiples. UNA is a measure of unverifiable net assets, Segment is the natural logarithm of the number of business segments and HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman ratio of business segment 
sales. All three variables are estimated for the combined firm after effective date of the transaction. See Table 3 for definitions of independent control variables. Asterisks ***, **, * represent 
significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of the two sample t-tests for the difference in means and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the difference in distributions for variables across the samples 
of U.K. GAAP and IFRS acquisitions, respectively. In case of binary variables a χ2-test is used to test statistical difference before and after the adoption of IFRS. Results of χ2-tests are marked to 
difference in means column. When χ2-test was not valid, Fisher's Exact test was used. Differences in distributions for binary variables cannot be tested and thus those are excluded from the table. 
  N Mean Median 
St.  
dev. Min. Max. 
Pre-IFRS 
mean 
Post-IFRS 
mean 
Pre-IFRS 
median 
Post-IFRS 
median 
Difference 
in 
means 
Difference 
in 
medians 
Dependent variable                   
Initial offer premium % 178 0.32 0.35 0.27 -0.80 1.27 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.33 -0.02 0.02 
Key independent variables                   
TGT Goodwill 178 0.17 0.00 0.38 -0.06 2.77 0.11 0.26 0.00 0.06 -0.15** -0.06*** 
Goodwill approximation 178 1.61 0.51 3.76 -0.95 21.78 1.58 1.66 0.45 0.65 -0.08 -0.20 
Recognised goodwill 178 0.63 0.60 0.60 -1.09 4.26 0.61 0.65 0.67 0.54 -0.04 0.12 
IFRS 178 0.39 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00              
Finite life intangibles 178 0.10 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.16 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.17 -0.23*** -0.17*** 
CEO Bonus % 177 0.58 0.39 0.73 0.00 4.40 0.39 0.87 0.27 0.65 -0.47*** -0.38*** 
Earnings based bonuses 132 0.83 1.00 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.89 0.76 1.00 1.00 0.13*  
UNA 161 -0.22 0.13 5.96 -72.67 7.05 0.41 -1.26 0.13 0.12 1.67 0.01 
Segment 167 0.89 1.10 0.62 0.00 2.20 0.82 1.00 1.10 1.10 -0.18* 0.00* 
HHI 165 0.63 0.56 0.28 0.13 1.00 0.67 0.58 0.64 0.50 0.09** 0.14** 
Market information                   
Runup -1 -42 178 0.20 0.16 0.30 -0.61 1.65 0.20 0.20 0.17 0.15 -0.01 0.02 
FTSE 100 178 18.72 17.00 6.53 7.36 31.46 22.60 12.58 23.75 12.64 10.03*** 11.11*** 
Deal characteristics                   
Multiple bidders 178 0.08 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.07   
Friendly 178 0.94 1.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.96 0.91 1.00 1.00 0.05   
Share only 178 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.19 0.00 0.00 -0.03   
Toehold % 178 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.35 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Initial agreement 178 0.89 1.00 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.92 0.84 1.00 1.00 0.08   
Target characteristics                   
TGT MTB 178 2.61 1.51 3.76 0.05 22.78 2.58 2.66 1.45 1.65 -0.08 -0.20 
TGT ROE 178 0.05 0.10 0.49 -4.15 1.46 0.00 0.12 0.10 0.09 -0.12* 0.01 
TGT Size 178 18.65 18.56 1.58 15.01 22.65 18.46 18.95 18.32 18.80 -0.49** -0.48* 
TGT FCF 178 0.08 0.09 0.17 -1.53 0.50 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.07 -0.02 0.03 
TGT Growth 1 year 178 0.16 0.07 0.49 -0.56 4.44 0.15 0.18 0.05 0.12 -0.04 -0.07 
Acquirer characteristics                     
ACQ Insider ownership % 178 0.20 0.14 0.20 0.00 0.82 0.23 0.14 0.19 0.10 0.09*** 0.08*** 
ACQ ROE 178 0.15 0.12 0.58 -1.93 6.29 0.09 0.24 0.11 0.15 -0.15* -0.04 
ACQ Leverage 178 0.70 0.24 3.27 0.00 42.85 0.41 1.16 0.24 0.27 -0.76 -0.03 
ACQ Size 178 20.16 19.94 2.33 14.49 26.27 19.78 20.76 19.50 21.32 -0.98*** -1.82*** 
ACQ FCF 178 0.09 0.09 0.12 -0.60 0.51 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.11 -0.04** -0.02 
ACQ Board ownership £ 178 15.10 15.00 2.15 8.02 20.92 15.06 15.18 14.94 15.14 -0.12 -0.20 
50 
 
 
 
Table 7 presents Pearson’s pairwise correlations between the key variables. Pearson’s pairwise correlations 
between other variables can be found from Table 19 in Appendix A. Table 7 shows that the premium variable 
is significant at the 1% level and negatively correlated with the target’s goodwill in the group of key 
variables. The premium variable is further highly significantly correlated with Runup (+), FTSE 100 (+), 
Share only (-), target’s ROE (+), TGT FCF (+) and ACQ Board ownership £ (+). The Target firm goodwill 
variable is highly significantly correlated with Recognised goodwill (+), Finite life intangibles (+), FTSE 100 
P/E ratio (-), share only (+) and acquirer’s size (-). The amount of goodwill approximated is highly correlated 
with Recognised goodwill (+), TGT ROE (+), TGT Leverage (+), TGT FCF (+) and ACQ MTB (+). The 
amount of goodwill recognised is further significantly correlated with Segment (+), HHI (-) and TGT MTB 
(+). The IFRS variable is also significantly correlated with Finite life intangibles (+), Segment (+), HHI (-), 
CEO bonus percentage (+), FTSE 100 (-), Cash only (+), acquirer’s insider ownership percentage (-) and size 
(+). Furthermore, organisational complexity (Segment and HHI) for the combined firm after acquisition is 
strongly and positively correlated with cash payment, but strongly and negatively correlated with share 
payment. In addition there is a strong and negative correlation between CEO bonus percentage and target’s 
insider ownership, but strong and positive correlation between CEO bonus percentage and target’s size. This 
result implies that CEOs with high bonuses try to avoid targets with high insider ownership, but tend to 
acquire larger targets. Following general findings in corporate finance literature, the CEO bonus percentage 
is also positively correlated with acquirer characteristics such as ROE, leverage, size and board ownership. 
The presence of earnings based bonuses is positively and highly significantly correlated with FTSE 100 P/E 
ratio, TGT FCF and ACQ FCF, while negative correlation is present with TGT Growth 1 year and ACQ 
Insider ownership percentage variables. Table 7 shows that the segment variable and HHI variable are 
extremely correlated with each other, which is the reason why those variables are not used in the same 
regression models. This issue is also present in the case of goodwill approximation and target’s MTB, which 
is the numerator in the former variable and thus the target’s MTB is excluded from some of the models. 
Regarding correlations between control variables, as shown in Table 19 in Appendix A, common deflators in 
financial data causes some very high correlations between variables. For example, the correlation between 
ACQ MTB and ACQ ROE is 0.92 and the correlation between ACQ ROE and ACQ Leverage is 0.82. 
However, due to exclusion of common deflators between dependent variables and independent variables I do 
not have to be concerned much about Pearson’s (1897) spurious correlation problem. However, to be certain 
that correlations are not causing problems, I will test each regression coefficient with Variance Inflator 
Factor (VIF), which is defined in Appendix B. 
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Table 7 – Pairwise correlation coefficients for main variables 
This table presents pairwise correlation coefficients for main variables, which can be seen from the columns. Rest of the correlation coefficients can be found from Table 19 in Appendix A. Asterisks 
***, **, * represent significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
  Premium 
TGT 
Goodwill 
Goodwill 
approxi-
mation 
Recogni-
sed 
goodwill IFRS 
Finite life 
intangibles UNA Segment HHI 
CEO 
bonus % 
Earnings 
based 
bonuses 
Premium 1.00                    
TGT Goodwill -0.26*** 1.00                  
Goodwill approximation 0.02 -0.15** 1.00                
Recognised goodwill -0.01 0.27*** 0.18*** 1.00        
IFRS -0.01 0.13** -0.01 -0.03 1.00            
Finite life intangibles -0.05 0.28*** 0.03 0.01 0.52*** 1.00          
UNA -0.16** 0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.06 -0.03 1.00        
Segment 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.25*** 0.18*** 0.05 -0.10 1.00      
HHI -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.28*** -0.18*** -0.08 0.09 -0.87*** 1.00    
CEO bonus % 0.05 -0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.25*** 0.03 -0.06 0.14** -0.13 1.00  
Earnings based bonuses 0.13 -0.13 0.12 0.11 -0.17* -0.06 -0.18** 0.20** -0.09 0.02 1.00 
Runup -1 -42 0.74*** -0.15** 0.03 0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.09 
FTSE 100 P/E ratio 0.16** -0.26*** 0.10 0.02 -0.74*** -0.40*** -0.03 -0.08 0.11 -0.23*** 0.24*** 
Multiple bidders 0.04 -0.07 0.08 0.03 -0.10 -0.05 -0.02 0.07 -0.08 -0.02 0.14 
Friendly 0.11 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.08 -0.30*** 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
Cash only 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.07 0.28*** 0.10 -0.05 0.23*** -0.20*** 0.15** -0.04 
Share only -0.25*** 0.18*** -0.09 -0.02 0.02 0.11 0.13 -0.26*** 0.28*** -0.13** -0.17* 
Toehold % -0.04 -0.01 0.06 -0.15** 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.12 0.04 -0.01 -0.13 
Initial agreement 0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.10 -0.04 
TGT MTB 0.02 -0.15** 1.00*** 0.18*** -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.12 
TGT Insider ownership % -0.10 0.01 -0.10 0.04 -0.13 -0.03 0.12 -0.01 0.02 -0.27*** -0.02 
TGT ROE 0.21*** -0.10 0.27*** -0.04 0.08 0.04 -0.02 0.170** -0.14** 0.10 0.21** 
TGT Leverage 0.05 -0.06 0.18*** -0.06 0.04 0.10 -0.02 0.06 -0.13 0.04 0.06 
TGT Size 0.02 -0.06 -0.10 -0.07 0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.18*** -0.17** 0.29*** 0.12 
TGT FCF 0.19*** -0.09 0.28*** 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.18*** -0.18** 0.15** 0.33*** 
TGT Growth 1 year -0.08 0.05 0.08 -0.14** 0.03 0.02 -0.20*** -0.08 0.00 0.04 -0.30*** 
ACQ MTB 0.05 0.04 0.31*** 0.14** 0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.10 0.00 0.14** 0.08 
ACQ Insider ownership % -0.06 0.12 -0.03 0.00 -0.17*** -0.08 0.15** -0.10 0.18*** -0.17*** -0.26*** 
ACQ ROE 0.08 -0.05 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.18** -0.05 0.23*** 0.15* 
ACQ Leverage -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.10 -0.01 -0.01 0.15** -0.06 0.20*** 0.07 
ACQ Size 0.17** -0.22*** 0.04 0.01 0.20*** 0.01 -0.07 0.41*** -0.36*** 0.43*** 0.20** 
ACQ FCF -0.11 -0.01 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.07 0.23*** 
ACQ Board ownership £ 0.18*** -0.06 0.11 0.08 0.03 -0.09 -0.03 0.10 -0.13 0.28*** 0.02 
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Table 8 elaborates the differences between finite life intangible assets recognised in business 
combinations for U.K. GAAP transactions and IFRS transactions. In more detail, Table 8 shows 
finite life intangible asset classes recognised together with their recognised values. Recognised 
values are presented in total and on an average per transaction basis. 
Table 8 – Finite life intangible assets recognised in business combinations  
This table shows examples about finite life intangible asset classes recognised in business combination under U.K. GAAP and IFRS. Also total 
and average values for finite life intangible assets are recognised for whole sample, Baseline sample and Replica sample are presented. 
Classification  U.K. GAAP examples IFRS examples 
Technology related 
Deferred development expenditure Computer software 
Patented technologies Patented and unpatented technologies 
  Intellectual property 
  Databases 
  Capitalized development costs 
  Trade secrets, know-how 
Contract related 
Broadcasting licenses, retail product rights Licenses, product rights, concessions 
  Marketing and distribution rights, publishing rights 
  Commercial agreements 
  Intellectual property rights 
  Service concession arrangements 
  Property advisory agreements 
  Management agreements 
  Concents 
Customer related 
Customer contracts and relationships Customer contracts and relationships 
  Order book 
Marketing related 
Trademarks  Trademarks, trade names 
Internet domain names Internet domain names 
  Managed email lists 
  Marketing information 
Art related Programme and film libraries   
Total value (million pounds):     
Whole sample 85.92 (n=149) 6015.73 (n=96) 
Baseline sample 5.16 (n=109) 4680.05 (n=67) 
Replica sample 5.14 (n=99) 4741.41 (n=78) 
Average value per transaction (million pounds):   
Whole sample 0.58 62.66 
Baseline sample 0.05 69.85 
Replica sample 0.05 60.79 
From Table 8 it can be seen that both the number of separable finite life intangible asset classes 
and average recognised values per transaction have increased dramatically after the adoption of 
IFRS. This is not a surprising result considering the possibility of also recognising assets other 
than those which are controlled through legal rights or custody under IFRS (see Sections 2.1.2 
and 2.2.2 for more information). The customer related intangible asset recognised under U.K. 
GAAP in Table 8 is an exception regarding a single business combination which occurred in 
2006 before the adoption of IFRS for an acquirer that was listed on the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM). 
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5.3 Handpicked data from the annual reports of the acquirer 
Handpicked data includes data disclosed in purchase price allocations (PPA), information 
regarding a company CEO’s/executive chairman’s compensation data and the value of directors’ 
shareholdings in the acquiring firm. From PPA, I have separately identified book values of all 
intangible assets and all net assets for target firm, fair value of net assets, consideration paid for 
the acquisition, minority interest, previous fixed investments of the target, goodwill recognised 
and other intangible assets. Other intangible assets hand-picked from annual reports are divided 
according to their accounting treatment in three different groups: indefinite life intangible assets, 
finite life intangible assets and in-process development costs. In-process development costs have 
been separated from finite life intangible assets, because they are not amortised until the product 
has been commercialised. These assets are typical among pharmaceutical firms in the U.K. 
Intangible assets related to extractive industries such as exploration and evaluation assets and 
mineral rights have been excluded from intangible assets due to the fact that their valuation in 
business combinations is rather similar in IFRS compared to UK GAAP and the key difference 
lies in initial classification as an intangible asset instead of a fixed tangible assets under UK 
GAAP. Under IFRS, after the existence of commercial reserves have been determined, acquired 
intangible exploration and evaluation assets are then transferred to properties, plant and 
equipment and depreciated to reflect the consumption of those assets, which is de facto similar to  
the accounting treatment under UK GAAP. Compensation data consists of bonuses and salaries 
paid to the CEO/chairman and how the firm has tied bonuses or options to performance of the 
firm. However, all firms have not disclosed remuneration in detail and there are a few cases in 
which only aggregated emoluments of the directors are shown in the notes of the annual report.  
In general the quality of manually handpicked information is rather good. However, there is a 
minor limitation concerning the disclosure of the fair value of the net assets acquired during the 
period of this study, which complicates the observation of the goodwill element in acquisitions. 
In this case, inadequate disclosure is luckily not widespread, but the level of disclosure varies 
systematically through time, which is the reason not to, in addition to maximisation of sample 
size, follow the conventional expedient of excluding non-disclosing firms from the sample. 
Instead, I use other available data to form the estimates for the recognised amount of goodwill. A 
fully disclosing acquirer will report both the acquired net assets at fair value and the acquired 
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goodwill. If they have disclosed the fair value of net assets but not the goodwill, then the value of 
goodwill can be deducted if I also know the fair value of the consideration. However, it is much 
more common for acquirers who made multiple acquisitions within a year to disclose the fair 
value of net assets acquired, and the goodwill in total rather than for each acquisition. Where the 
acquirer disclosed no data about the acquired net assets, the acquisition was excluded from the 
sample. However, consistent with the focus of this study, when the acquirer discloses net assets 
in total I retain the acquisition in sample, and prorate the acquired net assets and goodwill, so 
long as the fair value of the consideration is separately identified for the sample acquisition and 
for acquisitions in total, and on the basis that all the acquirer’s acquisitions in the year are 
roughly in the same industry. However, it is not reasonable to estimate other intangible assets by 
using the same method because those are more likely to have larger variations also within the 
industry. For example it is quite common for some firms in the same industry to have a 
significantly larger patent portfolio than others. The only exception was a situation where all 
intangible assets comprise only customer relationships and this applied to a few cases. In total 10 
acquisitions in my initial sample (232 obs.) partially disclosed in this way. 2009 was a turning 
point in disclosure and since then all acquisitions have fully disclosed information regarding 
PPA. 
5.4 Error checking and enhancements in the reliability of data 
The reliability of the data was enhanced through a rigorous error checking procedure, where the 
most important pieces of information were double checked manually. To improve the reliability 
of financial accounting data and share price data all company identificators for targets and 
acquirers were individually matched with the name of the firm as presented in SDC, the country 
of incorporation and the years of information available at Thomson One Banker database.  This 
process was achieved by employing the used firm identificators (e.g. either Datastream or Sedol 
code) in Thomson One Banker and then comparing the information shown there with the 
information collected from SDC. If the identificator tested failed to comply with the requirement, 
another identificator given by SDC was then tested. If there were no identificators given by SDC 
or the identificators did not match with the other data, then new identificators were looked for 
from Thomson One Banker and added to the data where applicable to make the sample more 
comprehensive. As already shown in Table 2 in Subchapter 5.1, in total 9 observations were 
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removed from the data due to inability to comply with the requirements of my data. These are 
cases where the target firm or the acquirer was incorporated in a different nation than the U.K. or 
delisted before the announcement of the acquisition. The handpicked information was studied for 
anomalies such as extremely high or low observations, which were then investigated and 
corrected if an error was observed. In addition, the sum of the fair value of net assets (including 
the previous investment and minority interest) and goodwill recognised minus minority interest 
and previous fixed investment were required to match with the total consideration paid in the 
fiscal year, because the consideration paid must be allocated in PPA according to accounting 
standards employed. 
5.5 Limitations of data 
The main limitation is the small sample size due to the nature of the research questions studied in 
this thesis, which requires that both target and acquirer must be listed firms and the acquirer must 
consolidate the target as an acquisition after the transaction. In addition there are 19 cases in 
which the purchase price allocation (PPA) data in annual reports is not available. These cases are 
typically either cases in which A) the acquirer has acquired multiple acquisitions in the same 
fiscal year and the acquisition of the target has not been individually material
19
 and the 
information regarding PPA could not be estimated according to the method presented in 
Subchapter 5.3 or cases in which B) the acquirer has been acquired before it was required to 
present annual reports or interim reports for the fiscal period of the acquisition. My analysis is 
therefore most applicable for acquisitions where the target firm has a material impact on the 
acquirer and for other transactions that meet the requirements of my sample. In fact, my analysis 
is likely to be less relevant outside my sample, where target firms outside the sample are often 
smaller and therefore have less impact on the acquirer. They are also often less liquid or even 
private, which makes them less likely to present high quality accounting information or demand 
payment in equity.  
  
                                                 
19
 Under both FRS 6 and IFRS 3 only material transactions are required to be disclosed individually, otherwise the 
information should be given in aggregate. 
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6 Variable construction 
This chapter provide the literature and theoretical reasoning behind the key dependent and 
independent variables used in this thesis. Subchapters 6.1-6.3 cover topics such as acquisition 
premium, calculation of goodwill and finite life intangibles and the variables used to estimate 
managerial discretion in impairment management. The final Subchapter 6.4 presents other 
determinants of acquisition premium, which are used as control variables in my study. 
6.1 Defining acquisition premium in M&A transactions 
Acquisition premium is the key dependent variable in my regression analysis. In many papers
20
 
the premium offered to shareholders is used as a proxy for shareholder wealth effects. I will 
calculate the premium following the recent literature
21
 as the natural logarithm of the final price 
offered by the acquirer divided by the share price before the first announcement: Premium= ln 
(final price offered / pre-acquisition share price). This specification of acquisition premium is 
useful, because it impounds the informational value of any announcement made during the 
acquisition process such as bidder competition and the identification of the acquiring party 
(Renneboog, Simons and Wright, 2007). Furthermore, the use of logarithmic transformation 
increases significantly the normality of the dependent variable and regression residuals as 
measured with the Shapiro-Wilk test, which is especially important when sample size is small. 
In prior literature there are several definitions for ‘final price offered’ and the ‘pre-acquisition 
share price’. As the final price, I will take the final offer price of the winning bid as e.g. Harlow 
and Howe (1993) do, and Renneboog, Simons and Wright (2007). An alternative, but less often 
used definition for ‘final price offered’ is final traded price of the shares in the market before the 
delisting. Some papers (e.g. Halpern, Kieschnick and Rotenberg, 1999; Lehn and Poulsen, 1989) 
believe that the final traded price best reflects the market value of a bid comprising securities. 
However, due to various reasons such as the use of loan notes and the form of acceptances 
(especially in the U.K.), true assessment of the final bid might not be observable from stock 
market data (Renneboog, Simons and Wright, 2007). 
                                                 
20
 See e.g. Kaplan (1989), Lehn and Poulsen (1989), and Halpern, Kieschnick and Rotenberg (1999) 
21
 See e.g. Renneboog, Simons and Wright (2007), Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008), and Dionne, La Haye, 
Bergerès, 2010 
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Renneboog, Simons and Wright (2007) posit that the challenge with the benchmark ‘pre-
acquisition price’ comes from the selection of the date. The reason for this is that there is a share 
price-up in the period preceding the first announcement of acquisition interest. This period is 
estimated to begin 42 days prior to the event date with the largest runup occurring after -21 day 
before announcement (Schwert, 1996). I will select the benchmark target share price on the 42
nd
 
trading day before the initial announcement. While trading day -42 is accepted in the literature
22
, 
I will follow the recent study made by Mulherin and Simsir (2015) and use ‘Original Date 
Announced’ (ODA) instead of generally used ‘Announcement Date’ (DA) to capture the price 
impact of all merger related news. Thus acquisition premium takes the following form: 
𝑇𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = ln (
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 42 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑
)    (1) 
In SDC the ODA is defined as following: “The date when the target company is first publicly 
disclosed as a possible acquisition candidate. Date originally announced (DAO) is used for the 
calculation of stock premiums. When multiple bidders exist, the DAO is recorded in the following 
cases: 
(1) If acquirer changes from ‘Seeking Buyer' or 'Undisclosed Acquirer' to an actual entity. 
(2) Competing bids are announced. 
(3) Competing stakes are announced. 
(4) A defensive transaction is announced.” 
In SDC the Date Announced is defined as following: “The date one or more parties involved in 
the transaction makes the first public disclosure of common or unilateral intent to pursue the 
transaction (no formal agreement is required). Among other things, Date Announced is 
determined by the disclosure of discussions between parties, disclosure of a unilateral approach 
made by a potential bidder, and the disclosure of a signed Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) or other agreement.” 
The problems of using DA as the event date are reported by Mulherin and Simsir (2015) with 
U.S. data and Arslan and Simsir (2013) with Turkish data. For U.S transactions with DA between 
01.01.2000 and 31.12.2010, Mulherin and Simsir (2015) show that about 20 % of the deal 
                                                 
22
 See e.g. Schwert (1996), Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008), and Dionne, La Haye, Bergerès (2010) 
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announcement dates provided in SDC are preceded by merger rumours, failed transactions, and 
unsolicited offers made by bidders to the target firms and that using DA as the event date instead 
of ODA leads to 9.1% lower estimated acquisition premiums. They attribute this difference in 
premiums to inability to capture the price impact of the news released around ODA. Furthermore, 
the problem could be even more severe with non-U.S. data as Arslan and Simsir (2013) find out 
with Turkish data with DA between 1 January 2005 and 31 December 2011 that in 78 deals out 
of 105 deals where the target is a public firm, the target firms experience merger-related events, 
such as merger rumours and search for buyer types of announcement before DA. They also find a 
10% estimated difference in bid premiums between benchmark prices calculated before DA and 
benchmark prices calculated before ODA. The findings presented above are statistically 
significant at the 1 % level in both studies. DA is still used to get the latest financial data. 
6.2 Calculation of goodwill and finite life intangibles 
Goodwill and finite life intangible assets are my key independent variables together with 
variables used as a proxy for managerial discretion regarding impairment management in 
Subchapter 6.3. I will calculate the goodwill variable in three different ways such as using the 
recognised amount of goodwill by the acquirer on acquisition, acquired goodwill by the target 
firm and finally an approximation of goodwill to be generated 42 days before the original 
announcement date. The recognised amount of goodwill is collected manually from the annual 
reports released by the acquirer after the acquisition. The data for acquired goodwill by the target 
firm is taken directly from Worldscope and further complemented with annual reports of the 
target. Both disclosed measures of goodwill are further standardised by dividing them by the total 
consideration paid and reported by the acquirer to increase the comparison among acquisitions of 
different size. Detzen and Zülch (2012) also use the same denominator in their study regarding 
the influence of CEO bonuses on the amount allocated to goodwill in purchase price allocation. 
Consistent with studies about pooling of interest
23
, I will also approximate the generated amount 
of goodwill instead of using the actual amount of goodwill. This approximation is calculated by 
first taking the difference between the target firm market capitalisation measured 42 days before 
the original date announced and the book value of equity and second divided by the book value of 
equity.  
                                                 
23
 See e.g. Nathan (1988), Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2002), and Bugeja and Loyeung (2011) 
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The main reason for using three different methods to calculate goodwill is the problems 
associated with each of the methods. For example, there is an endogeneity problem with the 
recognised amount of goodwill on acquisition. That endogeneity comes from the fact that the 
higher acquisition premium mechanically increases the amount recorded as goodwill and vice 
versa, which increases the correlation between the acquisition premium and the recognised 
amount of goodwill. Regarding the goodwill on the balance sheet of the target, not all targets 
have recognised goodwill in their balance sheet and even if they have, the amount of goodwill 
might not be material in many cases. This is a larger problem for earlier years in my sample, 
because before the adoption of FRS 10 goodwill was written-off directly to reserves. However, it 
is also part of the recognised goodwill, since its fair value in PPA is zero. Finally, approximation 
of goodwill is the most controversial proxy for true goodwill. First, it is perfectly correlated with 
market-to-book ratio, thus it resembles the fair value of growth assets. Second, it is significantly 
and positively correlated with the recognised amount of goodwill, because it measures, for 
example, the going concern goodwill of the target. Third, by its definition it excludes the 
goodwill on the balance sheet of the target firm and thus is significantly and negatively correlated 
with it. Fourth, it also includes part of the intangible assets to be recognised in business 
combinations. These issues make approximated goodwill the most inaccurate of the three 
goodwill measures used. Therefore, I will give it less weight than other measures. 
The finite life intangible asset variable follows the construction of the amount of goodwill 
recognised in PPA and the acquired goodwill by the target firm and thus the amount of finite life 
intangible assets recognised is also divided by the total consideration paid by the acquirer. The 
impact of finite life intangibles is two-fold. First, finite life intangibles are required to be 
amortised according to both U.K. GAAP and IFRS and thus their recognition will lead to a 
reduction in reported earnings. Second, finite life intangibles are actually valuable assets for the 
acquirer and in many cases they are the reason to acquire the target. Therefore, in theory, the 
impact of finite life intangibles should be similar under both IFRS and U.K. GAAP, but that 
under IFRS there should be more firms that have acquired finite life intangibles due to a much 
larger amount of assets being required to be recognised under IFRS compared to much stricter 
requirements under U.K. GAAP. For more information about criteria for recognition of 
intangible assets under IFRS, see Section 2.1.2 and for similar information under U.K. GAAP see 
Section 2.2.2.  
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6.3 The proxy variables for managerial discretion in the impairment procedure 
under IFRS 
Ramanna (2008) and Ramanna and Watts (2012) examine managerial discretion around goodwill 
impairments and identify three main proxies for management’s ability to engage in impairment 
management: the number and size of reporting units, reporting-units’ fair-value-to-book-value 
ratio and unverifiability of net assets. Also, Detzen and Zülch (2012) use these variables in their 
study regarding PPA under IFRS with European data. Here, I will use the term cash generating 
units (CGU) instead of reporting units as CGU is also used in IFRS 3 and IAS 35. Sections 6.3.1–
6.3.2 discuss the aforementioned factors that influence a firm’s ability to manage impairment. I 
will exclude the use of fair-value-to-book-value ratio, because those values for CGUs are not 
reported and I will use target and acquirer specific MTB ratios as my control variables. However, 
in addition to having the possibility of engaging in impairment management, managers also need 
motives to do so. While the motives for the firms to engage in impairment management
24
 itself is 
outside the scope of this thesis, the motives for the acquirer’s willingness to pay higher or lower 
premiums for target firms are discussed in Subchapter 3.2.  
6.3.1 Number and size of cash generating units 
Cash-generating units may have an impact on the likelihood of an impairment loss being 
recognised (Beatty and Weber, 2006). Schneider (2001) argues that firms with more than one 
cash-generating unit are expected to carry out more impairment tests and thus may report higher 
goodwill impairment losses because an existing loss in one unit cannot be netted against a profit 
in another unit. On the other hand, AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares and Roberts (2011) present an 
alternative hypothesis, which states that managers of firms with multiple cash-generating units 
also have more flexibility to use their write-off discretion to overstate goodwill impairments (take 
a bath or smooth reported income) by allocating the greater part of goodwill to cash-generating 
units that are expected to decrease in value. Alternatively, this discretion can be used to 
understate or avoid goodwill impairments by allocating the greater part of goodwill to cash-
generating units that are expected to increase in value and hence lower the probability of 
recognising goodwill impairment losses. To refine this idea further, I assume that CGU based 
                                                 
24
 See Ramanna and Watts (2012) for further information on private information, contracting, reputation and 
valuation motives of impairment management. 
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variables can be used as an approximation of the true value of the option to use managerial 
discretion opportunistically as allowed by the increased subjectivity with the introduction of 
IFRS.  
Following Ramanna and Watts (2012), I will use two different measures of managerial discretion 
in avoiding the possible goodwill impairment: the natural logarithm of the number of business 
segments and the internal Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). For both variables data is obtained 
from Thomson Worldscope in the form of sales reported in up to 10 different business segments. 
For the number of segments variable, I will check all 10 segments for each combined firm after 
acquisition and calculate manually the number of segments with sales information. If some firms 
do not have segmental disclosure, they are excluded from my analysis employing either of the 
two variables. 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of business segments is used by Ramanna and Watts (2012) as 
proxy for the management’s ability to allocate acquired goodwill arbitrarily across CGUs and 
understate or overstate future impairments. Business segments are used because there is only 
private data available regarding CGUs, while data on business segments is publicly reported. 
HHI is calculated as follows:  
                                                                            𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑(𝑠𝑖2)                                                                
𝑛
𝑖=1
(2) 
where n is the number of business segments in the firm and si is the ratio of the i
th business 
segments’ sales to total firm sales. Thus, it is an index of segment concentration within a firm and 
ranges with available information from 0.1 to one. A situation where it gets a value close to 0.1 is 
the most meaningful from my study’s view point, because then there are 10 equally sized 
segments within the firm and therefore greater flexibility and complexity of the firm associated 
with more and larger reporting units (and vice versa with HHI values close to one). In the case 
presented above, the internal HHI is calculated as 10*0.1^2=0.1. I want to test if that greater 
flexibility manifests itself in increased acquisition premiums after IFRS took place and removed 
amortisation of goodwill. In short, the idea is that before IFRS the complexity of the firm did not 
offer as many benefits regarding unverifiable assets and their amortisation, because amortisation 
could not be avoided. Depreciation could only be postponed and now the complexity of the firm 
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can be used as a tool for manager’s opportunism e.g. by hiding large declines in value of acquired 
assets and thus effectively avoiding write-offs in goodwill. As presented in Subchapter 5.1, 
segments with negative sales are excluded as discontinued operations and HHI is calculated in 
those cases by inputting negative sales to other segment sales on a pro rata basis. Also following 
diversification discount literature (e.g. Berger and Ofek, 1995; Schmid and Walter, 2009), I 
exclude cases in which the sum of segment sales differs by more than 25% of total firm level net 
sales. 
Based on the findings of Ramanna and Watts (2012) and the increased subjectivity in goodwill 
management, I expect that the adoption of IFRS will have a positive influence on the coefficient 
of the natural logarithm of the number of segments and vice versa for the HHI variable. In other 
words, I assume that firms with greater flexibility in PPA can pay larger premium post-IFRS than 
pre-IFRS due to their greater ability to exploit increased subjectivity provided by the IFRS. 
6.3.2 Unverifiable net assets in reporting units 
The more there are unverifiable net assets (UNAs) the more likely it is expected for managers to 
manage goodwill impairment losses (Ramanna and Watts, 2012). I assume that this increased 
opportunity to manage goodwill impairment losses is beneficial to managers and thus they can 
pay higher premiums post-IFRS, when impairment management has a large role. Following 
Ramanna and Watts (2012), I compute a ratio of [Cash + Investments – Debt – Preferred Equity] 
to [Assets – Liabilities]. In that ratio the numerator is a proxy for that component of net assets 
whose fair values are likely to be more verifiable (Richardson et al., 2005). By its nature this ratio 
is intended to capture the verifiability of net assets (VNA) as all the components in the numerator 
are easy to verify, thus excluding items which can be called unverifiable assets. That means 
effectively that when the ratio decreases, subjectivity in estimating the fair value of goodwill is 
expected to increase, which in turn I expect to lead potentially to higher target premiums. To get 
UNA, I will simply multiply VNA by -1. Mathematically it is easier and more efficient to solve 
UNA this way than calculate separately each of the unverifiable assets found on the balance 
sheet. UNA is calculated post-acquisition for the combined firm. 
Similarly to Ramanna and Watts (2007) in their unpublished draft I find the modification of UNA 
interesting and useful especially in cases where the VNA ratio exceeds 1. While it initially 
implies that the firm has a lower ability to manage fair value goodwill estimates, it might be that 
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the result ensues because of fewer verifiable liabilities compared to total liabilities. It follows that 
by overstating (understating) unverifiable liabilities, firms can understate (overstate) their non-
goodwill net assets and thus overstate (understate) goodwill. As a solution ModUNA is the 
absolute distance between VNA and one and in mathematical form │(1-│VNA│)│. In this 
form it can provide a more accurate measure of the verifiability of net assets than normal UNA in 
these specific cases (Ramanna and Watts, 2007). It must be noted that this measure of UNA was 
originally incorporated in their working paper but not in their 2012 published version. 
6.4 Determinants of acquisition premium 
In this subchapter, I will discuss the most important determinants of acquisition premium covered 
in academic research. The determinants presented here are later on used in the Methodology 
Chapter as control variables for my regression equations. Evidence for these variables is 
abundant in literature, but I will mainly follow Bugeja and Loyeung (2011) as they have done the 
closest study to mine. However, when applicable I will add other views from literature to give as 
comprehensive a view on this topic as possible. Following Bugeja and Loyeung (2011), I will 
present evidence for all 16 control variables used in their study and 5 new additions to their 
model. Here, I will divide the determinants of acquisition premium into four groups: deal specific 
determinants of acquisition premium, ownership related determinants of acquisition premium, 
firm specific financial characteristics and variables related to stock market information. Sections 
6.4.1-6.4.4 discuss the aforementioned determinants of acquisition premium. Key dependent and 
independent variables used in this thesis are covered in the previous Subchapters 6.1-6.3.   
6.4.1 Deal specific determinants of acquisition premium 
Deal specific determinants of acquisition premium such as multiple bidders, the hostility or 
friendliness of acquisition and the form of payment used in the Bugeja and Loyeung (2011) study 
are based on the findings in earlier literature. In addition to those, I will use the initial agreement 
variable in my own Baseline model. First, acquisition premiums are expected to be higher when 
there are competing bidders for a target firm (e.g. Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy, 2003; Henry, 
2005). The reason for higher premiums is that when there are multiple bidders, acquisition is  
much like an auction even if the target initially negotiates a merger agreement (Eckbo, 2009). In 
the single bidder setting the situation leads to negotiations between two parties with different 
strength in bargaining powers. However, when there are multiple bidders the bargaining power of 
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the seller is greater, since the seller can play one bidder against another and generate higher 
premium for their stock (Mansfield, 1990; Porter, 1980). Furthermore, according to the “winner’s 
curse” phenomenon25 the winner’s curse arises when firms are bidding on an asset and each 
bidder has a unique estimate of the true value of the asset. To avoid losing the target to another 
bidder, bidding firms will be tempted to bid close to their reservation prices. The reservation 
price of the winner can, however, be an overestimation due to error in valuation. Second, the 
evidence in previous studies regarding acquisition hostility indicate that hostility leads in higher 
premiums
26
. This is because the acquisition premium can reflect all or some of the following 
issues: a breakdown over negotiations, disagreement over the redeployment of assets after the 
acquisition or the disciplinary role of the market for corporate control. Third, according to prior 
research
27
, acquisition premiums are typically higher when cash consideration is offered as 
payment to target shareholders because cash payment is immediately taxable. Otherwise, target 
shareholders would be indifferent to the use of cash and non-taxable forms of payment (capital 
gains tax theory). However, there is some evidence that capital gains tax does not drive the higher 
premium for cash deals. For example, Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988) with U.K. data, show that 
acquisition premiums in the U.K. were greater in cash deals even before the introduction of 
capital gains taxes. Furthermore Eckbo and Langohr (1989) show that the larger total premium in 
all-cash offers carries over to minority buyouts which convey if any bidder tax benefits (as two 
firms are already consolidated). Also, the Shleifer-Vishny model (2003), posits that bidders 
engage in cash acquisitions only when the target is undervalued and in stock acquisitions when 
target is undervalued in relation to bidder, thus supporting the view about higher premiums for 
cash acquisitions as the value at the beginning is undervalued compared to fundamentals. Other 
hypotheses include deal-financing costs under asymmetric information regarding valuations of 
target and bidder (related to Shleifer-Vishny model), agency and corporate control motives, and 
behavioural arguments (Eckbo, 2009). My last deal-specific variable is initial acceptance 
(agreement) from the board of directors of the target. The results in multiple studies regarding 
initial acceptance and its connection with acquisition premium are mixed. For example, Walkling 
and Long (1984) examine cash tender offers in the U.S. and find no evidence that targets resist 
acquisitions that offer lower bid premiums, while for Australian acquisitions, Eddey and Casey 
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 See e.g. Barney (1988), Capen, Clapp and Campbell (1971), Roll (1986), and Varaiya (1988) 
26
 See e.g. Bugeja and Walter (1995), Franks and Mayer (1996), and Holl and Kyriazis (1996) 
27
 See e.g. Huang and Walkling (1987), Kaufman (1988), and Bugeja and Da Silva Rosa (2010) 
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(1989) find accept recommendations to be correlated with higher bid premium offers. Also, 
Henry (2005) reports that there is no difference in the magnitude of bid premiums offered in 
acquisitions that are supported or rejected by target firm directors. 
6.4.2 Ownership related determinants of acquisition premium 
The ownership structures of the target and acquirer firms are expected to be associated with 
acquisition premiums. These ownership structures are measured with toehold percentage, target 
firm insider ownership, acquirer insider ownership and the value of the acquirer’s board of 
directors ownership in the acquirer variables. Prior literature (e.g. Stulz, 1988 and Stulz, 
Walkling and Song, 1990) argues that a higher toehold stake of the bidder in the target improves 
the bidder’s bargaining position as they need to acquire fewer shares and lower the premium 
paid. In the multiple bidders setting, the expected acquisition premium decreases in light of the 
difference between the toeholds of the winner and competitors (Bulow, Huang and Klemperer, 
1999; Dasgupta and Tsui, 2003). Similarly, the bargaining position of the target firm will also be 
influenced by the ownership in the target held by the insiders of the target firm managers and thus 
in these cases manager ownership is expected to be positively associated with acquisition 
premiums (Bugeja and Loyeung, 2011). However, some authors such as Manne (1965), Fama 
(1980), Denis and McConnel (2003) argue that acquisitions are in some cases motivated to solve 
agency conflicts in the target firm, especially when the difference between actual value of the 
firm and potential value is sufficiently negative due to a large enough failure in internal control 
mechanisms. If that is the case, then acquisition premiums will be highest at lower levels of 
insider’s ownership in target. Actually, the latter view is supported for example by the findings of 
Bugeja and Loyeung (2011) with Australian data and Renneboog, Simons and Wright (2007) 
with U.K. data. Also, total percentage of share ownership of bidder’s insiders in bidding firm is 
expected to influence acquisition premiums. The Idea is that when the bidders are subject to 
agency problems, the more severe the agency problems are the more the bidder is going to 
overpay for the target (Bugeja and Loyeung, 2011). Therefore, I am expecting a negative relation 
between this proxy variable for agency problems and acquisition premiums. Firth’s (1997) results 
support that view, when he finds a positive relation between acquisition returns and the equity of 
the acquiring firm’s directors. However, greater inside shareholdings can also entrench 
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management by making it more difficult to transfer control and remove a manager
28
. It is worth 
noting that instead of management ownership percentage used in many of the studies mentioned, 
I use insider ownership percentage from Worldscope (closely held shares) following Marosi and 
Massoud (2008). In addition to insider ownership, I use also the value of the acquirer’s board of 
directors’ equity holdings in the acquirer to estimate the strength of the alignment between the 
interests of the directors and shareholders. 
6.4.3 Firm specific financial determinants of acquisition premium 
The target firm’s financial characteristics are expected to influence the premium paid on 
acquisitions. The findings in the previous literature are quite intuitive as they suggest the 
following target financial characteristics: firm performance (ROE), leverage ratio, size of the 
firm, free cash flow, market-to-book ratio and sales growth are expected to impact on the 
premium paid. If a acquirer can extract greater performance improvements from underperforming 
firms, premiums would be expected to negatively relate to the target firm return on equity 
(Bugeja and Loyeung, 2011). The evidence in literature, however, seems to present mixed results. 
For example, Goergen and Renneboog (2004), find in European data between the years 1993-
2000 that there is some (weak) evidence that the target’s performance (measured by the return on 
equity) is positively related to the merger or acquisition premium. Regarding the influence of the 
size of the target, there are contradicting hypotheses presented in the literature. First, acquirers 
tend to pay too much for larger acquisitions either due to managerial hubris
29
 or due to 
particularly high private benefits
30
. Second, the acquirers can offer a lower premium in large 
deals for several reasons as follows: 1) the high value at stake can result in more accurate 
valuations or can make managers and their boards more hesitant to offer hefty premiums 
(Alexandridis et al. 2013), 2) the complexity of integrating large firms can make expected 
synergies more uncertain and therefore lead to a lower premium (Alexandridis et al. 2013), 3) 
there are fewer potential buyers for large firms (Gorton, Kahl and Rosen, 2009), reducing the 
“winner’s curse” problem and leading to a lower acquisition premium and 4) large firms tend to 
be subject to lower managerial ownership (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) and thus may accept a 
lower premium (Bauguess, Moeller, Schlingemann and Zutter, 2009). Alexandridis et al. (2013) 
                                                 
28
 See e.g. Stulz (1988) Mikkelson and Partch (1989), and Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) 
29
 See e.g. Roll (1986) Hayward and Hambrick (1997), and Malmendier and Tate (2008) 
30
 See e.g. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Loderer and Martin (1990), Grinstein and Hribar (2004), and Harford 
and Li (2007) 
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show a robust negative relation between offer premium and target size, which indicates that 
acquirers tend to pay less for large firms. Here, I will measure size with the natural logarithm of 
total assets following Bugeja and Loyeung (2011) and Comment and Schwert (1995). Also, 
following Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory, the bidder is likely to pay a higher premium for 
a target with lower leverage and higher cash flows. His theory is consistent with the evidence 
gathered by Lehn and Poulson (1989). Furthermore, highly levered firms have typically a more 
concentrated ownership structure and the more disperse the ownership base is the easier it is for 
the acquirer to acquire its stake from the target (Israel, 1991 and Israel, 1992). The target’s past 
growth might have two opposite effects on the acquisition premium. First, poorly performing 
targets interest buyers because there are potential gains from replacing the current managers. If 
that is the case then the relation between the past performance of the target and the premium paid 
is negative. Schwert (2000) analyzes that relation and obtains a negative but insignificant 
coefficient. Second, poor performance is often associated with fragile financial health, which is 
likely to hinder the bargaining power of the target. The relation between past sales growth and the 
premium is thus expected to be positive. Like Dionne, La Haye and Bergéres (2010), and Bange 
and Mazzeo (2004), I measure sales growth by subtracting previous year’s total sales from the 
latest available fiscal year’s total sales and dividing that with previous year’s total sales. Sales 
growth is used because the empirical evidence provided by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) shows that sales are a less volatile variable than either cash flow or earnings. In addition 
to sales growth, I will also test whether growth opportunities are relevant to acquisition premium 
by using raw Tobin’s Q type of measure (market-to-book ratio). By using that valuation ratio 
with French data, Belze (2005) finds that it positively impacts on the likelihood of acquisition. 
Comment and Schwert (1995) obtain a lower premium with this ratio because some bidders are 
attracted to firms that the market undervalues. However, the impact on premium is ambiguous in 
literature. A negative relation is expected if a low ratio illustrates the undervaluation of the target, 
whereas a positive relation should be seen if a low ratio signals restricted investment 
opportunities (Dionne, La Haye and Bergéres, 2010). 
The acquirer’s financial characteristics that are likely to have an influence on the premium paid in 
acquisitions are market-to-book ratio, ROE, leverage ratio, size of the acquirer and acquirer’s 
free cash flow. Acquirer’s market-to-book ratio is added to the model to take into account the 
findings of Rau and Vermaelen (1998). They find that glamour acquirers pay higher premiums in 
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tender offers and experience poorer performance subsequent to a merger. However, Gondhalekar, 
Sant and Ferris (2004) find opposite results between an acquirer’s investment opportunities and 
the premium paid. The market-to-book ratio is calculated similar to the targets and measured as 
the market capitalisation of the acquirer 42 days prior to original acquisition announcement date 
divided by the book value of equity. The size of the acquirer can be considered as a proxy for 
managerial hubris (Roll, 1986; Malmendier and Tate, 2008), as larger acquirers tend to overpay 
in acquisitions (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004). Thus a positive sign is expected for this 
variable. Bugeja and Loyeung (2011) use bidder’s ROE as a control variable, but they do not find 
significant impact between it and acquisition premiums nor do they explain the reason for its 
existence in their model. However, it must be remembered that high profitability can imply 
greater management abilities and if those can be transferred to a less profitable target firm, then 
synergies from acquisition are higher (Beitel, Schiereck, Wahrenburg, 2004; Louis, 2004). 
Furthermore, Azofra, Días and Gutiérrez (2009) present evidence regarding the relation between 
acquisition premium and bidder’s returns with European data from bank mergers and 
acquisitions. They find that premiums have a positive influence on bidders’ returns thus 
supporting the view that higher synergies are the reason for higher premiums, but that influence 
is negative when premiums are too high as a consequence of overpayment
31
. An acquirer’s 
leverage and free cash flow are important as, according to Jensen (1986), acquirers with high free 
cash flow and low leverage are more likely to undertake value destroying acquisitions. 
Furthermore, if leverage is high, the creditors of the firm will probably prevent the acquirer from 
paying an overly high premium (Gondhalekar, Sant and Ferris, 2004). I therefore predict a 
positive sign for free cash flow and negative for leverage. 
6.4.4 Stock market information related determinants of acquisition premium 
In addition to deal, ownership and financial information, the information from stock market is 
highly likely to influence acquisition premiums paid in acquisitions. Therefore, I will use a target 
firm runup variable to capture target firm recent stock performance and P/E ratio of FTSE 100 
Index to capture market-wide investor sentiment. Target firm runup is the most important control 
variable included in my regressions. Runup can be considered as an empirical proxy for total 
acquisition synergies (Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn, 2009). Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2009), 
                                                 
31
 See for example Bradley, Desai and Kim (1987), Antoniou, Arbor and Zhao (2007) for synergy hypothesis and 
Varaiya (1988), Sirower (1997), Schwert (2003) for overpayment hypothesis. 
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calculate the runup as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the share price of the target on the day 
before the announcement to the share price 42 days before the announcement adjusted for stock 
splits and dividends. The authors concluded that an increase of $1.00 of runup creates an average 
initial premium increase of $0.80. I will deviate little from their definition to 1) avoid using 
unnecessary logarithms
32
, 2) use the original announcement date (ODA) instead of the 
announcement date (see Subchapter 6.1 about reasons to prefer ODA) and 3) calculate simple 
returns by taking the runup period stock return data from Thomson Reuters Datastream in the 
form of “total returns raw”, which is an index-like measure of total returns that include the return 
on stock as change in value as well as dividends, but excludes the effect of stock splits. Simple 
returns are as useful for my purposes as logarithmic returns although the latter are more 
commonly used in academic research, because I do not have time series analysis and thus returns 
do not need to be time additive as logarithmic returns are. Therefore, my runup is calculated as 
follows: 
                           𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑝 =
𝑟−1−𝑟−42
𝑟−42
                                                                  (3)                                                              
where r-1 is the value of total return raw index on the day before announcement and r-42 is the 
value for the same index 42 days before the original announcement date.  
Consistent with the findings presented above, I will expect that the positive runup of the share 
price of the target will increase the premium paid to the target and vice versa for negative runup. 
Following Chatterjee, John and Yan (2012) with acquisition premium data and Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) with stock return data, I will use the P/E ratio of the relevant stock index to 
measure market-wide sentiment’s impact on the acquisition premium. As my sample is based on 
U.K. data it is natural to choose the FTSE 100 Index instead of the S&P 500 Index. I will use the 
P/E figure 42 days before the announcement date because, based on the literature regarding 
runups (see e.g. Schwert, 1996; Dionne, La Haye, Bergerès, 2010; Betton et al., 2014), it is the 
last date before there is any indication in the market about the forthcoming offer bid by the 
ultimate acquirer. 
                                                 
32
 The histogram of the runup variable was studied and there was no significant indication about the usefulness of 
logarithmic transformation as measured with the absence of heavy right tail or large deviations of the normality of 
regression residuals caused by the runup variable. 
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7 Methodology 
In this chapter I will, first of all, describe the cross-sectional regression methodologies used in 
my research in Subchapter 7.1. Secondly, I will present empirical methodology used to validate 
my results in Subchapter 7.2. Methodologies used to validate my results include eliminations of 
outliers, application of the Shapiro-Wilk test to test the normality of regression residuals and 
Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) transformation.  
7.1 Regression methodology 
This subchapter elaborates the regression methodology that I will use in this study in more detail. 
Section 7.1.1 presents a pooled cross section methodology with fixed effects and compares its 
qualities, benefits and hindrances to panel data methodology. Sections 7.1.2-7.1.4 discuss 
different cross-sectional regression models and focus on presenting the differences between 
various cross-sectional regression models used in this thesis. 
7.1.1 Pooled cross section methodology with year fixed effects  
My data can be characterised as pooled cross section (PCS) data and thus I need to consider 
potential problems and hindrances related specifically to my data. I will shortly first describe 
pooled cross section data methodology with time fixed effects and then I will elaborate the key 
benefits and hindrances when compared to balanced panel data methodology. A pooled cross 
section methodology is used since I have data from multiple cross-sectional elements across 
multiple years for the U.K. GAAP and IFRS sub samples. My data differs from panel data by 
having a different sample of firms in each year, while panel data keeps the same entities, selected 
in the sample at the beginning of the time period, and measures some specific quantity about 
them over time. Assuming temporal stability between the relations studied in this thesis may not 
be a feasible assumption and therefore my model will include time indicator variables to capture 
structural change over time. Therefore, I will use the time fixed effects regression method. In my 
case, the year is the smallest possible and generally used time period in academic research, which 
will control for the abnormal changes in average acquisition premiums that differ from normal 
situations. Econometrically, the setup I have is described in the following equation: 
TtNiuudx itit
T
t
ttitit ...,2,1 ; ,...,2,1          )N(0,~     ,
1
1
1  
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            (4) 
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where it  is the dependent variable, a is the intercept term, 1  is a k x 1 vector of parameters to 
be estimated on the explanatory variables, and itx  is a time-variant 1 x k regressor matrix. 
Following similar logic, term ttd  describes the parameters and observations for the time fixed 
effects with t  being the coefficients to be estimated and td  dummy variables employed. To 
avoid the dummy variable trap and perfect multicollinearity, I will exclude one year dummy. The 
results for excluded year dummy are then reflected in the coefficient of the intercept,  . 
The key benefit of pooled cross sections data compared to panel data is that it generally does not 
suffer from autocorrelation, because observations, or in my case target firms, for each year are 
independent of each other. I will nevertheless check whether there is any autocorrelation because 
of the same acquirers acquiring multiple targets during my time period. I will use Durbin-Watson 
test statistics for this purpose and interpret whether test statistics that significantly differ from 2 
imply that there are potential problems with serial correlation. Due to lack of serial correlation, 
statistical analysis of PCS data is simpler than for panel data. 
The main drawback of pooled cross sections compared to panel data is that PCS require a more 
exhaustive amount of control variables to control for unit specific characteristics, while in panel 
data the usage of the same units throughout the period controls automatically for that issue. 
Therefore the potential problem in terms of omitted variable bias is larger in the case of PCS 
data. The panel data also takes care of the problem of individual heterogeneity, which is a 
consequence of unobservable variables that specifically affect the dependent variable. To tackle 
these issues, I have added a considerable amount of control variables to maximise the adjusted R-
squared and F-test in my models and thus decreased the impact of potentially omitted or 
unobservable variables. In addition, I will run robustness tests according to information presented 
in Subchapter 7.2. 
7.1.2 Model building method 
I will build my main model by employing a combination of forward/backward regressions with 
separate variable testing. The variables included in this testing procedure are based on the 
literature, but only literature regarding variables in final models is presented in Chapter 6 
regarding variable construction. Variables are selected in the final model based on the increases 
in adjusted R-squared and F-test values. In addition to statistical goodness of fit, serious 
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consideration is given to power of the regression analysis. Therefore in cases where the adjusted 
R-squared and F-test would suggest inclusion of another variable, but that introduction would 
drastically decrease the available sample size the variable is left out. For example the analyst 
dispersion variable is excluded from my analysis due to a drop in sample size. The following 
Sections 7.1.3-7.1.4 present the final models based on the model building techniques discussed 
here. 
7.1.3 Replica and Baseline OLS regression models for acquisition premiums 
In this subchapter, I will discuss the cross-sectional regression models used in my analysis, which 
aim to answer the three research questions presented in the Introduction Chapter. The first model 
shown here is a direct replication of the similar study done by Bugeja and Loyeung (2011), but 
instead of Australian acquisition offers it is applied to acquisitions of control among U.K. listed 
firms. The second model (the Baseline model) incorporates more information from the literature 
with the objective of making the model more robust to omitted variable bias and thus it increases 
the validity of t-tests and accuracy of coefficients by introducing new control variables. From the 
Baseline model the target firm insider ownership variable is excluded due to lack of data to keep 
the power of my results sufficiently high. The Baseline model, however, includes new key 
variable in the shape of finite life intangibles, which aim to study the relation between acquisition 
premium and the recognition of those assets in business combinations. The interaction between 
IFRS and finite life intangibles is excluded from the Baseline model due to a lack of observations 
of finite life intangible assets recognised in business combinations under U.K. GAAP (see 
descriptive statistics in Subchapter 5.2.). The detailed description of both models and the 
extension models to the Baseline model can be seen from Table 9 in Section 7.1.4, which 
presents extensions to the Baseline model. 
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Here is the model designed to test the association between acquisition premiums and IFRS 
related variables: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖 +  𝛽3𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖
+ 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖(𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙)
+   ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠)
𝑦
𝑗=5
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠)
𝑎
𝑗=𝑧
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)
𝑐
𝑗=𝑏
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)
𝑒
𝑗=𝑑
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑛 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒 �)
𝑔
𝑗=𝑓
+   𝜀𝑖                                                                                                                                 (5.1) 
Main variables in model are: 
Goodwillki = The amount of goodwill estimated by method k for each transaction i. Variable used 
in regression is one of the following three variables: goodwill on the balance sheet of the target 
firm, goodwill recognised in business combinations and approximation of goodwill. 
IFRSi = Dummy variable for IFRS, which has value 0 before the adoption of IFRS and value 1 if 
the acquirer consolidates the target according to IFRS for each transaction i 
Intangiblei = The partition of total consideration allocated to finite life intangible assets for each 
transaction i 
Goodwillki*IFRSi = Interaction variable used to describe the impact of IFRS on the coefficient of 
Goodwillki for each transaction i 
 
For more detailed definitions of variables see Table 3. Most of the models studied include 1-year 
dummy variables. The values for those dummies or control variables are not tabulated in the 
context of regressions unless specified otherwise. 
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7.1.4 Extensions to Baseline OLS regression models for acquisition premiums 
Here I will present Baseline model extensions, which incorporates three different variables used 
as a proxy for managerial discretion in purchase price allocations: Segment, HHI and UNA. These 
three variables are measured for the combined firm after consolidation. All of these variables are 
used in separate regressions to both maximise the power of my results by increasing sample size 
and also to prevent the multicollinearity problem between Segment and HHI variables. The 
Baseline model with managerial discretion extension is presented below: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑖 +  𝛽2𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖 +  𝛽3𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘𝑖 +  𝛽6𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑘𝑖 ∗ 𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖
+   ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑠)
𝑦
𝑗=10
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠)
𝑎
𝑗=𝑧
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)
𝑐
𝑗=𝑏
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠)
𝑒
𝑗=𝑑
+  ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠) +  
𝑔
𝑗=𝑓
 𝜀𝑖                                                        (5.2) 
Managerial discretion is proxied with the following three variables based on the findings of 
Ramanna and Watts (2012): 
Segmentki = The natural logarithm of the number of business segments for each transaction i 
HHIi = Calculated complexity of the combined firm after transaction, measured with the business 
segment sales based Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for each transaction i 
UNAi = Unverifiable net assets for each transaction i 
Other main variables are described shortly in the previous Section 7.1.3 presenting Replica and 
Baseline models. For detailed descriptions of the variables used in regressions see Table 3 for 
more information. The following Table 9 summarises the key differences between the cross-
sectional acquisition premium models used in this thesis. 
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Table 9 – Variable differences in cross-sectional regression models 
This table describes the differences between the Bugeja and Loyeung (2011) Replica model and different Baseline model versions. Subsample 
analyses describe the model used for separate subsamples according to accounting treatment and the existence of reported earnings based bonus 
incentives. X denotes cases, when variable in question belongs to a model in same row. All other variables are same in all models. 
    
Finite life 
intangibles Share only Cash only 
TGT  
Leverage 
ACQ 
Leverage 
TGT Insider 
ownership % Runup 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 m
o
d
el
s Replica 
  
X X X X 
 
Baseline X X 
  
X 
 
X 
Subsample analyses X X     X 
UNA X X 
  
X 
 
X 
Segment X X 
  
X 
 
X 
HHI X X 
  
X 
 
X 
                  
    
FTSE 100 
P/E 
ACQ Board 
owner-ship £ 
TGT  
Growth  
1 year 
Initial 
agreement UNA* Segment* HHI* 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
 m
o
d
el
s Replica 
       
Baseline X X X X 
   
Subsample analyses  X  X    
UNA X X X X X 
  
Segment X X X X 
 
X 
 
HHI X X X X 
  
X 
*Includes interaction term with IFRS indicator variable.   
From Table 9, we can see that Cash only variable has changed to Share only variable in Baseline 
models and that TGT Leverage variable has been excluded from the model. The reason for those 
changes is those variables’ insignificance. The reason for dropping the TGT Insider ownership 
percentage variable is its negative effect on the sample size. Similar to subsample analyses FTSE 
100 P/E and ACQ Leverage variables are dropped due to multicollinearity and TGT Growth 1 
year due to its negative effect on the sample size. The reasons for adding new variables in 
Baseline models are based on their significant impact on the goodness of fit. Theoretical 
foundations for all variables are presented in Chapter 6. 
7.2 Sensitivity and robustness analyses 
To ensure the robustness and validity of the results, I invoke two different test procedures, 
namely elimination of significant outliers and Inverse Hyperbolic Sine (IHS) transformation for 
selected models. Due to lack of winsorisation, the data set used includes few outlier observations. 
Therefore, I will first eliminate the highly influential outlier(s) according to the procedure 
described in Section 7.2.1 and run all my models without that/those outlier(s) to increase the 
robustness of my results. For other statistically significant, but less influential outliers, I will 
follow the procedure outlined in Section 7.2.2 and then rerun my regression models. After that, in 
Section 8.4.1, I will compare the adjusted results with the original results.  
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I will also apply IHS transformation in a separate analysis to further increase the normality of 
regression residuals. If that assumption is not satisfied then the p-values for t-tests for small 
sample sizes are not valid. However, normality is not required to obtain unbiased estimates of the 
regression coefficients. Thus, I will use models with transformation only to check p-values for t-
tests, where there is evidence that the normality assumption is violated. IHS transformation also 
allows for negative values unlike logarithmic transformations. In addition, I run the Shapiro-Wilk 
test to ascertain whether the transformations employed are sufficient in terms of the normality 
assumption and in case of heteroskedasticity I will use the HC3 robust adjustment procedure for 
small sample sizes to standardise all regression residuals. Section 7.2.3 discusses the Shapiro-
Wilk test in more detail and Section 7.2.4 covers IHS transformation, which uses the Shapiro-
Wilk test in parameter estimation procedure. 
7.2.1 Eliminating extremely influential outliers 
I will study each regression model for the influence of the outliers. Similar to Section 7.2.2, I will 
use studentized residuals to identify outliers and then check for the Cook’s Distance to estimate 
their influence on coefficients of my regressions. If I am able to find severe outliers (studentized 
residuals >3) with an extremely high influence for all my models (Cook’s D > 0.5), I am then 
going to study them more closely. Following the arguments of Bollen and Jackman (1990), I will 
remove an outlier only if it is both a statistically influential outlier and outlier in terms of its 
different characteristics compared to the rest of the sample. I am going through offer documents 
and annual reports for the effective year of the suspicious acquisitions to find out information 
about characteristics not incorporated in my models or other transactions 
7.2.2 Statistical outliers 
After elimination of extremely influential outliers, I will investigate the data employed in the 
regression  for statistical outliers by evaluating the studentized residuals associated with 
variables. According to Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) and Fox (1991) the studentized residuals 
computed from a regression equation with an absolute value of greater than 2 could raise 
concerns, while studentized residuals with an absolute value of greater than 3 are considered to 
be statistical outliers. I will further study the impact of those outliers with Cook’s Distance, 
which is an overall measure of influence. The lowest value that Cook's D can assume is zero, and 
the higher the Cook's D is, the more influential the point is. I therefore re-estimated regression 
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models after deleting observations with studentized residuals with an absolute value greater than 
3 and Cook’s D greater than 4/n, which can be assumed as a cut-off point according to Bollen and 
Jackson (1990). Eliminating outliers is especially important for small sample sizes where a few 
strong outliers might have a large impact on estimated coefficients. I will show the summary of 
the results from elimination of other outliers in section 8.4.1.  
7.2.3 Shapiro-Wilk test for the normality of regression residuals 
The Shapiro-Wilk test used to test normality of the regression residuals and variables is the most 
important statistics test in addition to adjusted r-squared for regressions. Other  statistics used and 
their explanation can be found in Appendix B. These include the Durbin-Watson Statistics 
(DWS) and variance inflation factor (VIF). DWS is used to check for potential problems with 
autocorrelation even though those problems are likely to be limited due to the fact that pooled 
cross sections data is not as vulnerable to serial correlation as panel data. VIF is used to measure 
harm inflicted by collinearity on the precision of estimated  individual coefficients. 
The importance of normality of residuals is undeniable since it is an underlying assumption under 
linear regression analysis and t-tests. However, technically normality is necessary only for 
hypothesis tests (i.e. p-values for t-tests and F-test) to be valid, because estimation of coefficients 
only requires that the errors are identically and independently distributed. When regression 
residuals violate the normality assumption, interpretation and inferences regarding the 
significance of the results are invalid, even in aforementioned cases the coefficients are valid. 
This normality assumption is of particular interest in my thesis, because my sample sizes are less 
than 200 for every model specification. For large samples, it is not a problem, because then the 
error term is actually the sum of a large number of independent error terms. Even if the individual 
error terms are not normally distributed, by the central limit theorem their sum may be assumed 
to be normally distributed. Based on the literature
34
 testing different normality tests for variables, 
I have chosen the Shapiro-Wilk test for the normality of regression residuals. Evidence shows 
that the Shapiro-Wilk is the most powerful normality test for all types of distribution and sample 
sizes. In addition to regression residuals, the Shapiro-Wilk test is also used in combination with 
histograms to test the normality of the dependent variable. This information is then used to decide 
whether to make log/IHS transformation. In addition, the Shapiro-Wilk test is used in the 
                                                 
34
 Se e.g. Mendes and Pala (2003), Keskin, 2006, and Razali and Wah (2011) 
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estimation of theta parameter for the IHS transformation function in the next Section 7.2.4 The 
following algorithm describes the Shapiro-Wilk test (𝑊): 
𝑊 =
(∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )
2
∑ (𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?𝑖)2
𝑛
𝑖
                                                                 (6) 
where 
?̅? =
∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
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√2(𝑛 2 + 1)⁄
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𝑎1 = −√𝑎1
2, 𝑎𝑛 = √𝑎𝑛2  
𝑎𝑖 = (2 𝑐⁄ )𝑚𝑖, 𝑖 = 2, … , 𝑛 − 1 
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) , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝛷 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑑𝑓 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  
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Based on the computed 𝑊 statistics, the significance is calculated by linearly interpolating within 
the range of simulated critical values given in Shapiro and Wilk (1965). 𝑊 statistics are reported 
within the result tables of this thesis. 
7.2.4 Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation 
The purpose of the IHS transformation is to reduce skewness and kurtosis of regression residuals 
by transforming selected variables employed in regression models. This is important, because 
violation of the normality of regression residuals assumption makes the use of t-tests invalid for 
hypothesis testing process. IHS transformation is rather similar to logarithmic transformations as 
it uses the arsinh function with scaling parameter theta, 𝜃. The key benefit of the arsinh function 
compared to logarithmic transformations is that it is defined also for zeros and negative values. 
This transformation has been commonly used with wealth data due to a long and thick right hand 
tail, a nontrivial number of wealth holdings in the multi-million dollar range and a substantial 
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fraction of the population with no wealth at all
35
. However, it can be used with different kinds of 
data sets. For example, Kale, Reis and Venkateswaran (2009) use IHS as an alternative way to 
handle negative gaps with compensation gap data. Therefore, I will apply IHS transformation as 
an alternative way to handle negative and zero values in addition to using nontransformed data. 
Univariate Inverse Hyperbolic Sine function is defined according to Johnson (1949) and 
Burbidge, Magee and Robb (1988) as follows: 
𝜃−1𝑠𝑖𝑛ℎ−1(𝜃𝑥) = 𝜃−1 ln (𝜃𝑥 + (𝜃2𝑥2 + 1)
1
2)                                        (6) 
Where 
𝜃 is a scaling parameter and 𝑥 nontransformed variable. 
IHS as a symmetric and monotone function is linear around the origin and approximates the 
logarithm in its right tail. For large values of 𝑥 the IHS function is simply a vertical displacement 
of the logarithm: ln (𝜃𝑥 + (𝜃2𝑥2 + 1)
1
2)≈𝑙𝑛2𝜃 + 𝑙𝑛𝑥. The scaling parameter 𝜃 governs the 
proportion of the function’s domain in which it is essentially linear and the proportion in which it 
approximates the logarithm. As 𝜃 approaches zero, the IHS transformation is linear for a larger 
proportion of its domain. To see this relation another way, note that the derivate of IHS(𝑥) is 
1/√𝜃2𝑥2 + 1. If 𝑥 is large relative to 𝜃, this derivative approximates the derivative of the log, 
1/𝑥 for most positive (or negative) values of 𝑥. If 𝑥 is small relative to 𝜃, the derivative is 
approximately one and the function is linear for most of its domain. (Pence, 2006) 
Another transformation that is defined for positive and negative values, and nests both the linear 
and logarithmic transformation, is the Box-Cox transformation. However, in this case IHS is 
preferable because the Box-Cox transformation is not defined at zero. In my sample there are 
multiple zeros for the Recognised goodwill variable for example. 
To estimate the optimal 𝜃 for the purpose of increasing normality of the variables, I will employ 
a rather simple, but sufficiently accurate method, which relies upon maximisation of the p-value 
of Shapiro-Wilk test statistics. In literature, IHS transformation has been generally applied to 
either the dependent variable by using the log-likelihood function presented by Burbidge, Magee 
and Robb (1988) or by using the simplified arsinh function with 𝜃 = 1 or some other tested value 
                                                 
35
 see e.g. Burbidge, Magee and Robb (1988), Pence (2006), Gale and Pence (2006), Dynan, Mian and Pence (2012), 
and Maynard and Qiu (2009) 
80 
 
  
 
used in previous studies. In the case of the independent variables, I could not find any study, 
which had studied the log-likelihood function for independent variables. The benefit of setting 
𝜃 = 1 in previous studies has been that for example in case of the net worth studies, the 
coefficients have been able to be interpreted similarly to the coefficients of logarithmic 
transformation for net worth values as small as $100 (see e.g. Maynard and Qiu, 2009; Cobb-
Clark and Hildebrand, 2006). However, in my case I am only interested in normalising 
independent variables to improve the normality of regression residuals sufficiently to make valid 
conclusions regarding the hypotheses presented in Chapter 4. As normality of regression 
residuals impact only p-values of t-statistics, I can use the coefficients of nontransformed 
variables to estimate the effect size for variables. Therefore, I find using Shapiro-Wilk’s p-value 
optimisation procedure regarding 𝜃 that maximises independent variables’ normality the most 
useful for my purposes. In short I will input IHS transformation in equation (8) to equation (6) in 
place of 𝑦 and run an optimisation procedure regarding the maximisation of the p-value of the 
Shapiro-Wilk test, which is calculated by linearly interpolating the 𝑊-statistics within the range 
of simulated critical values given by Shapiro and Wilk (1965). A script used to estimate 𝜃 with 
SPSS R integration plug-in can be found from the Appendix D.  
For an additional sanity check, I examined transformed variables used in regression for potential 
increases in variable specific standard errors and decreases in adjusted r-squared. If transformed 
variables failed to meet those criteria I used IHS transformation with lower 𝜃 value in case of 
large 𝜃 values and higher 𝜃 value in case of small 𝜃 values. I found out that reasonable lower and 
upper boundaries for 𝜃 values are 0.1 and 50, when standard errors are small before applying IHS 
transformation. While my analysis somewhat ignores the joint distribution of independent 
variables and changes in variance, the above mentioned procedure produces reasonably efficient 
results as witnessed from Table 22 in Appendix F. Values for adjusted r-squared are, however, 
lower than for models employing 𝜃=1. Despite this shortcoming, my results are superior, in terms 
of improvement in normality of regression residuals, to untabulated results gained by simply 
using arsinh function with 𝜃=1.   
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8 Findings 
In this chapter, I will present the findings of my thesis for the Baseline model and Replica model 
in Subchapters 8.1 and 8.2. These models are discussed thoroughly in Section 7.1.3. After the 
main findings, Subchapter 8.3 discusses the elimination of one substantially different outlier from 
both initial samples. The following Subchapter 8.4 shows the result of the robustness tests 
employed and finally Subchapter 8.5 concludes this chapter by presenting additional analyses. 
8.1 Baseline results  
This subchapter presents findings for Baseline models. As later shown in Subchapter 8.2, which 
presents findings for the Replica model, my model is superior to the Replica model in terms of 
statistical goodness of fit and the normality of regression residuals. Thus, it is reasonable to focus 
on more important results first. In addition, I will compare my results with Bugeja and Loyeung 
(2011) and highlight the differences. However, despite the similarity in topic, my results are not 
fully comparable with the Bugeja and Loyeung (2011) study due to the fact that their study focus 
on Australian takeover announcement offers instead of fully completed acquisition of control in 
the U.K. Also, I make comparisons to other studies where appropriate. Section 8.1.1 presents 
basic results for goodwill variables and finite life intangibles for the full sample and for the U.K. 
GAAP and IFRS subsamples. Section 8.1.2 discusses the influence of CEO bonuses and Section 
8.1.3 shows the results regarding the proxy variables for managerial discretion in PPA.  
8.1.1 Statistical fit and the association between goodwill and acquisition premiums 
Table 10 presents the cross-sectional regression results for the Baseline model in which the 
dependent variable is acquisition premium measured as the natural logarithm of the final offer 
price divided by the target share price 42 days before original acquisition announcement date. 
Following Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) I will use the terms initial offer price or initial 
offer premium instead for the nontransformed acquisition premium to make the distinction 
between those two clearer. The Initial offer premium is measured as the final offer price minus 
target share price 42 days before original acquisition announcement date divided by the target 
share price 42 days before original acquisition announcement date. Year fixed effects are added 
to models from (3) to (4) to make sure that yearly variation is not causing regression results in 
models (1) and (2).   
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Table 10 – Goodwill, finite life intangible assets and acquisition premium, Baseline results 
This table presents the results of the OLS regression for Baseline results with announcement dates from Jan 1 1999 to Dec 2012 for 178 
acquisitions among listed firms in the U.K. The dependent variable is Acquisition premium, which is the natural logarithm of the final offer price 
divided by the target share price 42 days before original acquisition announcement date.  In models from (1) to (2) TGT Goodwill and Goodwill 
approximation (Goodwillk) are studied without year fixed effects, which are added on to models from (3) to (4). TGT Goodwill is the balance sheet 
value of goodwill for the target firm divided by the consideration paid and Goodwill approximation is the target firm market value of equity 42 
days before original announcement date minus the book value of equity, divided by the book value of equity. IFRS is an indicator variable 
denoting acquisitions accounted according to IFRS. Finite life intangibles is the recognised amount of finite life intangible assets divided by the 
consideration paid. Variable TGT MTB is excluded from models with Goodwill approximation due to high correlation and variable FTSE 100 P/E 
ratio is excluded from models with year fixed effects due to high multicollinearity with year dummies as indicated by high VIF ratio (>10). See 
Table 3 for definitions of independent control variables. Asterisks ***, **, * represent statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
(two-tailed), respectively. All standard errors are corrected using the HC3 robust adjustment procedure for small samples. 
 Dependent Variable = Acquisition Premium 
 Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TGT Goodwill -0.191**  -0.195**  
  (-2.34)  (-2.25)  
Goodwill approximation  -0.010  -0.013* 
  (-1.52)  (-1.91) 
IFRS 0.024 0.066 -0.038 -0.012 
  (0.46) (1.30) (-0.66) (-0.18) 
TGT Goodwill*IFRS 0.112  0.094  
 (1.16)  (0.86)  
Goodwill approximation*IFRS  0.001  0.002 
   (0.14)  (0.18) 
Finite life intangibles 0.117 0.069 0.106 0.062 
  (1.17) (0.63) (0.91) (0.49) 
Runup -1-42 0.600*** 0.625*** 0.604*** 0.628*** 
  (11.32) (12.15) (10.41) (10.90) 
FTSE 100 P/E ratio  0.004 0.007*   
  (0.97) (1.92)   
Multiple bidders 0.046 0.063 0.048 0.069 
  (0.78) (1.04) (0.81) (1.14) 
Friendly 0.024 0.001 0.005 -0.029 
  (0.30) (0.01) (0.05) (-0.34) 
Share only -0.019 -0.036 -0.013 -0.028 
  (-0.44) (-0.80) (-0.29) (-0.61) 
Toehold % -0.072 -0.081 -0.003 -0.052 
  (-0.37) (-0.39) (-0.05) (-0.21) 
Initial agreement -0.009 0.007 0.019 0.043 
 
(-0.19) (0.15) (0.34) (0.78) 
TGT MTB -0.012**   -0.014***  
  (-2.37)   (-2.74)  
TGT ROE 0.139*** 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.124*** 
  (4.14) (3.71) (3.86) (2.59) 
TGT Size -0.030** -0.032** -0.023 -0.026* 
  (-2.17) (-2.28) (-1.52) (-1.68) 
TGT FCF -0.044 -0.043 -0.017 -0.010 
  (-0.28) (-0.34) (-0.09) (-0.07) 
TGT Growth 1 year -0.053 -0.053 -0.067 -0.065 
  (-1.22) (-1.02) (-1.18) (-1.07) 
ACQ Insider ownership % 0.061 0.042 0.060 0.041 
  (0.72) (0.51) (0.70) (0.50) 
ACQ  ROE -0.085 -0.079 -0.085 -0.079 
  (-1.33) (-1.15) (-1.28) (-1.10) 
ACQ Leverage 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006 
  (0.44) (0.35) (0.28) (0.21) 
ACQ Size 0.010 0.014 0.008 0.014 
  (0.94) (1.35) (0.69) (1.15) 
ACQ Board ownership £ 0.016** 0.016** 0.013* 0.013* 
  (2.32) (2.20) (1.80) (1.66) 
ACQ FCF 0.298 0.251 0.327* 0.268 
  (1.47) (1.22) (1.66) (1.31) 
Constant 0.235 0.096 0.254 0.206 
  (1.18) (0.46) (1.18) (0.91) 
Year fixed effects no no yes yes 
Number of acquisitions 178 178 178 178 
Adjusted R2 0.682 0.660 0.688 0.662 
Shapiro-Wilk test 0.988 0.993 0.983** 0.991 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.321 2.351 2.535 2.507 
Starting with the indicators of statistical fit, the model evidently possesses good level explanatory 
power with the adjusted R
2
s ranging from 0.660 to 0.688. In addition, regression residuals deviate 
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from OLS regression normality assumption at 10% level only in the case of the model (3) in 
Table 10. The data also provide partial support for Hypothesis 1 in that TGT Goodwill measure 
for goodwill is statistically significantly correlated to the acquisition premium pre-IFRS at the 
5% significance level. However, the data does not provide support to Hypothesis 2 or to the 
findings of Bugeja and Loyeung (2011) regarding the positive impact of IFRS on the coefficient 
of goodwill measures nor Hypothesis 6 regarding the value relevance of finite life intangibles. 
The OLS coefficient of -0.191 indicates that a one-unit increase in TGT Goodwill is associated 
with a 0.191 unit decrease in the natural logarithm of acquisition premium under U.K. GAAP, 
while keeping the other variables constant. This result translates into a 19.1% decrease in 
acquisition premium for every one-unit increase in TGT Goodwill. One-unit increase in TGT 
Goodwill represents an increase in the goodwill on the balance sheet of the target firm, which is 
at the size of the total consideration paid. The size of the effect for the initial offer premium, is a 
decrease of 25.21 percentage points per one-unit increase in TGT Goodwill.   The effect is nearly 
identical when taking into account year fixed effects. This effect can be considered somewhat 
significant, because one standard deviation change in TGT Goodwill represent a decrease of 9.58 
percentage points in average initial offer premium.  
Adding year fixed effects, however, do have implications for the significance of the OLS 
coefficient of -0.012 for Goodwill approximation under U.K. GAAP, which is now statistically 
significant at the 10% level. The size of its impact on the initial offer premium represents a 
decrease of 1.72 percentage points, when Goodwill approximation increases by one-unit. This 
effect translates to a decrease of 6.45 percentage points per one-unit change in standard deviation, 
which is clearly smaller than the impact of the goodwill on the balance sheet of the target firm. 
Other key variables such as the interaction between IFRS and goodwill variables and finite life 
intangibles do not seem to differ from zero at the 10% significance level, even though the sign of 
the coefficients of those variables are positive as expected. The most significant control variables 
in the model are Runup, TGT MTB and TGT ROE of which the Runup variable explains the 
largest part of the variation in acquisition premium by contributing a 0.79-0.83 percentage point 
change in average initial offer price per one percentage point change in Runup. This result is 
identical with the findings of Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) with US control bid data, who 
find that a dollar increase in the runup raises the initial offer price by $0.80.  
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To study whether the negative correlation between goodwill and acquisition premium still exists 
after the adoption of IFRS, I have employed a subsample analysis for U.K. GAAP and IFRS 
acquisitions separately. Table 11 presents the results for this subsample analysis. Subsample 
analysis shows weak level evidence that IFRS has made the previously found pre-IFRS goodwill 
related discount in acquisition premium insignificant and thus supports Hypothesis 2. 
Table 11 – Regression results for U.K. GAAP transactions and IFRS transactions separately 
This table presents the results of the OLS regression for U.K. GAAP acquisitions and IFRS acquisitions with announcement dates from Jan 1 1999 
to Dec 2012 for acquisitions among listed firms in the U.K. Panel A presents normal regression results, while Panel B presents significantly 
changed results for model (2) after removal of statistical outliers and after adding variable transformations to improve normality of regression 
residuals. In models (1) and (2) the sample of 116 acquisitions is formed from transactions where acquirer has used U.K. GAAP acquisition 
accounting, while in models (3) and (4) IFRS has been used in business combinations to generate a sample size of 80 acquisitions. The dependent 
variable is Acquisition premium, which is the natural logarithm of the final offer price divided by the target share price 42 days before original 
acquisition announcement date.  TGT Goodwill is the balance sheet value of goodwill for the target firm divided by the consideration paid and 
Goodwill approximation is the target firm market value of equity 42 days before original announcement date minus the book value of equity, 
divided by the book value of equity. IFRS is an indicator variable denoting acquisitions accounted according to IFRS. Control variables are based 
on the Baseline model excluding FTSE 100 P/E ratio and ACQ Leverage variables due to multicollinearity (VIF values>10) and TGT Growth 1 
year variable due to small number of observations. These limitations lead to following 15 control variables: Runup, Multiple bidders, Friendly, 
Share only, Toehold %, Initial agreement, TGT MTB, TGT ROE, TGT Size, TGT FCF, ACQ Insider ownership %, ACQ ROE, ACQ Size, ACQ 
Board ownership £ and  ACQ FCF. See Table 3 for definitions of independent control variables. Asterisks ***, **, * represent statistical 
significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All standard errors are corrected using the HC3 robust adjustment 
procedure for small samples. 
Panel A: Normal regression results 
 Dependent Variable = Acquisition Premium 
 U.K. GAAP business combinations  IFRS business combinations 
Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
TGT Goodwill -0.236*   -0.080  
  (-1.90)   (-0.91)  
Goodwill approximation  -0.013*   -0.008 
  (-1.72)   (-0.64) 
Finite life intangibles 0.360 -0.086  0.073 0.062 
  (0.46) (-0.04)  (0.43) (0.36) 
Constant 0.249 0.122  -0.507 -0.635 
  (0.77) (0.36)  (-0.74) (-0.88) 
Control variables yes yes  yes yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes  yes yes 
Number of acquisitions 116 116  80 80 
Adjusted R2 0.717 0.696  0.464 0.458 
Shapiro-Wilk test 0.982 0.980*  0.916*** 0.921*** 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.273 2.251  2.632 2.671 
 
      
Panel B: Regression results for model (2) without cases when recognised goodwill has indefinite life and with variable transformations 
  
Excluding U.K. cases 
with  indefinite life 
goodwill 
 With variable 
transformations 
applied 
 
  (5)  (6)  
Goodwill approximation  -0.012    
  (-1.58)    
Goodwill approximation, IHS transformed   -0.117**  
    (-2.40)  
Finite life intangibles  -0.047  -0.084  
   (-0.02)  (-0.04)  
Constant  0.103  0.133  
  (0.29)  (0.41)  
Control variables  yes  yes  
Year fixed effects  yes  yes  
Number of acquisitions  113  116  
Adjusted R2  0.707  0.705  
Shapiro-Wilk test  0.984  0.991  
Durbin-Watson statistics  2.262  2.354  
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Table 11 shows that the model clearly works much better for U.K. GAAP acquisitions as 
expressed by higher adjusted r-squared values compared to IFRS acquisitions. One potential 
reason could be that the sample size for the IFRS sample is smaller and thus it is more vulnerable 
to the effects of outliers. This theory is confirmed by an untabulated robustness test, where the 
removal of one statistical outlier improves the models’ adjusted r-squared values from 0.464 to 
0.589 in case of TGT Goodwill model and from 0.458 to 0.587 in case of Goodwill 
approximation model. While the IFRS sample models violate the normality assumption of 
regression residuals and somewhat suffers from autocorrelation as seen from Durbin-Watson 
Statistics that exceed 2.5, it is unlikely that these would have had a serious effect on the 
significance of the results due to small coefficients. 
Under U.K. GAAP the same measures for goodwill as in Table 10, namely TGT Goodwill and 
Goodwill approximation, exhibit negative correlations with acquisition premium. The Goodwill 
approximation measure is vulnerable to changes in model specifications. For example, exclusion 
of U.K. GAAP observations where recognised goodwill has been considered to have an indefinite 
life makes the variables coefficient insignificant, while employing variable transformations to 
increase normality of regression residuals makes the coefficient significant at 5% level. 
8.1.2 The influence of CEO bonuses 
Table 12 describes how different incentives for CEOs connect CEOs’ actions to changes in the 
association between goodwill and acquisition premiums. More specifically, Table 12 shows the 
coefficients for key variables for two subsamples: those with reported earnings based incentives 
and those without. A CEO has reported earnings based incentives if he has been paid bonuses in 
either of the two previous years before acquisition and those bonuses are based on increase in 
earnings, operating profit, EPS or return on sales figures. Goodwill related independent variables 
in Table 12 are TGT Goodwill and Recognised goodwill, of which the latter is the amount of 
goodwill recognised in business combinations.   
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Table 12 – Regression results for acquirers with and without earnings based bonus incentives 
This table presents the results of the OLS regression for acquirers with and without earnings based bonus incentives with announcement dates 
from Jan 1 1999 to Dec 2012 for acquisitions among listed firms in the U.K. Panel A presents normal regression results, while Panel B presents 
significantly changed results for model (4) after removal of statistical outliers and after adding variable transformations to improve normality of 
regression residuals.  In models (1) and (2) the sample is formed from transactions where acquirer hasn’t paid bonuses to CEO in the two previous 
fiscal years or bonuses are based on something else than earnings, operating profit, EPS or return on sales, while in models (3) and (4) only 
transactions where acquirer has paid bonuses in either of the two previous years to CEO and those bonuses are linked to one of the aforementioned 
indicators are included. Models (1) and (2) also include transactions were bonuses are tied to EVA/PANI/ROCE/EP or transactions where only 
word profitability is mentioned. The dependent variable is Acquisition premium, which is the natural logarithm of the final offer price divided by 
the target share price 42 days before original acquisition announcement date.  TGT Goodwill is the balance sheet value of goodwill for the target 
firm divided by the consideration paid and Recognised goodwill is the recognised balance sheet value of goodwill divided by the consideration 
paid. IFRS is an indicator variable denoting acquisitions accounted according to IFRS. Control variables are based on the Baseline model 
excluding FTSE 100 P/E ratio and ACQ Leverage variables due to multicollinearity (VIF values>10) and TGT Growth 1 year variable due to 
small number of observations. These limitations lead to following 15 control variables: Runup, Multiple bidders, Friendly, Share only, Toehold %, 
Initial agreement, TGT MTB, TGT ROE, TGT Size, TGT FCF, ACQ Insider ownership %, ACQ ROE, ACQ Size, ACQ Board ownership £ and  
ACQ FCF. See Table 3 for definitions of independent control variables. In models (3) and (4), year dummies for years 2011 and 2012 are 
combined in constant term due to only one observation for year 2012. Asterisks ***, **, * represent statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All standard errors are corrected using the HC3 robust adjustment procedure for small samples. 
Panel A: Normal regression results 
 Dependent Variable = Acquisition Premium 
 
No bonuses paid in previous years or bonuses 
not awarded from increase in reported earnings 
 Bonuses paid in previous years and bonuses 
awarded from increase in reported earnings 
Independent Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
TGT Goodwill -0.020   -0.441**  
  (-0.10)   (-2.28)  
Recognised goodwill  0.041   -0.074** 
  (0.31)   (-2.05) 
IFRS -0.082 0.055  -0.117 -0.099 
  (-0.38) (0.23)  (-1.28) (-1.07) 
TGT Goodwill*IFRS 0.005   0.395  
  (0.02)   (1.59)  
Recognised goodwill*IFRS  -0.178   0.110* 
  (-0.91)   (1.81) 
Finite life intangibles 0.066 0.044  0.081 0.083 
  (0.21) (0.15)  (0.49) (0.44) 
Constant -0.643 -0.415  0.772* 0.367 
  (-0.60) (-0.43)  (1.71) (0.67) 
Control variables yes yes  yes yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes  yes yes 
Number of acquisitions 71 71  101 101 
Adjusted R2 0.658 0.678  0.667 0.593 
Shapiro-Wilk test 0.939*** 0.934***  0.981 0.961*** 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.552 2.475  2.456 2.484 
      
Panel B: Regression results for model (4) without two statistical outliers and with variable transformations 
  Excluding two 
statistical outliers 
 With variable 
transformations  
 
  (5)  (6)  
Recognised goodwill  -0.059**  -0.065  
  (-1.99)  (-1.49)  
IFRS  -0.093  -0.126  
  (-1.08)  (-1.25)  
IFRS*Recognised goodwill  0.096  0.117*  
  (1.62)  (-1.76)  
Finite life intangibles  0.077  0.198  
   (0.041)  (0.91)  
Constant  0.463  0.433  
  (1.09)  (0.79)  
Control variables  yes  yes  
Year fixed effects  yes  yes  
Number of acquisitions  99  101  
Adjusted R2  0.660  0.561  
Shapiro-Wilk test  0.982  0.980  
Durbin-Watson statistics  2.452  2.551  
Again dividing the sample in two pieces increases the deviation of regression residuals from 
normal distribution, as measured with the Shapiro-Wilk test. Otherwise models exhibit nearly 
equal explanatory power when compared to full sample analyses. 
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The most striking result from Table 12 is that the earlier discovered significant relation between 
TGT Goodwill and acquisition premium hold only for transactions where the CEO has reported 
earnings based bonus incentives. Thus there is support for Hypothesis 3. The size of this effect is 
increased by 12.54 percentage points and now a one standard deviation change in TGT Goodwill 
represent a 22.12 percentage points decrease in initial offer premium. Additionally, while full 
sample analysis did not show any correlation between Recognised goodwill and acquisition 
premium, the bonus sample analysis reveals a significantly negative correlation under U.K. 
GAAP at the 5% level and a significantly positive correlation under IFRS at the 10% level. The 
effect sizes for these relations are minus 5.86 percentage points and plus 8.71 percentage points, 
respectively. The significance of the results for the Recognised goodwill, however, are 
questionable due to violation of the normality assumption. Therefore, Table 12 presents 
separately the results after removal of two statistical outliers and with variable transformations to 
shed some light on the issue. These results for models (5) and (6) in Table 12 are conflicting. 
Results without statistical outliers present only significant and negative correlation between 
Recognised goodwill and acquisition premium under U.K. GAAP, while the results with variable 
transformations show that IFRS has had a significantly positive effect on the coefficient of 
Recognised goodwill. Pulling these results together, it can be said that there is weak evidence that 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS removes the recognised goodwill related discount in acquisition 
premium; when the acquirers’ CEOs have reported earnings based bonus incentives. For 
transactions made by other acquirers, amortisation of goodwill seems to have no effect at all 
under U.K. GAAP and this relation stays unaffected by the adoption of IFRS.  
Furthermore, the Goodwill approximation variable is insignificant and is thus excluded from 
Table 12. This is not surprising, because it is the most controversial measure of goodwill of the 
three measures used in this thesis. First, it is perfectly correlated with TGT MTB ratio, thus it 
resembles the fair value of growth assets. Second, it is significantly and positively correlated with 
the recognised amount of goodwill, because it measures, for example, the going concern goodwill 
of the target. Third, by its definition it excludes the goodwill on the balance sheet of the target 
firm and thus is significantly and negatively correlated with it. It is worth noticing that goodwill 
on the balance sheet of the target firm is also part of the recognised goodwill, since its fair value 
in PPA is zero. Fourth, it also includes part of the intangible assets to be recognised in business 
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combinations. These issues make Goodwill approximation the most inaccurate of the three 
goodwill measures used. Therefore, I will give less weight to it than other measures. 
8.1.3 Acquisition premiums and managerial discretion in purchase price allocations 
The relation between managerial discretion in purchase price allocations and acquisition 
premiums is studied by introducing two organisational complexity related variables called 
Segment and HHI, and one variable measuring unverifiable net assets (UNA). Segment is the 
natural logarithm of the number of business segments and HHI measures internal sales 
concentration. See the exact calculation for UNA in Table 3. All these variables are calculated for 
the combined firm after acquisition. Table 13 presents results for organisational complexity 
related variables and Table 14 describes the impact of UNA. 
Table 13 – The relation of combined firm complexity with acquisition premium pre- and post-IFRS 
This table presents the results of the baseline OLS regression extension for Segment and HHI variables with announcement dates from Jan 1 1999 
to Dec 2012 for acquisitions among listed firms in the U.K. The dependent variable is Acquisition premium, which is the natural logarithm of the 
final offer price divided by the target share price 42 days before original acquisition announcement date.  In models from (1) to (2) TGT Goodwill 
and Goodwill approximation (Goodwillk) are studied without year fixed effects, which are added on to models from (3) to (4). TGT Goodwill is the 
balance sheet value of goodwill for the target firm divided by the consideration paid and Goodwill approximation is the target firm market value of 
equity 42 days before original announcement date minus the book value of equity, divided by the book value of equity. IFRS is an indicator 
variable denoting acquisitions accounted according to IFRS. Finite life intangibles is the recognised amount of finite life intangible assets divided 
by the consideration paid. Segment is the natural logarithm of the number of business segments and HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman ratio of 
business segment sales. Both variables are estimated for the combined firm after effective date of the transaction. Control variables are same than 
in Table 10: Runup, Multiple bidders, Friendly, Share only, Toehold %, Initial agreement, TGT MTB, TGT ROE, TGT Size, TGT FCF,TGT Growth 
1 year, ACQ Insider ownership %, ACQ ROE, ACQ Leverage ACQ Size, ACQ Board ownership £ and  ACQ FCF.  See Table 3 for definitions of 
independent control variables. Asterisks ***, **, * represent statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
All standard errors are corrected using the HC3 robust adjustment procedure for small samples. 
 Dependent Variable = Acquisition Premium 
Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4)  
TGT Goodwill   -0.182** -0.173**   
    (-2.27) (-2.26)   
Goodwill approximation   -0.015** -0.015** 
 
    (-2.22) (-2.04) 
 
IFRS   -0.113 -0.001 -0.089 
 
0.016 
 
    (-1.41) (-0.01) (-1.04) 
 
(0.15) 
 
TGT Goodwill*IFRS 0,096 0.075 
 
  
   (0.92) (0.74) 
 
  
Goodwill approximation*IFRS   0.004 0.006 
 
   (0.46) (0.67) 
 
Finite life intangibles 0,111 0.094 0.066 
 
0.046 
 
   (0.91) (0.77) 
 
(0.51) 
 
(0.36) 
 
 
Segment   -0.057*  -0.075**  
    (-1.75)  (-2.16) 
 
Segment*IFRS 0.069  0.070 
   (1.31)  (1.29) 
HHI    0.109  0.156** 
     (1.58)  (2.13) 
HHI*IFRS    -0.075  -0.077 
 
     (-0.60)  (-0.59) 
 
Constant   0.292 -0.170 0.234 0.54 
 
    (1.33) (0.72) (1.03) (0.22) 
 
Control variables yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects   yes yes yes yes 
Number of acquisitions 166 162 166 162 
Adjusted R2 0.688 0.678 0.667 0.656 
Shapiro-Wilk test 0.982** 0.985* 0.985* 0.988 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.534 2.574 2.515 2.541 
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Table 13 shows us that selection of goodwill variables have an effect on the coefficients of 
Segment and HHI variable. When those are combined with Goodwill approximation their 
correlation with acquisition premium is noticeably stronger than when combined with the TGT 
Goodwill variable. In addition, none of the organisational complexity variables significantly 
support the Hypothesis 4, which states that more complex acquirers should be more willing to 
pay higher premiums under IFRS due to larger opportunities to engage in goodwill management. 
Before IFRS there is evidence that diversified firms pay less than others for acquisitions as the 
coefficient for Segment is significantly negative and the coefficient for HHI variable is 
significantly positive for the model with Goodwill approximation. Results regarding Segment 
must be interpreted with care due to the fact that those models violate the normality assumption 
of OLS. To confirm my results, variable transformations were applied and these results are in 
more detail discussed in section 8.4.3. In short those results support the results for models (3) and 
(4), but when combined with TGT Goodwill the Segment variable is no longer significant.  
Regarding the size of the effect, one per cent change in Segment translates to -0.057 or -0.075 per 
cent changes in acquisition premium, when all other variables are kept constant. To elaborate this 
effect, if the acquirer were to have three segments after acquisition then it would pay either 3.76 
or 4.95 percentage points less, in terms of average initial offer price, than an acquirer with two 
segments after acquisition. HHI variable’s impact on acquisition premium according to model (4) 
is +15.6% per one-unit change in HHI variable. Thus an extremely diversified firm with 10 equal 
segments and an HHI of 0.1 would pay 18.53 percentage points less initial offer price than a firm 
with one segment and a HHI of 1 after acquisition. 
Next, I will go through the results for unverifiable net assets and acquisition premium according 
to Table 14. Hypothesis 5 states that a firm with more unverifiable net assets would be able to 
“combine” internally generated goodwill with external goodwill to potentially avoid necessary 
impairments in goodwill. As we can see from the results, we must reject Hypothesis 5 regardless 
of how the UNA variables are calculated. 
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Table 14 – The relation of unverifiable net assets with acquisition premium 
This table presents the results of the baseline OLS regression extension for UNA variables with announcement dates from Jan 1 1999 to Dec 2012 
for acquisitions among listed firms in the U.K. The dependent variable is Acquisition premium, which is the natural logarithm of the final offer 
price divided by the target share price 42 days before original acquisition announcement date.  TGT Goodwill is the balance sheet value of goodwill 
for the target firm divided by the consideration paid. IFRS is an indicator variable denoting acquisitions accounted according to IFRS. Finite life 
intangibles is the recognised amount of finite life intangible assets divided by the consideration paid. UNA and ModUNA are measures of 
unverifiable net assets for the combined firm after effective date of the transaction (see calculation in Table 3). UNA is winsorised at the 1% and 
1% percentiles and ModUNA at the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles. Additionally, results for in-sample ranks are presented for both variables. Control 
variables are same than in Table 10: Runup, Multiple bidders, Friendly, Share only, Toehold %, Initial agreement, TGT MTB, TGT ROE, TGT Size, 
TGT FCF,TGT Growth 1 year, ACQ Insider ownership %, ACQ ROE, ACQ Leverage ACQ Size, ACQ Board ownership £ and  ACQ FCF.  See 
Table 3 for definitions of independent control variables. Asterisks ***, **, * represent statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
(two-tailed), respectively. All standard errors are corrected using the HC3 robust adjustment procedure for small samples. 
 Dependent Variable = Acquisition Premium 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TGT Goodwill -0.164** -0.162** -0.165** -0.165** -0.159** -0.160** 
  (-2.14) (-2.05) (-2.12) (-2.19) (-2.06) (-2.07) 
IFRS -0.030 -0.028 -0.011 -0.031 -0.032 -0.051 
  (-0.42) (-0.39) (-0.12) (-0.43) (-0.41) (-0.58) 
TGT Goodwill*IFRS 0.055 0.052 0.056 0.054 0.049 0.050 
  (0.55) (0.48) (0.53) (0.54) (0.45) (0.47) 
Finite life intangibles 0.089 0.102 0.107 0.088 0.101 0.102 
  (0.64) (0.71) (0.77) (0.65) (0.73) 
)) 
(0.74) 
UNA -0.002      
  (-0.13)      
UNA*IFRS 0.004      
  (0.22)      
UNA winsorised  -0.001     
   (-0.06)     
UNA winsorised*IFRS  0.000     
   (0.00)     
UNA in-sample ranked 
 
  0.000    
    (0.14)    
UNA in-sample ranked*IFRS   -0.000    
    (-0.24)    
ModUNA    -0.004   
     (-0.23)   
ModUNA*IFRS    0.001   
     (0.05)   
ModUNA winsorised     -0.004  
      (-0.19)  
ModUNA winsorised*IFRS     0.006  
      (0.16)  
ModUNA in-sample ranked 
 
     -0.000 
       (-0.04) 
ModUNA in-sample ranked*IFRS      0.000 
       (0.44) 
Constant 0.152 0.196 0.184 0.156 0.203 0.187 
  (0.59) (0.76) (0.75) (0.61) (0.80) (0.72) 
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of acquisitions 161 161 161 161 161 161 
Adjusted R2 0.699 0.696 0.696 0.699 0.696 0.697 
Shapiro-Wilk test 0.976*** 0.979** 0.979** 0.976*** 0.979** 0.978** 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.577 2.589 2.585 2.573 2.584 2.586 
Table 14, however, shows no evidence that Hypothesis 5 would hold in reality. In fact, none of 
the ways to calculate unverifiable net assets are even close to be significant. Thus I must reject it. 
8.2 Results for Bugeja and Loyeung (2011) model 
Table 15 presents the cross-sectional regression results for the Replica model in which the 
dependent variable is also the acquisition premium measured as the natural logarithm of the final 
offer price divided by the target share price 42 days before original acquisition announcement 
date. Year fixed effects controls for changes in the acquisition premium during the period are 
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added to models from (4) to (6). The purpose of Table 15 is to make direct comparison with the 
Bugeja and Loyeung (2011) results and also to showcase the need for a more advanced model 
specification due to the qualities of my sample. 
Table 15 – Goodwill and acquisition premium, Replica results 
This table presents the results of the OLS regression for the Replica model studied by Bugeja and Loyeung (2011) with announcement dates from 
Jan 1 1999 to Dec 2012 for 179 acquisitions among listed firms in the U.K. The dependent variable is Acquisition premium, which is the natural 
logarithm of the final offer price divided by the target share price 42 days before original acquisition announcement date.  In models from (1) to (3) 
TGT Goodwill, Goodwill approximation and Recognised goodwill (Goodwillk) are studied without year fixed effects, which are added on to 
models from (4) to (6). TGT Goodwill is the balance sheet value of goodwill for the target firm before acquisition divided by the consideration 
paid, Goodwill approximation is the target firm market value of equity 42 days before original announcement date minus the book value of equity, 
divided by the book value of equity and Recognised goodwill is the recognised balance sheet value of goodwill divided by the consideration paid. 
IFRS is an indicator variable denoting acquisitions accounted according to IFRS. Replica model includes following control variables used in 
Baseline models: Multiple bidders, Friendly, Toehold %, TGT MTB, TGT ROE, TGT Size, TGT FCF, ACQ Insider ownership %, ACQ ROE, ACQ 
Leverage, ACQ Size and ACQ FCF. Control variables not included in Baseline models are: Cash only, TGT Insider ownership, TGT Leverage and 
ACQ MTB. Table 9 further explains the difference between Replica and Baseline models. See Table 3 for definitions of independent control 
variables. Asterisks ***, **, * represent statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All standard errors 
are corrected using the HC3 robust adjustment procedure for small samples. 
 Dependent Variable = Acquisition Premium 
Independent Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TGT Goodwill -0.314*   -0.294   
  (-1.88)   (-1.54)   
Goodwill approximation  -0.010   -0.015  
  (-0.44)   (-0.65)  
Recognised goodwill   0.042   0.062 
   (0.48)   (0.67) 
IFRS -0.004 0.024 0.050 -0.105 -0.007 0.035 
  (-0.08) (0.42) (0.66) (-1.24) (-0.08) (0.29) 
TGT Goodwill*IFRS 0.165   0.139   
 (0.89)   (0.67)   
Goodwill approximation*IFRS  -0.013   -0.014  
  (-0.59)   (-0.64)  
Recognised goodwill*IFRS   -0.066   -0.066 
    (-0.66)   (-0.61) 
Constant 0.127 -0.078 -0.068 0.038 -0.055 -0.029 
  (0.34) (-0.20) (-0.18) (0.10) (-0.13) (-0.07) 
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects no no no yes yes yes 
Number of acquisitions 179 179 179 179 179 179 
Adjusted R2 0.260 0.180 0.175 0.300 0.240 0.235 
Shapiro-Wilk test 0.953*** 0.957*** 0.957*** 0.972*** 0.979*** 0.978*** 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.209 2.109 2.116 2.388 2.339 2.356 
 
I will start my analysis with the overall statistical fit of the Replica model. It can clearly be seen 
from the adjusted R
2
 that the explanatory power of the Replica model is weak; at best it only 
reaches a value of 0.300. However, the explanatory power in the context of consolidated 
acquisitions among listed U.K. firms is significantly higher than in the Bugeja and Loyeung’s 
(2011) comparative adjusted R
2
 of 0.023 with the sample of Australian acquisition offer bids. The 
Replica model also suffers from another problem, which is its inability to meet the requirement of 
the normality assumption of regression residuals. Transforming variables with IHS and Ln 
transformations is not enough to make the regression residuals normal. Only the removal of four 
statistical outliers allows the models (4) and (6) in Table 15 to meet that requirement.  
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Therefore, due to low explanatory power and violation of the normality assumption it is not 
surprising that results for all measures of goodwill are shown as insignificant. Even in reality they 
are not as evidenced by the results of the Baseline model. Also, the results after removal of 
statistical outliers are insignificant for these two models. Removal of statistical outliers, 
nevertheless, makes regression residuals closer to normal distribution and increases the adjusted 
r-squares to 0.349 for model (4) and to 0.246 for model (6) in Table 15. These results without 
statistical outliers cannot be given full weight due to the fact that only those outliers that are 
unique from other observations in the sample or represent a population other than the one I am 
interested in can be dropped from the sample such as the extreme outlier discussed in the 
following Subchapter 8.3. One could argue that these conflicting results are driven by different 
samples. However, when looking at the descriptive statistics in Subchapter 5.2 more carefully it 
can be seen that Replica and Baseline samples are reasonably similar especially in the case of the 
values for the dependent variable and key independent variables.  
Thus, based on the lower explanatory power of the Replica model, I reason that the difference in 
results is mainly driven by omitted variable bias. Another fact that supports my reasoning is that 
in the Replica models there are at least three statistical outliers for each model specification while 
in the basic Baseline models there are at most only two statistical outliers. Regarding omitted 
variables, Bollen and Jackson (1990) state that a case can be an outlier because an important 
explanatory variable has been omitted from the model – indeed, in such setting, the outlier may 
be the most important case in the analysis because it points to this form of specification error. In 
fact, the Replica model omits Runup, the most important variable, when compared to the 
Baseline models and two of the outliers of the Replica model are included as normal observations 
in the Baseline sample, but are not considered as statistical outliers. Therefore, my Summary and 
Conclusions Chapter is mainly based on the findings of the baseline models.   
8.3 Elimination of significant outlier from my sample 
As explained in Section 7.2.2 extreme outliers were searched by studying studentized residuals 
and Cook’s D. I found only one statistically extreme outlier. Studentized residuals greatly 
exceeded the threshold of 3 for each of the models studied in this thesis. Furthermore, Cook’s D 
was also higher than the comparable threshold of 0.5, effectively meaning that the outlier was 
also significantly influential. After studying the transaction documents more carefully I found out 
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that WPP plc. – as the largest creditor of the Cordiant Communications group – acquired the firm 
before Cordiant Communications group was required to enter into administration. The offer 
document describes the impact of WPP’s financial support: “If such support is withdrawn, and if 
additional sources of financing are not made available to Cordiant, it is likely that an 
administrator or administrative receiver would be appointed in respect of Cordiant. In these 
circumstances, Cordiant Shareholders would be highly unlikely to receive any value for their 
shares.” Thus it seems that the transaction was effectively a fire sale situation for the 
shareholders of Cordiant, which is also backed up by the fact that calculated acquisition premium 
for the transaction is extremely negative (-91.5%). This transaction is different from all other 
observations and thus its removal from the sample can be justified. As a result of this analysis, I 
have excluded this extreme outlier from my sample for all regression models. This elimination 
drastically improved the normality of the regression residuals, adjusted r-squared and lowered the 
coefficients of goodwill variables. As results including this extreme outlier are not reliable, those 
results are not tabulated. 
8.4 Sensitivity and robustness tests 
I now present the results of robustness tests that were undertaken to ensure the robustness of my 
primary results. First, in Section 8.4.1, I will report the results for variables that were affected by 
statistical outliers. Second, in Sections 8.4.2 and 8.4.3, I will go through results for models 
utilizing variable transformations, namely inverse hyperbolic sine transformation and logarithmic 
transformation, to transform the variables employed in the regression models to reduce the 
severity of non-normality of regression residuals and also reduce the impact of heteroskedasticity. 
To further mitigate econometric issues associated with heteroscedastic error terms, the HC3 
adjustment procedure was applied to all regression models evaluated in my empirical analysis.  
8.4.1 Outliers and changes in regression coefficients 
Data employed in my analysis was investigated for outliers. The investigation was done by 
evaluating the studentized residuals associated with the variables. According to Belsley, Kuh and 
Welsch (1980) and Fox (1991) the studentized residuals computed from a regression equation 
with an absolute value of greater than 2 could raise concerns, while studentized residuals with an 
absolute value of greater than 3 are considered to be outliers. The impact of these outliers was 
further studied with Cook’s Distance, which is an overall measure of influence. I therefore re-
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estimated regression models after deleting observations with studentized residuals with an 
absolute value greater than 3 and Cook’s D greater than 4/n, which can be assumed as a cut-off 
point according to Bollen and Jackson (1990). These outliers have an impact on the results and 
therefore it is justified to present comparable results for the variables that were changed the most.  
Recall from Section 8.1.2 that removal of outliers made the interactive term IFRS*Recognised 
goodwill insignificant in the sample, where acquirers’ CEOs have earnings based targets. This 
information is already placed on Table 12 to show the reader the most important findings 
immediately. Table 16 below presents the results also for other changed coefficients with their t-
statistics.  
Table 16 – Robustness tests: The impact of statistical outliers to the coefficients of key variables 
This table presents all changes in the significance of the coefficients of the key variables after removal of statistical outliers. Statistical outlier is 
here defined as an observation, which studentized residual exceed 3 and Cook’s D exceed 4/n. There were no other changes made to models. 
Asterisks ***, **, * represent statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. All standard errors are 
corrected using the HC3 robust adjustment procedure for small samples. 
  Dependent Variable = Acquisition Premium 
  Regression results   Excluding outliers 
Independent Variables Obs. Coefficient t-value   Obs. Coefficient t-value 
Baseline models               
TGT Goodwill (no fixed effects) 178 -0,191** -2,34   177 -0,206*** -2,75 
U.K. GAAP Sample               
TGT Goodwilla 116 -0,236* -1,90   114 -0,215 -1,64 
Acquirers with earnings based incentives        
IFRS*Recognised goodwill 101 0.110* 1.81  99 0.096 1.62 
aRegression residuals for the model excluding outliers deviate significantly from normal distribution according to Shapiro-Wilk test at 10% level. 
Therefore, t-statistic for the model without outliers is unreliable.  For the sample including outliers, regression residuals do not deviate 
significantly from normal distribution. 
Table 16 shows us first and foremost that only in two cases, in addition to the aforementioned 
case shown already in Table 12 had the removal of the statistical outliers any impact on the 
coefficients of the key variables. In the first case, the significance of the coefficient for TGT 
Goodwill variable in the Baseline model without year fixed-effects increased from 5% level to 
1% level when statistical outliers were excluded. In the second case, Table 16 further shows that 
the removal of statistical outliers from the U.K. GAAP Sample makes the coefficient of the TGT 
Goodwill variable insignificant. This last result, however, is unreliable due to the fact that 
regression residuals, after removing two outliers from the sample, deviate significantly from 
normal distribution when tested with the Shapiro-Wilk test. Table 20 regarding the impact of 
outliers on the normality of regression residuals can be found from Appendix C. Table 20 
together with Table 16 confirms the results obtained regarding organisational complexity due to 
increased normality of regression residuals and somewhat strengthens my baseline results. 
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Results, however, fail to confirm or reject U.K. GAAP Sample results due to violation of the 
normality assumption. In this rare case removing statistical outliers changes the model and 
exposes it to other statistical outliers. In summary, this robustness test reveals that only the result 
for the IFRS*Recognised goodwill variable seems to be driven by statistical outliers, while there 
are not any other significant and negative impact on the results. 
8.4.2 IHS and logarithmic transformations  
To transform my variables, I have used IHS and natural logarithmic transformations. Regression 
statistics and illustrative impact of IHS and logarithmic transformations are presented in Table 
22, which can be found from Appendix F. I have applied IHS transformation in situations where 
A) Shapiro-Wilk test statistics indicate large variations from normal distribution, B) applying 
IHS transformation has a positive impact on the normality of the observations, C) the variable has 
observations with zeros or negative values and D) applying the IHS transformation does not have 
a significantly negative impact on the adjusted r-squared of the model.  Variables transformed for 
Baseline models with IHS are, Goodwill approximation, Recognised goodwill, TGT ROE, ACQ 
ROE and ACQ Leverage. In addition Acquisition premium and TGT FCF variables have been 
transformed with IHS for a few models. Due to the violation of D) the following variables cannot 
be transformed with IHS in my sample sizes: TGT Goodwill, Toehold % and Finite life 
intangibles. In addition, I have applied logarithmic transformation for MTB variables. 
Employing part of those variables to models eliminates problems with normality of regression 
residuals for the following models: Baseline TGT Goodwill model, U.K. GAAP Sample: 
Goodwill approximation model, No bonus sample: Goodwill recognised model and models 
regarding organisational complexity. In total, all 16 models tested show improved normality of 
regression residuals after employing selected variable transformations. Transformed variables 
included in all models can be seen from Table 21 in Appendix E. The Durbin-Watson Statistics 
have also improved for 12 out of the 16 models. Similarly adjusted r-squares have improved for 8 
models, especially for the weaker Replica models. Thus it can be reasonably concluded that 
employing these transformations have increased the robustness of the results in general. 
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8.4.3 Variable transformations and changes in regression coefficients 
Table 17 below shows the significance levels for key variables before and after employing 
variable transformations to correct violations of the OLS normality assumption. While violations 
of normality assumption do not have an impact on the regression coefficients it will make 
hypothesis testing with t-statistics invalid. Thus the impact of the results should be read from pre-
transformed coefficients, while the significance should be read from Table 17. The Shapiro-Wilk 
test is used to test overall changes in regression residuals’ normality for each model. 
Table 17 – Robustness tests: Variable transformations and changes in the significance of the coefficients of key variables 
This table shows changes in significance of the coefficients for key variables after employing variable transformations including Inverse 
Hyperbolic Sine transformation. Sign represent either positive or negative change or no change (NA) in the significance of the variable. Changes 
in the coefficient’s significance are only posted here if the model’s residuals do not deviate significantly from the normal distribution at 10% level 
after employing variable transformations. Normality of regression residuals is estimated with Shapiro-Wilk test. Variable transformations 
employed can be seen from Table 21, which can be found from Appendix E. 
  Changes in significance level 
  Pre-transformation   Transformed 
Independent Variables t-statistics two-tailed p-value Sign t-statistics two-tailed p-value 
Bonus incentives: Recognised goodwill model, N=101     
Recognised goodwill -2.05 0.043 - -1.49 0.140 
IFRS*Recognised goodwill -1.81 0.074 NA 1.76 0.082 
U.K. GAAP Sample: Goodwill approximation model, N=116  
Goodwill approximation -1.72 0.087 + -2.40 0.018 
Segment Sample: TGT Goodwill model, N=166  
 TGT Goodwill -2.27 0.025 + -2.63 0.009 
Segment  -1.75 0.081 - -1.13 0.261 
HHI Sample: TGT Goodwill model, N=162      
TGT Goodwill -2.26 0.025 + -2.75 0.007 
Segment Sample: Goodwill approximation model, N=166  
 Goodwill approximation -2.22 0.028 NA -2.30 0.022 
Segment -2.16 0.032 NA -2.24 0.026 
Based on the information in Table 17, it can be concluded that in Bonus incentive sample the 
coefficient of Recognised goodwill variable is no longer negative at any significance level. 
Regardless, transformed results do support the positive impact of the Recognised goodwill 
variable after adoption of IFRS for firms with reported earnings based incentives. In U.K. GAAP 
Sample the coefficient of Goodwill approximation variable is significantly negative at the 5% 
level, when data transformations are applied. In both Segment and HHI models TGT Goodwill 
variable’s significance level exceeds 1% threshold, but Segment variable’s significance level 
drops below 10% threshold. However, when paired with the Goodwill approximation variable, 
Segment variable’s significance at 5% level is unchanged after adopting variable transformations. 
Pulling these results together, previous main findings are largely supported and are negatively 
changed only in the case of the Recognised goodwill variable in the Bonus incentives model. 
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8.5 Further analyses 
In addition to the previously presented analysis further investigation was undertaken into:  
1. whether U.K. acquisitions where the recognised goodwill has indefinite life have any 
impact on the results 
2. whether goodwill is negatively correlated with the percentage of bonuses paid to CEOs 
3. whether the addition of an analyst dispersion measure to the model would have an impact 
on the results 
Reasons for these investigations are the following. First, under U.K. GAAP as explained in 
Section 2.2.2, firms had an incentive to record goodwill with indefinite life if strict requirements 
were met. Based on this, I expect that transactions where recognised goodwill is recorded with 
indefinite life should be similar with IFRS observations due to similar accounting treatment. 
Second, CEOs with relatively large accounting based bonuses might have an incentive to avoid 
targets with goodwill before IFRS due to amortisation’s negative impact on reported earnings. 
Third, the findings of Chatterjee, John and Yan (2012) suggest that investors’ divergence of 
opinion is positively and significantly related to total acquisition premiums. Therefore I 
investigate the effect of adding an analyst earnings forecast measure to my models. 
Regarding the first part, I eliminated all observations where recognised goodwill was given 
indefinite life under U.K. GAAP. However, results reveal that in U.K. GAAP Sample goodwill 
approximation variable’s significance was actually lowered after making this elimination instead 
of the opposite. Otherwise results do not differ from the main results. Regarding the second and 
third parts, there are no significant results that would contradict my findings or add new 
information. In both of those models, regression residuals were significantly different from 
normal distribution, which implies either a small sample size (analyst dispersion models) or 
omitted variable bias (CEO bonus percentage). In case of the CEO bonus percentage, I find that it 
is not correlated negatively with goodwill measures. Adding the analyst dispersion variable, 
measured as the dispersion in EPS forecasts for FY+1 before the offer announcement, to the 
model drastically decreased sample size for Baseline model to 94. In addition, when measured 
with VIF statistics, IFRS and goodwill variables suffer from multicorrelation with year dummies 
and each other in models with the analyst dispersion variable. Therefore the effect of analyst 
dispersion variable cannot be tested with year fixed-effects.  
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9  Summary and conclusions 
This study investigates whether changes in acquisition accounting from U.K. GAAP to IFRS 
influence acquisition premiums paid on acquisitions of control among U.K. listed firms. My main 
sample consists of 178 domestic acquisitions with announcement dates from 1999 to 2012. My 
main findings partially support the existence of goodwill related discount on premiums. Goodwill 
on the balance sheet of the target firm and the goodwill approximated are significantly correlated 
with acquisition premium. The former represent an estimated discount of 9.58 percentage points 
from average initial offer price for one-unit change in standard deviation while the latter’s effect 
size is 6.45 percentage points per one-unit change in standard deviation. Thus, there is supporting 
evidence concerning goodwill related discount. However, goodwill recognised in transactions is 
not significantly and negatively correlated with acquisition premium probably due to joint 
determination of acquisition premium and recognised goodwill. The benefit of goodwill on the 
balance sheet of the target is that it is automatically included in recognised goodwill and it is free 
from above mentioned endogeneity issue (see Subchapter 6.2). 
The goodwill related discount on premium does not seem to be significantly affected by the 
introduction of IFRS. The coefficients for IFRS and goodwill interaction variables, however, are 
positive and that indicates that the discount on premium might not be significant anymore after 
the adoption of IFRS. When separately testing IFRS and U.K. GAAP acquisitions I find that the 
negative discount on premium seems to hold only for acquisitions accounted under U.K. GAAP. 
My results differ from Bugeja and Loyeung (2011) as they find that goodwill related discount is 
significantly smaller after the adoption of IFRS.  
My results further show that goodwill related discount only exists for transactions where the CEO 
has reported earnings related incentives for the goodwill on the balance sheet of the target firm. 
There is no discount for the goodwill approximated to be generated in transactions, but it is not 
surprising given the fact that it is the most controversial measure for goodwill (see Subchapter 
6.2). However, this is the first time in this thesis when the recognised amount of goodwill 
indicates a significant correlation with acquisition premiums. There is weak level evidence that 
the recognised amount of goodwill has a negative effect on acquisition premium before IFRS and 
that IFRS has had a significant and positive effect on the coefficient of Recognised goodwill 
variable. 
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Finally, I find some evidence that diversified firms paid lower premiums than others before the 
adoption of IFRS, but that adoption of IFRS has not had any significant impact on this relation. 
Furthermore, I find no indication that unverifiable net assets or their recognition would have had 
a significant impact on acquisition premiums pre- or post-IFRS. Thus I can reject Hypotheses 4-
6. In addition, when testing separately the model used by Bugeja and Loyeung (2011), serious 
concerns arose regarding omitted variable bias due to the model’s low explanatory power, low 
normality of regression residuals and somewhat large amount of statistical outliers.  
Following Table 18 summarises my hypotheses and implications of my main results for each 
hypothesis.  
Table 18 – Summary of hypotheses and results 
# Short description of the hypothesis Verification 
H1 
Goodwill correlates negatively with acquisition premium pre-IFRS Partially supported and 
economically strong 
H2 
The mandatory adoption of IFRS decreases goodwill related 
discount in acquisition premium 
Partially supported and 
economically weak 
H3 
H1 and H2 only hold when acquirer’s CEO expects to receive 
bonuses based on reaching earnings related targets 
Supported and economically 
strong 
H4 
For organisationally complex firms the impact of IFRS on 
acquisition premium is positive 
Rejected 
H5 
Unverifiable net assets has a positive impact on the acquisition 
premium after the adoption of IFRS 
Rejected 
H6 
Recognition of acquired finite life intangible assets is positively 
correlated with acquisition premium 
Rejected 
Possible weaknesses of my thesis include criticism regarding the impact of external factors on 
acquisition premiums. One can argue that acquisition premiums have changed due to a sixth 
merger wave, which occurred from 2003 to 2007 (see Alexandridis, Mavrovitis and Travlos, 
2012), market crash during 2000 and 2001 or due to the financial crisis. Robinson and Shane 
(1990) present another criticism and argue that the empirical relation between acquisition 
accounting method and acquisition premiums is difficult to assess, because benefits (or costs) 
associated with accounting method are difficult to isolate and measure separately. However, it is 
not clear that these issues or events would influence the coefficients of the main variables. In 
addition, I have already included an exhaustive number of control variables and year fixed effects 
to minimise those effects. Furthermore, the results from U.K. and IFRS sub sample analysis 
confirm the main findings from full sample analysis. This evidence indicates that it is unlikely 
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that my results are driven by any change in the association of the acquisition premiums with any 
of the control variables between pre- and post-IFRS periods. 
My findings also shed more light on how IASB’s decisions regarding financial statement 
information can influence the actions of certain market participants. Previously, it was known 
that firms in the U.K. use the discretion in goodwill impairment according to the objectives of 
IASB and thus convey private information about future cash flows (AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares and 
Roberts, 2011). In addition, the findings of Detzen and Zülch (2012) and Shalev, Zhang and 
Zhang (2013) indicate that firms with bonus incentives engage in earnings management in 
purchase price allocations to decrease future amortisations of finite life intangible assets. My 
results paint a more comprehensive picture by providing information that U.K. firms with bonus 
incentives are likely to lower (increase) paid acquisition premium, when future reported earnings 
decrease(increase) due to changes in financial reporting standards.  
Market participants, especially those who are selling their business, can use my findings to 
acknowledge how the CEOs of potential buyers might see the goodwill on their balance sheet and 
the goodwill that will be generated from acquisitions. My results can be applied to give an overall 
idea about how listed and private acquirers might behave regarding the difference in their 
accounting for goodwill. Thus, based on the results for U.K. GAAP, I expect that private 
acquirers with earnings targets for bonuses lower their offer price if the target has goodwill on the 
balance sheet or the acquisition generates goodwill. However, my results are only directional and 
a separate study concerning private acquirers would be needed to draw further conclusions. 
In the case of the public firms one aspect that has not been studied before regarding IFRS and 
M&As would be how beneficial are transaction multiples calculated according to IFRS rules 
when compared to local standards. This kind of study could follow methodologically, for 
example, the doctoral thesis of Schreiner (2007) regarding equity valuation using multiples. It 
would be important to study the changes in the value relevance of transaction multiples as the 
impact of the adoption of IFRS on financial ratios and other reported information was significant 
(see e.g. Kallunki, Lantto and Sahlström, 2008; Capkun et al. 2008). Furthermore it would add to 
the literature studying the usefulness of IFRS in the context of firm valuation in M&A.  
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APPENDIX A: Rest the correlation coefficients of for control variables 
Table 19 – Correlation coefficients for control variables 
This table presents to correlation coefficients for control variables. Correlation coefficients for key variables are shown in Table 7. 
  
Runup -1-
42 FTSE 100 
Multiple 
bidders Friendly Cash only Share only Toehold % 
Initial 
agreement TGT MTB 
TGT 
Insider 
ownership 
% TGT ROE 
Runup -1 -42 1.00                     
FTSE 100 0.16** 1.00                   
Multiple bidders 0.02 0.02 1.00                 
Friendly 0.08 0.08 -0.08 1.00               
Cash only -0.04 -0.31*** -0.05 0.02 1.00             
Share only -0.17*** -0.07 -0.05 0.04 -0.36*** 1.00           
Toehold % -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.09 0.07 -0.01 1.00         
Initial agreement 0.01 0.07 -0.12 0.44*** -0.02 0.05 -0.05 1.00       
TGT MTB 0.03 0.10 0.08 -0.02 0.01 -0.09 0.06 0.00 1.00     
TGT Insider ownership % -0.09 0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.11 0.19*** -0.10 1.00   
TGT ROE 0.07 0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.07 -0.26*** 0.03 -0.06 0.27*** -0.08 1.00 
TGT Leverage 0.01 -0.01 0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.09 0.09 -0.05 0.18*** -0.09 0.11 
TGT Size -0.03 0.01 0.14** -0.12 -0.14** -0.06 -0.05 -0.12 -0.10 -0.31*** 0.21*** 
TGT FCF 0.07 0.11 0.03 -0.01 0.06 -0.34*** 0.02 -0.04 0.28*** -0.07 0.72*** 
TGT Growth 1 year -0.02 -0.11 -0.02 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.14** 0.01 0.08 -0.04 0.05 
ACQ MTB -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.31*** 0.02 0.07 
ACQ Insider ownership % -0.07 0.11 -0.09 -0.01 -0.04 0.08 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.16** -0.14** 
ACQ ROE -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.09 -0.09 -0.03 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.13 
ACQ Leverage -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.05 
ACQ Size 0.06 -0.10 0.11 -0.05 0.20*** -0.31*** -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.20*** 0.22*** 
ACQ FCF -0.14** -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.20*** 0.06 -0.04 0.02 
ACQ Board ownership £ 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03 0.11 -0.15** 0.07 
 
 
TGT 
Leverage TGT Size TGT FCF 
TGT 
Growth 1 
year ACQ MTB 
ACQ 
Insider 
ownership 
% ACQ ROE 
ACQ 
Leverage ACQ Size ACQ FCF 
ACQ Board 
ownership 
£ 
TGT Leverage 1.00                     
TGT Size 0.32*** 1.00                   
TGT FCF 0.08 0.23*** 1.00                 
TGT Growth 1 year 0.11 -0.09 0.10 1.00               
ACQ MTB -0.09 0.01 0.04 -0.01 1.00             
ACQ Insider ownership % -0.15** -0.19*** -0.12 -0.08 0.11 1.00           
ACQ ROE -0.08 0.08 0.08 -0.03 0.92*** 0.03 1.00         
ACQ Leverage -0.03 0.03 0.12 -0.04 0.69*** 0.00 0.82*** 1.00       
ACQ Size 0.19*** 0.59*** 0.26*** 0.02 0.02 -0.44*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 1.00     
ACQ FCF 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.22*** -0.14** 0.35*** 0.02 0.26*** 1.00   
ACQ Board ownership £ 0.03 0.17*** 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.26*** 0.01 1.00 
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APPENDIX B: Other statistical tests used in this thesis 
The variance inflation factor to test multicollinearity  
To test the presence of multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is used with a simple 
rule of thumb as a guiding rule whether to exclude a specific variable from regression model or 
not. Variables are excluded from the model if VIF values exceed 10. The variance inflation factor 
is according to Fox and Monette (1992), a useful diagnostic tool because it indicates directly the 
harm inflicted by collinearity on the precision of estimation of individual coefficients. The 
variance inflation factor for independent variable j, is computed as 1/[1 - p], where p is the 
multiple correlation coefficient from regressing independent variable j on all of the remaining 
independent variables. 
Durbin-Watson statistics for serial correlation of residuals 
To test whether there is any serial correlation of residuals due to possibility that certain acquirers 
dominate my sample, I will apply Durbin-Watson statistics. It is important to test for serial 
correlation, because serial correlation leads to biased OLS regression estimates if it is not taken 
into account. However, in this case Durbin-Watson statistics is more like a precautionary action, 
because pooled cross sections data is not as vulnerable to serial correlation as panel data. Durbin-
Watson test uses unstandardised residuals and for independent observations the rule of thumb is 
that test statistics should be between 1.5 and 2.5. Here is the linear regression algorithm for 
Durbin-Watson statistics: 
𝐷𝑊 =
(∑ 𝑒𝑖 − 𝑒𝑖−1
𝐼
𝑖=2 )
2
∑ 𝑒𝑖
2𝐼
𝑖=1
,                                                           (7) 
where 
𝑒𝑖 = 𝑌𝑖 − 𝑌?̂? 
Durbin-Watson statistics are applied to the results of all regression models. 
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APPENDIX C: Statistical outliers and changes in the normality of the regression 
residuals 
Table 20 – Robustness tests: Statistical outliers and changes in the normality of the regression residuals 
This table presents Shapiro-Wilk test statistics before and after removal of statistical outliers for regression models. Only those models are presented, 
which regression residuals’ normality have either increased or decreased after removal of statistical outliers. For the residuals of other models, statistical 
outliers did not have any significant impact. Year fixed effects are applied to all regressions unless otherwise specified. Asterisks ***, **, * represent 
statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
  Shapiro-Wilk test statistics 
  
Regression results   Excluding outliers 
Regression model Obs. Statistic Sig.   Obs. Statistic Sig. 
Baseline TGT Goodwill 178 0.983** 0.030   176 0.995 0.842 
U.K. GAAP Sample: TGT Goodwill 116 0.982 0.118   114 0.978* 0.055 
U.K. GAAP Sample: Goodwill approximation 116 0.980* 0.084   113 0.974** 0.028 
IFRS Sample: TGT Goodwill 80 0.916*** 0.000   79 0.966** 0.032 
IFRS Sample: Goodwill approximation 80 0.921*** 0.000   79 0.969** 0.048 
No bonus Sample: TGT Goodwill 71 0.934*** 0.001   70 0.983 0.449 
No bonus Sample: Goodwill recognised 71 0.939*** 0.002   70 0.977 0.231 
Bonus Sample: Goodwill recognised 101 0.961*** 0.005   99 0.982 0.210 
Segment: TGT Goodwill 166 0.982** 0.027   165 0.989 0.220 
HHI: TGT Goodwill 162 0.985* 0.070   161 0.990 0.341 
Segment: Goodwill approximation 166 0.985* 0.063   165 0.990 0.324 
UNA 161 0.976*** 0.006   159 0.994 0.751 
UNA winsorised 161 0.979** 0.015   159 0.995 0.826 
UNA in-sample ranked 161 0.979** 0.016   159 0.996 0.921 
ModUNA 161 0.976*** 0.007   159 0.994 0.81 
ModUNA winsorised 161 0.979** 0.016   159 0.995 0.87 
ModUNA in-sample ranked 161 0.978** 0.011   159 0.994 0.774 
Replica: TGT Goodwill, no fixed effects 179 0.953*** 0.000   175 0.986* 0.077 
Replica: Goodwill approximation, no fixed effects 179 0.957*** 0.000   176 0.983** 0.032 
Replica: Recognised goodwill, no fixed effects 179 0.957*** 0.000   176 0.985** 0.049 
Replica: TGT Goodwill 179 0.972*** 0.001   175 0.988 0.138 
Replica: Goodwill approximation 179 0.979*** 0.008   176 0.983** 0.035 
Replica: Recognised goodwill 179 0.978*** 0.006   175 0.987 0.109 
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APPENDIX D: Optimisation script used to estimate theta for IHS transformations 
An example about the script used with R integration plug-in for SPSS to estimate 𝜃 by 
optimizing Shapiro-Wilk test’s p-value, when 𝑥 is Goodwill approximation variable, is presented 
below. 
BEGIN PROGRAM R. 
casedata <- spssdata.GetDataFromSPSS() 
# Define IHS transformation 
IHS <- function(x, theta){   
  (1/theta)*asinh(theta * x)} 
#Input IHS transformation function to Shapiro-Wilk test to estimate p-value 
Shapiro.test.pvalue <- function(theta, x){  
  x <- IHS(x, theta)  
  shapiro.test(x)$p.value } 
#function used to optimise p-value of Shapiro-Wilk test 
optimise(Shapiro.test.pvalue, lower=0.0000000000001, upper=5000,x=casedata$V180, 
maximum=TRUE)   
END PROGRAM.  
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APPENDIX E: Variables transformed and employed in re-estimated regression models 
 
Table 21 – Robustness tests: Variables transformed and employed in re-estimated regression models 
This table presents variables that are transformed for each of the models that have been re-estimated to improve normality of regression residuals and 
goodness of fit. Panel A shows transformations applied and its impact on the normality of the variables in Baseline and Replica models. Theta in Panel 
A is calculated as the value, which maximizes Shapiro-Wilk test p-value by optimizing a function presented in Section 7.2.4. Theta is a scaling factor in 
Inverse Hyperbolic Sine function (IHS). Panel B shows how transformed variables are employed in regression models. Initial offer premium % in Panel 
B is defined as the final offer price minus target share price 42 days before original acquisition announcement date divided by the target share price 42 
days before original acquisition announcement date. TGT FCF is here defined as the cash flow from operations less dividends for target firm in fiscal 
year t-1 without deflating the variable with total assets. Other variables are estimated as described in Table 3. 
Panel A: The normality of variables for Baseline sample Shapiro-Wilk test statistics 
    Pre-transformation   Transformed 
Variables 
Transfor-
mation 
Theta 
θ Statistic Sig.   Statistic Sig. 
Baseline Sample transformations (N=178)       
Goodwill approximation IHS 2.75 0.502*** 0.000  0.970*** 0.001 
IFRS*Goodwill approximation IHS 2.75 0.309*** 0.000  0.736*** 0.000 
Recognised goodwill IHS 1.44 0.820*** 0.000  0.964*** 0.000 
IFRS*Recognised goodwill IHS 1.44 0.577*** 0.000  0.706*** 0.000 
TGT MTB Ln - 0.502*** 0.000   0.965*** 0.000 
TGT ROE IHS 7.53 0.523*** 0.000   0,920*** 0,000 
ACQ ROE IHS 6.68 0.433*** 0.000   0.913*** 0.000 
ACQ Leverage IHS 14.80 0.145*** 0.000   0.915*** 0.000 
IFRS Sample transformations (N=80)       
Acquisition premium IHS 2.07 0.949*** 0.003  0.979 0.217 
No bonus incentives sample (N=71)        
TGT FCF IHS 0.10 0.600*** 0.000  0.708*** 0.000 
Replica Sample transformations (N=179)       
Goodwill approximation IHS 2.44 0.491*** 0.000  0.973*** 0.001 
IFRS*Goodwill approximation IHS 2.44 0.330*** 0.000  0.784*** 0.000 
Recognised goodwill IHS 1.18 0.868*** 0.000  0.966*** 0.000 
IFRS*Recognised goodwill IHS 1.18 0.618*** 0.000  0.745*** 0.000 
TGT MTB Ln - 0.491*** 0.000  0.972*** 0.000 
ACQ MTB Ln - 0.317*** 0.000  0.951*** 0.000 
ACQ ROE IHS 6.37 0.448*** 0.000  0.933*** 0.000 
TGT Leverage IHS 45.36 0.565*** 0.000  0.893*** 0.000 
ACQ Leverage IHS 13.57 0.144*** 0.000  0.906*** 0.000 
   
Panel B: Transformed variables used in re-estimated models  
Regression model Transformed variables 
Baseline TGT Goodwill TGT MTB 
U.K. GAAP Sample: Goodwill approximation Goodwill approximation 
IFRS Sample: TGT Goodwill Acquisition premium %, TGT MTB 
IFRS Sample: Goodwill approximation Acquisition premium %, Goodwill approximation 
No bonus Sample: TGT Goodwill TGT ROE, TGT FCF, TGT MTB 
No bonus Sample: Goodwill recognised Recognised goodwill, IFRS*Recognised goodwill, TGT MTB, TGT ROE, TGT FCF 
Bonus Sample: Goodwill recognised TGT MTB, TGT ROE, ACQ ROE 
Segment: TGT Goodwill TGT MTB 
HHI: TGT Goodwill TGT MTB 
Segment: Goodwill approximation ACQ ROE, ACQ Leverage 
All Replica models TGT MTB, ACQ ROE, TGT Leverage, ACQ Leverage 
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APPENDIX F: Regression statistics for re-estimated models with variable 
transformations 
 
Table 22 – Robustness tests: Regression statistics for re-estimated models with variable transformations 
This table presents regressions statistics before and after variable transformations. Panel A presents the results of Shapiro-Wilk test. Panel B present 
Adjusted R2 and Durbin-Watson Statistics for the important models with problems in normality of regression residuals. Year fixed effects are applied to 
all regressions unless otherwise specified. Asterisks ***, **, * represent statistical significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
Panel A: The normality of regression residuals Shapiro-Wilk test statistics 
    Pre-transformation   Transformed 
Regression model Obs. Statistic Sig.   Statistic Sig. 
Baseline TGT Goodwill 178 0.983** 0.030 
 
0.990 0.268 
U.K. GAAP Sample: Goodwill approximation 116 0.980* 0.084 
 
0.991 0.691 
IFRS Sample: TGT Goodwill 80 0.916*** 0.000 
 
0.953*** 0.005 
IFRS Sample: Goodwill approximation 80 0.921*** 0.000 
 
0.948*** 0.003 
No bonus Sample: TGT Goodwill 71 0.934*** 0.001 
 
0.958** 0.017 
No bonus Sample: Goodwill recognised 71 0.939*** 0.002 
 
0.973 0.134 
Bonus Sample: Goodwill recognised 101 0.961*** 0.005 
 
0.980 0.118 
Segment: TGT Goodwill 166 0.982** 0.027 
 
0.989 0.227 
HHI: TGT Goodwill 162 0.985* 0.070 
 
0.991 0.428 
Segment: Goodwill approximation 166 0.985* 0.063 
 
0.987 0.119 
Replica: TGT Goodwill, no fixed effects 179 0.953*** 0.000 
 
0.964*** 0.000 
Replica: Goodwill approximation, no fixed effects 179 0.957*** 0.000 
 
0.969*** 0.001 
Replica: Recognised goodwill, no fixed effects 179 0.957*** 0.000 
 
0.968*** 0.000 
Replica: TGT Goodwill 179 0.972*** 0.001 
 
0.980** 0.012 
Replica: Goodwill approximation 179 0.979*** 0.008 
 
0.987* 0.087 
Replica: Recognised goodwill 179 0.978*** 0.006 
 
0.985** 0.048 
      
  
    
Panel B: Adjusted R2 and Durbin-Watson Statistics Other statistics 
    Pre-transformation   Transformed 
Regression model Obs. Adjusted R2 DWS   Adjusted R2 DWS 
Baseline TGT Goodwill 178 0.688 2.535   0.685 2.481 
U.K. GAAP Sample: Goodwill approximation 116 0.696 2.251   0.705 2.354 
IFRS Sample: TGT Goodwill 80 0.464 2.632   0.495 2.617 
IFRS Sample: Goodwill approximation 80 0.458 2.671   0.463 2.681 
No bonus Sample: TGT Goodwill 71 0.658 2.552   0.699 2.487 
No bonus Sample: Goodwill recognised 71 0.678 2.475   0.718 2.491 
Bonus Sample: Goodwill recognised 101 0.593 2.484   0.561 2.551 
Segment: TGT Goodwill 166 0.688 2.534   0.686 2.454 
HHI: TGT Goodwill 162 0.678 2.574   0.690 2.513 
Segment: Goodwill approximation 166 0.667 2.515   0.665 2.506 
Replica: TGT Goodwill, no fixed effects 179 0.260 2.209   0.272 2.051 
Replica: Goodwill approximation, no fixed effects 179 0.180 2.109   0.162 2.010 
Replica: Recognised goodwill, no fixed effects 179 0.175 2.116   0.172 1.974 
Replica: TGT Goodwill 179 0.300 2.388   0.322 2.223 
Replica: Goodwill approximation 179 0.240 2.339   0.213 2.204 
Replica: Recognised goodwill 179 0.235 2.356   0.234 2.215 
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